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The Crowning Phase in the Critical Philosophy—a Study in Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment.

P R E F A C E .
This little work is.sufficiently described as a study in 
Kant's Critique of Judgment. But I have made extensive use 
of Kant's other writings, and perhaps it would be more accurate 
to say that the Critique of Judgment is made the basis in an 
interpretation of Kant's entire system, with a view to express­
ing the highest standpoint of his thought. The title of so 
small a work may seem somewhat pretentious, but it is chosen 
to indicate the author's opinion that Kant's Theory of 
Knowledge, is not completely understood, until we have followed 
it as it passes into the last phase of his system. An essen­
tial problem in this study is naturally the relation between 
Aesthetic and Teleology. This problem is the distinctive 
feature in the Critique of Judgment, and must be taken as a 
serious contribution to philosophy. Our best authority for 
this point of view is Kant's own mental history, as it is given 
in his correspondence and academic lectures. To Judge from 
the trend of recent speculation, the Critique of Judgment is 
about to come into its kingdom for the second time, and this . 
very conjunction of Aesthetic and Teleology, which has been 
for so long neglected as a literary enigma, will become the 
natural formula for the philosophy of the twentieth century.
It should be remarked here that, coincident with the motive 
of the work, the treatment of Aesthetic has only been under­
taken in so far as it was strictly necessary as the typical 
illustration of Kant's metaphysical position, and no preten­
sion whatsoever is made to a knowledge of art—criticism. It 
was inevitable in a study which seeks to commend Kant to the 
modem mind, that some attempt should have been made to bring 
him into line with recent philosophers. In particular, the 
influence of M. Bergson will be noticed. But it would be 
unfair to say that I have read into Kant ideas which are
foreign to his own. In point of fact, I arrived at my own 
interpretation of Kant before I had read M. Bergson's works. 
Mr. Creed Meredith's recent book on Kant's Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment, did not come into my hands until after 
the manuscript was sent to the publishers.
My chief obligations are due to the works of Caird, 
Adamson, Basch, Cohen and Stadler. I wish to take this 
opportunity of thanking Professor Boutroux of Paris, for 
his kind courtesy in directing me to the French literature 
on the subject. The second chapter originally appeared in 
Mind, and is here reprinted with some additions by the 
editor's permission. The generous appreciation which 
Professor Stout incidentally expressed for this article, was 
a strong encouragement to proceed in an undertaking for 
which I felt myself to be increasingly incompetent. I have 
also to thank my brother, Rev. E. Macmillan, B.D., of Pretoria, 
for reading the whole of the manuscript in type and for 
suggesting many improvements in the text.
It only remains to add, that the important part in the
was
actual process of writing/completed under circumstances of 
peculiar difficulty. It was a serious interruption to my 
work when I was called to Johannesburg, and I had to take up 
the broken threads under very unfavourable conditions. Not 
to speak of the initial incubus of an altitude of nearly 
6000 feet, and the care of a new Parish in a new country, I 
was fain to put off my shoes from my feet and go softly to 
make believe that gold-reef was transcendental ground. I 
have also, in consequence, been deprived of the assistance 
which I should have sought from my University Professors and 
other experts in this particular subject of study, just at 
the moment when their help was most needed. Professor 
Hoernle of Cape Town kindly consented to read the manuscript, 
but at the last moment found himself unable to do so and it
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was then too late to look elsewhere. I have thus been work­
ing in the dark from the beginning, and it is not wonderful 
if the book is an easy prey to criticism. But if the critic 
knew the sincere modesty and hesitation with which this volume 
is launched into the world of letters, he would lay aside his 
gory spear and enter the field with a sword of lath. I have 
at least the satisfaction which every author feels who writes 
to any purpose, that I have seen more than I have been able to
express, and may console myself with the lines of Propertius:
*
Quod si deficiant vires, audacia certe 
Laus erit: in magnis et voluisse sat est.
R. A. C. Macmillan.
J ohannesburg.
Jan. 11th. 1912.
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C H A P T E R 1.
By Rev. R. A. C. Macmillan, 
Johannesburg.
1 THE SEARCH FOR A NEW PRINCIPLE”.
Chapter 1.
Perhaps it is not remarkable that what is in many respects 
the highest achievement of an author, should have received 
SO; little attention. There is no. ground of comparison bet­
ween the colossal literature which has grown around Kant’s 
criticism of Theory and Practice and his criticism of Peeling, 
which is the subject of our study. While in Prance and even 
in Germany the literature is mean, there is not yet in English 
a single book expressly devoted to the Critique of Judgment in 
its entire range. Two. reasons may be found for this apparent 
want of interest. There can be no reasonable doubt, that Kant's 
greatest and most fruitful work is the Cfritique of Pure Reason. 
The natural failing to extol opr chosen subject of study as 
the author's greatest work, can have no, place here. There is 
no. other of the great philosophers, except Plato., whose writing 
warms the brain with the same intellectual glow. The forbidd­
ing style, the uncouth language, the interminable periods and 
continual contradictions, yield the same pleasure to the 
strenuous thinker as the perilous ascent to, the mountain-
climber. And they who have gained a summit in Kant's labori-
£
o.us thought shall never forget the c/arity o.f vision, merged 
in the opal haze o.f the infinite vo.id. This is his most 
original work, and it is not surprising if it has absorbed the 
minds o.f philosophers. It. is the mould in which his spirit 
was cast for all time, and no. study of Kant will be effective 
which does not make continual reference to its contents. The 
second reason is. connected with the nature of the problem in 
the Critique of Judgment. Evidently Kant is less easily 
master of the situation. His aesthetic theory, which makes 
up the greater part o.f the book, is no.t nearly so. original as 
it appears to. be. He gathered his ideas from many different f
2.
sources. From Hume he learned the subjective character of 
Aesthetic; the influence of Shaftesbury and Hutchison, who 
taught a community of nature in the Beautiful and^the G-o.od, i.s 
very marked in his ’Observations on the Beautiful and the 
Sublime', and appears later in his moral Ideal; the concep­
tion of the Ideal he learnt from Winckelmann1s researches In­
to. Greek Plastic, while Baumgarten and Gerard supplied him 
with the theory of Genius. It is not suggested that in the 
third Critique originality is displaced by an eclectic tendency. 
Never was there a thinker more severely independent. And 
though he gladly availed himself of foreign ideas, they must 
first pass through the alembi.c of his own mind. As he wrote 
to Herz in October 1790, he felt less inclined every day
to. accept from others the speculative setting of their Ideas, 
and must follow the track which his thought has cut out for it- 
self during many years. [^Briefwechsel: Kirchmann, p. 439 7J 
But there is an evident want of fitness in the speculative form 
he has given to the material he collected and developed. In 
the programme of his lectures fon the winter-session of 
1765 - 66, he proposes to. give some notice to the criticism of 
Taste in connection with the study of Logic;2 pHartenstein TT~, 
p. 518-5192 and from that time onwards he elaborated, from 
various sources, in his lectures on Logic and Anthropology 
which are now being published in the standard edition of the 
Prussian Academy, practically all that he has to. say on Aesthetic 
in the Critique of Judgment, These discussions were undertaken 
apparently without any definite systematic intention. But 
when he came to. write the third Critique, the mould of his mind 
had been already fixed in the Critique of Pure Reason, and he 
he felt bound t-e., in the interest o.f unity, to impose this 
speculative fo.rm on his/a<^ sthetical ideas. The result co.uld 
only be disappointing. It was different with the Critique of
1 2
Briefweohsel; Kir^chmann, p.459 Hartenstein 11, p.518-519.
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Pure Reason, In spite of its artificial structure, there is 
a certain natural affinity of form and content, and a great 
part of its originality consists in the marvellous symmetry 
of metho.d with which its ideas are developed. But in the 
Critique of Judgment the old skins are bursting because the
wine is new,j; and we are losing both. And there is a
f
further complication which adds to the difficulty. Under the 
influence of Baumgarten and Gerard, Kant came to see that the 
aesthetic consciousness, as it is most perfectly expressed 
in Genius, is a harmony of mental activities, and might there­
fore be called a kind of Teleology. By the year 1787, as he 
indicates in his letter to. Reinho.ld, his intention was to 
write a book exclusively on Taste which he identified witht'his 
subjective Teleology, not as a logical judgment but as a 
psychological process. Meanwhile, in his anthropological, 
studies, he had become interested in the origin of species, 
and in the following year, 1788, published a short essay on 
the use of.the teleo.logical principle. This, of course, is 
a very different kind of Teleology from the former. It is a 
logical judgment, and while it may be also, partly a harmony 
of o.ur mental states, its distinctive character as Teleology 
consists in having a predicate of purpose. In the one case 
o.ur mental states are purposive, in the other it is their con­
tent or meaning that is purposive, and it is the predicate in 
our judgment upon things which have teleology in themselves, 
namely, organisms. How Kant had no clear idea of bringing 
these two. forms of Teleology under a common principle, by the
time he wrote to Reinhold. Erdmann is decided on this point.1 ■#
This is dope for the first time in the two. introductions, the 
original form of which must, have been cast not later than 1789. 
What helped Kant to make up his mind was the unfinished problem
[Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft. Einleitung, pe
4.
in the Critique o.f Pure Reason. There he had developed the
principle of the specification of Nature into classes and
•**
kinds. This principle naturally take/i cognisance of organ- 
isms, for the first specification of Nature ip: into, organic 
and inorganic. But, at the same time, it .does not pretend to. 
discover the real purpose oy final unity in things, and i#
’t
only undertaken for our own sakes in order to complete the
unity of oju.r Knowledge. It. is therefore a Subjective
Teleology which fulfils a purpose of our oym in maintaining
the harmony of our mental states. Here, then, Is a principle 
• /*»
• '■■■. ..
which can unite , under the comprehensive name, Reflective 
Judgment, the two. distinct Kinds o,f Teleology. At first 
sight it is almost incredible that a serious writer should 
have dreamt of forcing a marriage between such unwilling partie 
It practically means uniting such divergent forms of ex­
perience as Art and Science under a common principle.
Probably this extraordinary connection of ideas is the chief 
reason for the comparative neglect which the Critique of 
Judgment has suffered. And Kant himself seems to. have lost 
all consciousness of the connection.
But the intellectual charm of the book consists precisely 
in its paradox. Our curiosity is stimulated and maintained 
in seeking to. understand as a natural relation what is apparent 
ly a tour de force. And I hope to. show, before we have
thSiw
finished,^what Kant blindly approved in a fit of literary des­
peration, is justified on Cromwell’s principle that a man 
never mounts so. high as when he does not know where he is going 
Besides, the Critique of Judgment has unquestioned importance 
in the history of literary criticism. It gave formal ex­
pression to. the spirit of the Romantic movement, and placed 
Aesthetic, for the first time, on a genuine philosophical basis 
It is true that Kant was incapable of appreciating the literary 
movement of his age, He lived in the middle of the ’Sturm 
und Drang’, but was only sensible of what he regarded as
5.
reprehensible features, an untempered lust for novelty and 
extravagance in fanciful expression.. He thought deeply about 
Genius and was a genius himself, but failed to. recognise it 
in G-o.ethe. His attjjitude to Schiller was naturally different.
i'
He acknowledged in him a kindred spirit and made light of the 
differences between them, so. long as he remained his disciple 
But when Schiller rose to Goethe's expectations, he fell o.ut 
of the sphere .of Kant's sympathies. And still it is true, 
to use Windelband's expression, that the great philosopher 
constructed the poetical idea of Goethe, notwithstanding his 
remoteness from the spirit of his time. The Critique of 
Judgment is also of capital importance for the influence it 
exercised on the subsequent development of philosophy and 
theology. Schelling made it the basis of his system, and 
gave to aesthetic intuition as the reconciling medium of Nature 
and Spirit, that substantive existence which Kant had denied 
to it; and from Schelling i.t passed into. Hegel who has much 
less to. say in criticism on the third Critique than on the 
other two.. Contemporary with the Romantic and Pantheistic 
tendency in philosophy, the foundation of mo.dern theology was 
laid at the beginning of last century by Schleief^maoher.
Kant's Reflective Judgment as independent, subjective, in­
dividual,. experience but at the same time self-approying, 
communicable and capable of universal validity, is the natural, 
parent of the great theologian's religious intuition, as the 
feeling o.f simple dependence on the supersensible Ground, a 
feeling which is neither theoretical nor practical but akin to 
and inclusive of aesthetic experience. Later the Werturteil 
of Ritschl is a specification of the Urtei1skraft: and even
Pragmatism, if its feelings were less arrogant and more 
sensitive to. the discipline of Religion and Art, co.uld put in 
a small claim for the rich inheritance.
[Note to 'Religion within the limits of Reason alone!
Abbott, Kant's1 Ethics.1 p. 330]
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But apart from its historical connections, the Critique of 
Judgment' is the high-water mark in the system of* Critical 
Philosophy itself, and may indeed be called its crowning phase.
We lose its significance if we only consider i.t as an episodical 
treatment of what lay o.utside Kant’s proper study. It con­
tains a further development of principles without which it is 
hardly possible to. interpret, with some measure of fairness and 
appreciation, his theory of Knowledge. While the second edi­
tion of the first. Critique, notwithstanding its polemical aim, 
is a reply to Kant himself rather than to. his critics, the 
Critique of Judgment, which is also, polemical with a different 
intention, as Schlapp has shown, contains a further criticism
o.n Kant's own position, and might be called the third edition. 
Although the peculiar form which the problem eventually assumed 
is very obscure to. explain, the problem itself lay in the trend 
of Kant’s thinking and arose quite naturally in the course of 
his reflections, as an extension of our hypothetical Knowledge.
In its simplest terms Kant's position may be stated as follows . 
There are in the human mind two distinct types of apprehension, 
Understanding and Reason- The faculty of Knowledge, in the 
common perception of scientist and ordinary consciousness alike, 
by which we delimit Nature into, a geographical world, arranged
in space and succeeding in periods of time, is the Understanding.
Its characteristic objects are incomplete unities which are 
dependent for their boundaries on their relations to. each other. 
It is not necessary for o.ur present purpose to1 specify Sensibili­
ty as a third and distinct, faculty of mind, for the Understanding
as Kant finally conceived it is organised sense-perception.
Reason is ah intuitive power, which comes to the clearest ex­
pression in its typical form as moral consciousness. It is not 
able to. specify its objects in the diversity of their relations 
but it does perceive their completed unity. These two faculties, 
the discursive and intuitive, always tend to. appropriate each 
other’s merits. The Understanding is vaguely dissatisfied with
the aggregate unities of i.t.s objects whose parts are exter­
nally related, and continuously but vainly aspires to com-
ly ,f
pleteness. Reason, likewise, is not always content to. dw-ell 
in sanctuary, and seeks to. make plain the mystical and indivisi­
ble perception of Duty by explanations which Understading alone
can approve. These two tendencies meet in a third mode of
i's 'In-
apprehension, the Theoretical Reason, which differently an ex-
A
tension of Understanding in its effort to. become intuitive, and
is
an extension of Reason, which.properly and only practical, when 
it becomes discursive. There is the advantage in this manner 
of statement that it resolves the ambiguity of meaning in 
Reason as two, distinct functions, theoretical and practical, which 
Kant does not notice or explain.
Now the Understanding, though itself a discursive appre­
hension o.f parts in their discreteness, is based op. an intuitive 
principle. For in order to. grasp the parts in relation at all, 
their unity must, at least be thought. We are not indeed able 
to, perceive Nature as a whole and therefore no, object in the 
complete conditions of* its existence. The relativity of human 
Knowledge means that all our explanations of o.bjects are ex­
traneous to themselves and unending. There is, therefore, no 
question here of unity in the object itself. But that they 
should be connected fop us at all, we must furnish that unity 
to. the parts of an object which is necessary to, the conscious­
ness of o.ur own identity. The fundamental principle, then,
0.f Understanding is itself an ranalytic proposition’ , the 
immediate consciousness of a unity which is indivisible. But
1.t. is precisely the complete sum of conditions which exhausts 
the existence of an object that Understanding, in its extended 
form as Theorej^ tical Reason, requires; the intuitive principle 
must not only be felt as the anticipative idea o.f unity but 
must be maintained until it becomes the perception of a whole 
whose parts are all transparent. This attitude of mind, which
may be called the inductive, is quite distinct frojn the other 
two., as its logical prototype shows. Kant indeed, in keeping 
with his general scheme, would seem to. derive the Ideas of Theore­
tical Reason from the deductive syllogism, while the Understand­
ing i.s modelled on the logical judgment. But we know very well 
how wooden these pro.crustean fabrications are, and how frequent­
ly Kant’s meaning is obscured by his method. In fact,the 
notions of Understanding take their character from the whole 
procedure of deductive reasoning, as Kant acknowledges when he 
opposes the discursive nature of Understanding to. the intuitive 
in the Critique of Judgment. And i.t is not the deductive 
syllogism that prefigures the Ideas of Reason, but the prosyllo­
gism which leads us backwards in a train of reasoning to. the 
unconditioned major premiss. Deduction proceeds through epi- 
syllogisms, by taking the conclusion in the preceding syllogism 
as the major premiss in that which follows, until it has ex­
hausted the entire range of consequences. But it is the totali­
ty of conditions and not the consequences that the prosyllogism 
seeks to. determine; and what is in question is. the major premiss, 
the truth o.f which is assumed in the deductive syllogism.
Taking the major premiss, then, as the conclusion, we try to con­
struct a new syllogism in which the major premiss is less con­
ditioned, and so. ascend through syllogism to. syllogism until we 
reach, if possible,.a premiss that is self-evident and needs no.
~j
further qualification. The value of this inductive method is
that it combines the discursive process of Understanding with the
~ing
intuition of Reason. Understand^fs the Khowledge of related 
perceptions circumscribed by a certain unity of form which is 
called the object, whose limits, however, are quite arbitrary 
and subject to. incessant change, as the piece of wax loses its 
rigidity and becomes a fluid mass in the presence of heat. The 
political divisions of the same continent on maps which represent
1 Critique of Pure Reason: Meiklejohn p.251.
different periods of history, is a good illustration of the
fluctuating boundaries which define the objects of Understand-
inge And it resembles the deductive syllogism in assuming the
0
validity of the piqfvisional system within which its attention 
is confined, as if all the conditions were present which make 
up the existence of the object. Bht only so, many conditions 
are present as are needful for immediate perception, and there­
fore what is actual for the Understanding cannot be the object 
itself but only the relations* Reason, again, may be said to 
have its type in the final moment of the inductive process
J  /  I \s *
)• when the absolute premisses (' )
are discoyered. We are speaking of the time before the laws
of inductive inference were formulated, and in the absence of
(X.
these methodical rules, we p upon our first truths, as 
Aristotle believed, more or less contingently. With the same 
appearance of suddenness our moral convictions dawn upon us, 
and no analysis of ^ ibtives will ever make explicit the mystical
voice of Duty* It is"the intuition of an analytic unity in
the sense that it cam never be complete^ specified, and there­
fore what is actual for Reason is the unity and not the diver­
sity, for this is only ideal. Waiving for the moment the 
extreme formalism in Kant’s Ethics, hfs fundamental principle 
is ultimately sound* The motives into, which we are able to 
resolve a moral act, make up so. inconsiderable a part of the 
total conditions which are necessary to originate such an act, 
as to be practically negligible in view of a complete explana­
tion. This double limitation in our^hbory and Piekfttice is~ ' y ■ !
transcended, it would seem, in Theoretical Reason* It employs 
the intuition of Reason as practical in aspiring to. a perception 
of totality, but at the same time, unlike Reason and in 
furtherance of the Understanding, it seeks to enumerate dis­
cursively the particular conditions which in their sum make up 
this total unity. Both Understanding and Reason are abstract 
forms of apprehension, the former having a relatively coherent
content without an o b j e c t ,  the latter having a complete
object without any content at all. Reason has intuitions
o.f* God, the Soul and Immortality, but these are so. remote from
a
the conditions of existence, that it must, assume the role o.f 
Theoretical Reason to. give them articulate expression in the 
form of Ideas; and in the degree that these Ideas are able to 
supply the total conditions o.f existence, the intuitions of 
Reason will be actual as well as possible and so. become 
necessary. Thus if we were able to. have a complete insight 
into, the nature of man, immortality would follow as a necessary 
attribute of his being; and, conversely, the intuition of 
immortality would no. longer be an abstract thought without con­
tent, but the perception of a real quality o.f existence in the 
complexity of its relations as they are known by Understanding. 
Similarly the Understanding appropriates these intuitions of 
Reason, and uses them as guiding Ideas in order to present its 
fragmentary perceptions in their completeness. Theoretical 
Reason, then, is more concrete than either Understanding or 
Reason, and it should mean that the tale of existence is complete­
ly told. But this is not the case. The Knowledge of Under­
standing as it is extended by Theoretical Reason is only 
hypothetical, and if taken in earnest, leads to, illusion.
In the end as in the beginning, the complete unity which alone 
deserves the name of object is merely ideal, and the initial 
feeling of unity, with which the Understanding sets out in 
constructing experience, appears in its final form as the dis­
tended bladder of its own- enthusiasm, which at a touch may pop 
into, vacuity. We must remind ourselves, however, that Kant 
is talking at a very high level. He does not mean that our • 
efforts to. give an exhaustive explanation are illusive, but 
only that we are in danger of illusion when we forget our 
limitations. This hypothetical Knowledge has for its results 
such excellent and useful information as the classification
11.
of Nature into genera and species, what we should call to. day 
the contents of the special sciences. But fop a transcend­
ental philosopher, this Knowledge does not touch the root of 
the matter. In Kant's opinion, no. science will ever be able 
to get beyond appearances. There is a limit %p o.ur intensive 
perception, while its extensive range is boundless. We pass 
through an interminable maze of facts, and not a single fact 
is exhaustively explained. And Science deludes itself often 
in thinking that it is exploiting the secret of existence when 
it is only spreading itself oyer a vast area. . The agnostic 
tendency, however, in contemporary Science, is hardly in 
danger of this error.
The reason for this restriction is due to a defect in 
the constitution of our minds. When we analyse a piece of 
Knowledge, we discover that there is something given beyond 
what we contribute. This is sensation. Kant sets out with 
the position that sensations are produced in us by an unknown, 
supersensible, thing, and are passively received; and although 
he considerably modifies this dopt.rine in what is known as' 
the Subjective Deduction, he never quits hold of its impli­
cations. In the first instance, sensations are described as 
a manifold of unrelated impressions which are simply given 
from without, and what makes them our own as possible elements 
in Knowledge is o.ur form of Sensibility in the pure representa­
tion of Space. In the Aesthetic Kant speaks of Space as if 
it were the object of a pure perception and therefore a priori. 
and he puts forward as a chief argument that sensation would 
lose all.its quality as having relation to something outside 
of us, and would be nothing more than a subjective feeling or 
idea, without the presupposition of Space. No. element of 
perception can be imagined which has not a spatial quality, 
"although we can quite readily think of space as empty of 
objects"1; we must therefore have an antecedent perception
1 Transcendental Aesthetic; Watson’s Selections, p.2 4-2 5 .
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of empty Space, to. account for that quality of 'outness' and 
external relation to. each other which we observe in sensations 
as they enter into, consciousness. Evidently Kant has here 
anticipated his propf in the Analytic, and already finds an 
ordered physical world in the pure form of Sensibility. If 
this view of Space were so.und, the problem o.f Knowledge would 
lose its meaning. But it is quite as difficult to. think of 
an empty space without any objects as to think o.f objects which 
are not in space. And not only is the argument invalid, it 
is conflicting with Kant’s primary intention. His real propf 
is based on the established science of Geometry, which shows 
that we have the power of constructing relations in space 
according to. o.ur own conception of what those relations should 
be, and therefore may be said to, have an a priori perception 
of the nature of space by which the process of construction is 
controlled. It is quite misleading, then, to. speak of Space 
as a perception, and we ought rather to say that it is a power 
o.f perception; and in the opening passage of the Aesthetic, 
Kant defines his problem as ’the capacity for receiving 
representations”, which we call Sensibility^. It must there­
fore be said, and probably this is Kant's real position, that 
Space as a perception is inseparable from sensation and arises 
simultaneously. His view of sensation as an unrelated mani­
fold of impressions, which are then for the first time arranged 
in our pure perception of empty space, i.s contradicted by his 
own admission further o.n, that sensations have degrees and 
therefore dimensional quality. Or if we refuse to. introduce
©
the conception of quantity into sensation, and prefer to. say 
with M. Bergson that degree in sensation means a more or less 
extended area of affection, it is all the more certain that 
sensations have no. meaning for us unless they have the qualifi­





Aesthetic on Space as an object of perception, i^ his anxiety 
to define Sense and Thought as quite distinct faculties..
But in the Analytic. this motive, which was taken over from 
the Dissertation of 1770, naturally fades into the background.
All that he had wished to prove was that Space as a form of our 
perception renders Subjective the primary qualities of extension 
and figure, and that therefore the objects of perception are 
only phenomena and not things in themselves. But since the 
Analytic shows that nothing can become an element in perception 
without the activity of thought*',, the insistence on Space as 
a priori perception in its own right is no longer necessary, for 
now all the qualities of matter, primary and secondary, exten­
sion and figure as well as impenetrability, hardness and colour, 
are mental. Space itself is a construction due to the synthetic 
activity of thought, and what is a -priori in our perception of 
Space can only be the original apprehension of the relations to 
be constructed. Accordingly, Kant now says that, without this 
mental synthesis, which is alone able to hold things together in 
the identity of one and the same unity, "not even the simplest 
and most elementary idea of space or time could arise in my 
consciousness"^. Perhaps some of the confusion, which in­
evitably attends a discussion on this elusive subject, will be 
avoided if we say, that Kant reversed somewhat the order of the 
problem as it had appealed to Berkeley. The problem for 
Berkeley was: granted that the secondary qualities of matter,
which are due to sensation, are mental, to prove that the primary 
qualities are likewise mental. Kant, on the other hand, appears 
to take it thus: granted that our apprehension of Space is in­
dependent of experience, as Geometry conclusively shows, and 
that therefore the primary qualities are mental, to prove that 
the secondary qualities, which are due to sensation, are like­
wise mental. This may seem strange, but it is a fair statement 
1
Watson: Selections, p. 59.
of Kant's position; and though, he riddles, the independent 
existence of sensation "by showing that nothing can enter into 
consciousness without the synthesis of thought, he reverts to 
his original view and maintains it to the end, as we shall 
presently see.
Synthesis, then, is the paramount factor in Knowledge.,
The connection of elements in perception, which is the dis­
tinctive feature in Knowledge, could not even he imagined un­
less the relations among things were considered as held to­
gether in the unity of a conscious mind. That there should 
be relation's at all., means that a plurality of elements are 
perceived by an identical mind, which abides,- one and the same 
throughout succeeding impressions. But when Kant was rightly 
advised by his critics that, his doctrine would only account 
for a purely subjective world, confined to the individual mind, 
he replied in the second edition of the Critique by pointing 
out that synthesis is not self-explaining and involves a 
circular argument. Kant believed in good faith that this is 
not a vicious circle, and though it must be admitted that his 
reply is as much a criticism on his own position, particularly 
his doctrine of sensation^ as an answer to his critics, we are 
able to credit his intention when we consider the peculiar 
nature of.his problem. The ordinary mind knows the difference 
between stable objects and illusions and distinguishes them as 
reality and appearance. To this Kant would say: Retain this
distinction, but remember that the medium in which it is made 
is itself phenomenal. He sought, then, to interpose this 
phenomenal medium, as what is mental states and something more, 
between the realm of subjective illusion, which exists only 
for the individual, mind, and Reality which exists for itself. 
And his proof is, that if consciousness is the source of 
relations, consciousness itself presupposes a fixed order of 
relations. Let it be granted that we know nothing except 
our mehtal states., we can only be conscious of ourselves in a
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succession of mental states, and if these didnot succeed in 
a certain fixed order, our consciousness of the preceding 
states would drop out of memory before we reached the others, 
and at each moment we should be confined to an isolated percep­
tion and lose our own identity altogether. There must there­
fore be an objective ground in sensations which informs them 
with that connection which is necessary to the consciousness of 
ourselves. Of that ground we can say nothing more than that it 
is there, and mark the spot with an algebraical sign. This is 
what Kant calls the Transcendental Object.
This transcendental object is on no account to be confused 
with the thing in itself. As every student of Kant knows, 
'transcendental' has always for him the suggestion of immanence, 
while the supersensible Thing is completely transcendent. It 
may be a very subtle distinction and hard to define, but it was 
quite sufficient for Kant's purpose. He wanted, in fact, to 
return to his original view of sensation. What gives rise to 
sensations in us is this supersensible Thing, not indeed as 
cause for then it would be a term in our Knowledge, but as in­
determinate ground. And sensations in themselves are quite 
independent and have no necessity for our Understanding, or 
as he phrases it in the Critique, of Judgment, the particular is 
contingent for the universal of our Understanding. I do not 
think there can be any doubt of the exact parallel., in this 
connection, between Kant and Plato. In the Philebus the 
phenomenal world is composed of two factors, the Indeterminate 
( To oCTTecfp i/ ) an(j ^6 Limit ( T& nrepckS ). pirg-k
corresponds to the contingent material of sensation, the second 
to the transcendental object. Then the cause of the Mixture, 
and not the Limit'1', is what answers to the Ideas of Plato's
1 ; /
•..To equate the with the Ideas, as. e.g. Ritchie does
1(Plato, p.117.), would identify the Ideas with a purely 
quantitative conception. In favour of the view we have 
adopted, ^iSf’the causal relation of Ideas to particulars
^ ^ ^ 1 0 0 %  ft " T M T t L  7H* y i y r s T «
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earlier doctrine, and the Ideas are Kant's things in themselves, 
/v Since the Indeterminate has a nature of its own, the resulting
mixture can only have a relative necessity. Phenomena are 
not indeed representations confined to an individual mind, for 
consciousness implies a fixed order in representations, and 
we are therefore limited by the obligation to think in a cer­
tain way which is universally valid for all minds. But this 
necessary connection in Knowledge does not affect the original 
factor in sensations themselves. Kant only means that, to 
be our objects, sensations must have a certain limit imposed 
upon them in order that we may be conscious of our own identity, 
and all he wants to prove is that they are only our objects or 
phenomena.
The consequences of this position now easily follow. The 
primary element in sensation, of which we can only speak as a 
presentation to consciousness, is not perceived by us as it is 
in itself. We could only have a real perception if the total 
conditions which make up a presentation were present to con­
sciousness. . But, as it^ ippears to us, a presentation contains 
no more than the minimum conditions, which are necessary for 
the perception of ourselves as an abiding unity in a permanent 
order of relations. It may indeed be true, though Kant's 
theory would deprive even this assumption of security, that the 
limited series of conditions which we perceive are a real part 
of the presentation, as the initial members in an infinite 
series of numbers may be judged to be continuous with the last 
term. But we are never able to follow the terms in- such a 
series to infinity, and to do this a completely different order 
of perception from ours would be required. This is what the 
Understanding makes its ambition in its role as Theoretical 
Reason, but all that it succeeds in procuring is an ideal sum 
to n terms, which is a very different thing. The qualification 
that the conditions appear to us in consciousness seems to 
constitute them into a different series, and the inference then 
follows, that a perception, or a judgment of fact, contains no 
more than the minimum of categorical truth contributed by the
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original shock of* sensation, as it is expressed in the com­
pletely abstract and indeterminate judgment, ‘something is*.
Kant frequently speaks in the Aesthetic of empirical judgments
'•and
as if they were immediate^self-evident, and in our easier 
language this means, that in simple perception we are. in touch 
with actual fact and that our judgment is true without further 
condition. But this is denied in the Analytic. which... shows. 
that all. judgments of fact are hypothetical. We are. in touch 
with, fact indeed, Kant would say, hut only under the form of 
our perception; ag. Mill afterwards maintained, the matter of 
sensation, which occasions our first contact with Reality, is 
not affected by our consciousness. Presentation is therefore 
not itself perception, hut a suggestion whichkis constructed 
hy o.ur thoughts, into that diluted kind of perception, which 
we .call appearance. We quite mistake Kant's meaning, however, 
if we think, as the reason for this conclusion, that the 
supersensible Thing cannot appear. I wish to insist on this 
point because it is of the first importance to the Critique of 
Judgment, which has for its problem, from one point of view, 
whether and to what extent the Supersensible can enter the 
realm of appearance, without impairing its quality. Where 
Kant prefers to lay all the blame is on the entire structure 
of our minds, not simply as Understanding, but also in their 
function as Practical Reason. Both in our Theory and Practice
the same defect is exhibited. It is not that the Supersensi­
ble is inherently incapable of appearing, but that our minds 
are not adapted for pure perception. This admission is made 
of practical Intellect in the Critique of Judgment j 76.
Like the Understanding, it supposes two different orders of 
existence, the actual and the possible. The recognition of 
commands implies a distinction between what ought to be and 
what is. We are so made that we can think relations which 
are, not actual, and enact moral decisions which cannot become 
effective until they are realised in sensible conditions.
For a higher order of mind there would he no such distinction; 
what is thinkable would be a necessary perception, and a 
possible determination of will would also be actual just be­
cause it is good. The Will, however, is in its very nature 
more happily equipped than Intellect, and it is not without 
just reason that Kant gives it the primacy. To a certain ex­
tent, it is able to overcome this dualism by procuring its own 
sensible conditions. Volition is the concentration of the 
mind on an idea which it has united with itself completely and 
not in part, as happens when we only wish to understand, and 
this continuous effort of attention can originate presentations 
in the motor continuum, without waiting on corresponding 
changes in the sensory continuum. We can will to believe that 
we shall recover from an illness, and in many instances we do 
recover, because the nerve-centres have been instructed to ini­
tiate those sensible conditions, which would otherwise require 
to be passively supplied. But our success only'reminds us of 
our defect, for it is achieved through a laboured process, and 
is not immediate as it should be in a mind for whom the possible 
is inherently actual. The Understanding too, realises the 
same measure of success when it unites with the Will, in that 
©ixed practice which we may call pragmatical activity. But 
in itself if is particularly helpless, for the creative power 
which it does envince in synthesis, has only application to 
possible relations and none whatever to actual conditions„
And what spoils the Understanding is just this want of sustain­
ed attention, of which even the Will is only capable by an 
extraordinary expenditure of effort. Whenever a presentation 
occurs, we inevitably wander away from il# and begin to think 
of something else, because we can make nothing of itself„
What is given is a mere blank point of sensation which we must 
think discursively by means of 'wandering adjectives* . To 
make it intelligible at all, we are driven to think if first 
in the most general terms and then advance to more conditioned
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thoughts, striving at each successive step to apperceive its 
meaning, "by affiliating it more and more closely to our notions 
of possible experience. What controls this process throughout 
are schemata, abstract thoughts which are the dynamic in all 
our thinking and have a natural tendency to what is actual.
But they never do become actual of themselves; not even as 
sensuous images can we perceive them. In Kant's somewhat 
artificial language, schemata have only the form of what is 
actual, and are nothing more than possible representations until 
they are applied to the matter of sensation. We are able, how­
ever, to detect their presence in the process by which we ad­
vance from thoughts which are relatively unconditioned to 
those which are more conditioned, until we finally reach those 
notions of similar presentations in our past experience, which 
are mgst nearly akin to what would now fain hold our attention. 
But clearly this is thinking the presentation in terms of others. 
Like the bee which goes from flower to flower, we gather our 
Knowledge discursively and never exhaust a single presentation. 
Instead of dwelling on what is actual until it tells us its 
story, we dissipate perception in external relations. To be 
inherently perceptive the Understanding must be instinctive, 
but in such a way that it shall lose itself in the presentation 
without,,, at the same time losing its self-consciousness.
Then it would approximate to that ideal Understanding, which is 
able to recognise sensation as its own product, rather.than as 
coming from a foreign source. Instinct has all the necessary 
equipment for intensive insight because it is not self- con­
scious, but for that very reason it can never discover its 
secrets. Only self-conscious Understanding can ask the 
proper questions of a presentation to elicit its meaning, but 
this very habit of asking questions causes its attention to 
wander, and for that reason it will never find what it seeks.
In M. Bergson's words: il y a des choses que 1' intelligence
seule est capable de chercher, mais que, paar elle-meme, elle
1 Q-ffne trouvera .jamais. Ces choses, 1'instinct seul- trouverait•
)
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mais il ne les oherohera .jamais.1 If Understanding confined 
itself simply to asking questions, it would "be alright. For 
if we can believe what G-eorge Meredith says in the fourth 
chapter of Harry Richmond, the quickest way of getting at facts 
is to leave off answering and limit ourselves to questioning 
one another; at least he thinks this to he true of hoys and 
women, and it is surely the same elemental kind of intercourse 
we must use in addressing a presentation. But the Understand­
ing insist on answers, and, if it gets no reply, it invariably 
inquires next door.
It will he clear from what has heen said that Understanding 
is a superficial faculty, because it has no sufficient sympathy 
to exercise patience in dealing with presentations. Our heads 
are too big and our eyes are too small, we can think more than 
we can see. But this is the failing in what is really a virtue, 
for we should he reduced to the level of animal instinct and 
could never extend our Knowledge, if our thoughts were not in' 
advance of sensation. Whatever criticism may have to say in 
disparagement of Knowledge, we find, on analysis, that it is 
not our making so much as it is due to the influence of a 
Power ^ not ourselves, and may therefore be regarded as a secure 
basis' for a deeper apprehension of Reality. It may be that 
the very same factors which are at work in Knowledge, may be so 
adjusted that we can have a purer perception than an unequal 
mixture of thought and sense, which will approximate to that 
ideal Understanding whose thoughts are themselves perceptions. 
That these factors are hetereogeneous is unquestioned, for how 
else could there be a problem of Knowledge? But it is all the 
more wonderful, just because it makes a problem for us, that an 
idea in my head should indicate an object outside of me, It is 
to the Supersensible that we owe our most ordinary Knowledge, 
the immediate perception of an ordered world in space and time
1 ' / /jj*Evolution Creatioe, p. 164.
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For Knowledge means synthesis, synthesis is the work of con­
sciousness, and consciousness supposes connections which are 
already implicit in the very things which we unite, and this 
logically prior connection, or transcendental object, has a 
supersensible ground. We cannot have erred, then, in being 
under the influence of the supersensible Thing. And there is 
a further concession on the part of Nature. Phenomena are 
so intimately bound up with the consciousness of ourselves 
that they may be regarded as dependent on our consciousness.
But the material of sensation is contingent and independent of 
our minds, so far as we know, for we have no means of determin­
ing whether the conditions under which sensations enter into 
consciousness, are also the real conditions under -which they 
exist in themselves, or, what is the same thing., in a perfect 
Understanding. This means that our objects are never exhausti­
vely defined. Now this is just what Theoretical Reason pro­
fesses to do, and Nature helps her in yielding the assumption that 
the material basis of existence is also adapted to our Under­
standing. But this hypothetical Knowledge is not different in 
kind from Understanding, its objects are not a different kind of 
perceptions but phenomena to the nth power. And although we 
spoke of these approaches on the part of the Supersensible as 
concessions to our Understanding, this is only a manner of 
speaking and we must not mention them as favours. Rather they 
are; a bare necessity, for without these adaptions, there would j 
be-.neither Knowledge of phenomena nor thought of the Supersensi­
ble for us; just as the adaption of our eyes for sight is no 
argument for a special design on the part .of Nature, because if 
we are to see at all, our eyes must be suitably adapted and they 
must be good eyes too. If the Supersensible would have us to
know that it is there, it is in its .own interest to give us a 
lead. And all that it has done hitherto, both in the Understand­
ing proper as the limited Knowledge of immediate, perception, 
and in its extended form as hypothetical Reason, without which
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the Understanding would have no security, is only what is 
strictly necessary for the coherence of our thoughts about 
Nature or, what is the same thing, the appearance at all of a 
uniform world. Well, this has been done, and the question now 
put forward in the Critique of Judgment is whether the Super­
sensible has any favours for us, and if so, whether we have a 
highe^?f apprehension than the hypothetical Understanding, 
which will bring us into closer touch with the Supersensible in 
these gratuitous appearances. Kant finds three such favours in 
the phenomena of Beauty, organic forms and moral Man, and the 
corresponding form of higher apprehension in Reflective Judg­
ment. We are encouraged to look for these concessions, not 
only for the reason that the Supersensible has been the moving 
principle in our ordinary apprehension, but also because this 
apprehension is so remote from Reality and is diot through with 
the marks of imperfection. There is a lack of spontaneity in 
the way fc the factors come together, which make up both 
Theory and Practice. I have been careful in this discussion to 
include Practical Reason in the criticism which Kant passes on 
the Understanding as discursive. He only mentions it 
aooidonUy in the Critique of Judgment, but though their im­
perfections start from opposite sides, they are clearly parts of 
the same defect, and without the reference to Practical Reason, 
Kant's argument would be incomplete. The third Critique, 
especially in the moral Ideal, makes an evident effort to im­
prove upon the abstract exercise of Reason in the Categorical 
Imperative, and Reflective Judgment is a form of apprehension 
which is intended to supersede both Practice and Theory. The 
whole structure of our minds- is wrong so long as they have no 
immediate connection with feeling, for then they will have no 
sympathetic insight into Reality. To bring the matter to a 
point, we are suffering badly from a sense of obligation.
To take Knowledge first, it is true that we have an a priori 
apprehension of objects; we know that they must appear in 
space and time and in causal connection*.. But this simplv
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refers to the form of apprehension, and only means that in 
no other way can they appear. That sensations should come 
to us at all and when they please, is completely outwith our 
control and we must take our cue from them. And even when we 
anticipate Nature, as we do in experimental science, by making 
her answer our questions and thus exercise an a priori apprehen­
sion of her material basis, these questions of ours are ultimate­
ly conditioned by Nature herself in the influence she exercises 
over us. We cannot escape the conclusion that Knowledge, 
determinate or hypothetical, is what we are compelled" to believe. 
Obligation, again, lies in the very nature of morality, and it is 
not well to conceive of a transcendent ethic from which it has 
vanished. But in out naturality, this sense of obligation acts 
on us in the form of a foreign compulsion which is not good. 
Conscience, as the bare recognition of good and evil, evokes a 
spirit of antagonism, and in appealing to the highest, rouses 
the worst passions in our nature. To use the language of St. 
Paul, the consciousness of Law works all manner of concupiscence 
-in us and produces a state akin to death. In the days of his 
naturality, he was "alive without Law", a free, breathing ani- 
mal ) like Adam in paradise, but when the
commandment came, sin revived and he died. (Rom.Vll. 9: 1 Co. 
xv. 45.). The self-realisation of Idealism endangers morality 
by taking the law completely into our own. hands, and can only 
deliver the commandment unimpaired on the precarious assumption 
that our nature is completely good. In confusing the psychical 
state with the content which it bears, it identifies psychology 
with metaphysics. That morality be possible at all,, its law 
must be realised in me, but while the way in which it is realised 
is mine, the content is not mine; otherwise the whole con­
ception of obligation is destroyed. Much worse is the self- 
assertion of Pragmatism, which has neither the power-nor the 
wish to discriminate a lower from a higher self, as Idealism un­
doubtedly and most jealously does. There is more truth in
Kant's ethic, notwithstanding its limitations, than his 
critics have been willin’g to recognise. He saw that Law puts 
such a strain on the rivets of pleasure and pain, to use Plato's 
expression, that morality as realised capacity is impossible 
in threescore years and ten. And his Theory moreover implies, 
what neither Idealism nor Pragmatism sufficiently recognises 
but what is attested by the history of human experience, that 
unreasoned constraint remains a dominant factor in the best of 
lives, and that a complete acquiescence in the Law only comes 
in intermittent flashes of the "faith which worketh by love".
The divine command confronts us in majesty, and while it re­
quires our loving obedience, does not explain the reason for its 
authority. The Law -appears to us in its abstract totality, 
but systematic disposition of its parts in their relations 
there is none. We cannot read this Law discursively as in­
terpreted by Nature, unless we feel convinced that Nature is a 
d; divine
^organisation in sympathy with ouT Will.
Prom this universal criticism of the human mind a new 
problem arises. While the factors in experience are out of 
gear, unequally yoked and grasped in different ways, the unity 
conceived by thought, the parts perceived by sense or imagina­
tion, our apprehension of Reality is one-sided and imperfect.
We recognised at the outset two cardinal functions of mind, 
Understanding and Reason. Then from the combination of these 
two we deduced a third type of apprehension, which we fondly 
hoped would repair their inherent defects, by giving articulate 
expression to the unreasoned intuitions of the Will and a com­
pletely coherent unity to the fragmentary perceptions of Under­
standing. But we have found this principle of Theoretical 
Reason to be illusive, and incapable of anything more than a 
hypothetical determination of the Supersensible. For while the 
elements of perception are apprehended in their discreteness, 
their unity is not perceived or imagined in the same way but 
imag&fied or conceived. To realise the total conditions which
would make up the exhaustive unity of these elements, Under­
standing, in its hypothetical function, must run into an 
indeterminate series which is impossible without antinomy, 
for the series may equally be regarded as finite or as infinite 
and the final sum is not actual but ideal. If now we could 
discover a greater degree of facility in-the way these factors 
come together, this would undoubtedly argue a certain spontaneity 
in their relation, and we should confidently assert what Kant 
only ventured to surmise, that sense and thought spring from a 
common root. It would be a real concession on the part of the
Supersensible to our Understanding, or in Kant's own words,
1
"a favour which Nature has felt for us". Our thoughts would
not be empty possibilities which can only be realised when they 
are limited by sensational shocks, but would be themselves 
interpretative perceptions which are able to dwell in the actual 
as a kindred element. Nor would the Understanding, a sober 
sentinel, restrain the spontaneity of Sense, calling after it, 
‘Hold there, you have forgotten the categories* , but freely move 
with it in play. The Whole is not produced in utter nakedness 
nor are the parts received in shreds, but an Individual of flesh 
and blood is revealed to our eyes. This disposition of 
material existence to our apprehension, in which the Supersensi­
ble may be said to rise to the surface, is found in Aesthetic 
and Teleology of Nature, and they have this at least in common 
that their problem is the Individual. But to compass.-;, this 
end we require a new principle.
As I gave out in an earlier part of this chapter, the 
search for a new principle arose naturally out of Kant's reflec­
tions on the hypothetical nature of Knowledge. Both in the 
received Introduction to the third Critique and in the earlier 
sketch, now. called 'J.S. Beck's Auszug', he distinguishes 





For himself the term ’practical' always signifies the pure 
activity of Will, and of this alone can there he a philosophy. 
But he finds that people often use the term to denote the 
application of a particular science, as for example, mensura­
tion the practical philosophy of arithmetic; or we might speak 
of a practical geometry and a practical psychology. But this 
is misleading, for it implies that these applications are a 
distinct kind of Theory from the science in question, whereas 
they are only consequences of the same in the nature of a 
scholium or corollary. Under this false use of the term 
would fall the practical philosophy of Mr. Squeers; in his 
educational scheme, theory was exemplified in spelling 'winder', 
hut if you wish to learn the practical philosophy of the subject, 
you must go and clean the 'winder' . These applications are 
but extensions of Theory and4form no part of Practical Philoso­
phy at all. In order, then, to avoid ambiguity, Kant proposes 
to call them technical, judgments of industrial art and skill, 
"for they belong to art (technical), the procuring of what one
wills a thing should be, which is in each instance a mere con-
1sequence in a complete theory". The distinctive character 
of these technical 'judgments lies in the presence of human pur­
pose. Although Technic involves the activity of Will, it is
not the pure exercise of Will but as united with a "natural
2concept". In the application of theoretical principles to
legislation, politics, industry and agriculture, the Will is not 
actuated by a pure conception of duty, but by our own idea of 
what a thing should be according to the end we have in view. 
Precepts of morality, on the other hand, are "not merely pre­
cepts or rules in this or that aspect, but without any pre­
ceding reference to purposes and designs, are laws";3 and it is 
their characteristic feature to exclude interest or purpose.
1 |Ueber Philosophie iiberhaupt: Rosen-xKranz, Werke l.p.585j| 
{Bernard: p. 7 J  ^ {ibid: p. 9 J
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The Will is only supersensible when it represents an act simply
in its intention as prescribed by the moral law, and "without
1
regard to the means whereby the object is to be realised".
It is from this mixture of Theory and Practice in the 
execution of human purposes, over which the god of Pragmatism 
presides, that Kant takes his cue in the search for a new 
principle. Technical judgments follow naturally as corollaries 
from the whole body of theoretical Knowledge, determinate and 
hypothetical. But they differ from their sources in an im­
portant respect. Theoretical Knowledge is certain because it 
is independent of experience, and, even as hypothetical, its 
regulative principles which guide the procedure of inductive 
science, are "immanent in their exercise and sure". And 
Duty has no uncertain voice.' But in Pragmatic, our Will des­
cends from its high eminence into the hands of natural concepts, 
our smiths, our shoemakers and builders. And we ho longer 
hear the clear direction of a single voice, but a Babel of 
earth-born tongues which brings confusion. Kant has brought 
us to the strange conclusion that the realm of purpose is the 
realm of contingence. Now Kant proposes to use this term 
Technic to denote Reflective Judgment. But he makes it quite 
clear that it is only on the analogy of these technical judg­
ments that we are to think of Refflexion. For Reflexion is
3neither theoretical nor pragmatical since it determines
nothing either in the constitution or production of objects,
but is merely the way in which Nature is conceived on the
3analogy of technical art. And he further adds, it is not
the reflective Judgments themselves that we shall call techni­
cal but the whole reflective outlook, the Urteilskraft. on 
whose laws they are based, and Nature also we shall call tech-
4
nical as the object of Reflexion s_
o-*u
1
Ueber Philosoohie uberhauut: Rosenkranz, Werke 1., p. 585.
-^Bernard: p. 317. cp. Appendix to Dialectic, Meiklejohn :p . 394
3 ~ * *The text is: theoretisch noch praktisch (in der zuletzt
angefiihrten Bedeutung) m technical or pragmatical. Ueber
Phi1osophie uberhaupt: Rosenkranz, Werke 1. p.585.cpThernard n 19
- ibid: Erdmann, Kant's Kritik der Urteilskraft T p . 3 4 7
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This evidently means that the relation between Reflexion and 
Technic is a loose analogy.
It is difficult to say what exactly we have learnt from 
this obscure language, and the reasonable doubt arises whether 
it contains a new principle at all. These technical judgments 
are easily confused, in a vague way, with the inductive pro­
cedure which Kant calls the hypothetical function of Reason, 
and he never clearly distinguishes Reflexion from hypothetical 
Reason, Thus in the Logic edited by Jasche, he defines 
determinant and reflective Judgment as deduction and induction 
respectively, the former proceeding from the universal to the 
particular, the latter from the particular to the universal. 
Only, Reflexion is here further defined as the wider process 
of arriving at certain general conclusions from particular con­
cepts, with its two specific forms, induction and analogy: the
former reasoning from many to all things of one kind, the latter 
reasoning from many features common to things of the same, kind 
to the remaining features'1". The point of distinction is so 
fine that it is hardly appreciable, and involves the whole 
question, on which expositors are divided, whether Reflexion, 
apart from, its aesthetical function, really goes beyond the 
Dialectic. So eminent an authority as Stadler, for instance, 
is decided that it does not. But I think the evidence in 
Kant's own writings is sufficient to make it worth our while 
contending for a new principle. How could Reflexion be 
identified with inductive procedure when it is expressly based, 
as we have seen, on the analogy of what are direct corollaries 
of all Theory, including the hypothetical principles of in­
duction? Technical judgments are but the application of these 
inductive principles in experimental science, or as it is stated 
in the Critique of Judgment, Reflexion is based on the analogy 
of our causality according to purposes. Reflexion, then, as 
derived from this new principle, means that we think of Nature 
as an artisan. It will be said, however, that this is only
another expression for -the specification of Nature into 
Hartensteirj, V T T l , p. 128 - 9.
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and species, which is the very principle of hypothetical 
Reason. Undoubtedly; hut while the Dialectic only insists 
on the hare principle itself, we are here putting forward a 
new way of' envisaging this principle, and we think of Nature, 
not simply as an abstract quantity, hut with the help of an 
anthropological conception derived from our own experience.
To put it briefly, the principle in the Dialectic is logical 
while the new principle of Reflexion is psychological. And 
this is the significance of the analogy. While the ex­
perimental application of principles brings us into the region 
of uncertainty, there is also the advantage of a more intimate 
Knowledge. We never know exactly how a thing will turn out 
until it is completed, but al-so, as Kant says, "we see into a 
thing completely only so far as we can make it in accordance 
with our concepts and bring it to completion"'1'. And the 
reason for this insight is that the factors in experience 
develope simultaneously, and are present in an equal degree of 
reality. Kant's definition of a purpose in this connection 
is very instructive. He says it is "the concept of an Object
so far as it contains the ground of the actuality of this
qObject" . The concepts of Understanding only represent the 
possible existence of an object. But when a concept is the 
ground of its actual existence, we are not simply thinking it 
but bringing it into being. And there is no longer the dis­
crepancy between possible and actual which we discover in 
theoretical Knowledge, for the range of possibility is suppress - 
ed and is only paid out in the measure that the parts emerge 
into existence. We have here no superfluous thoughts in 
advance of sensation which may only be possible, our thoughts 
have -the perceptive quality of instinct because they are 
genetic like the parts themselves. And while in Pragmatic,
way
whole and part are apprehended incompletely in the same vague^
1 2Bernard: p. 291. Bernard, p. 18.
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Reflexion will be that power of mind for which these factors 
exist in an equal degree of reality, but also in their complete­
ness. In beautiful and living forms the relation between 
whole and part is transparent, and we are not conscious of the 
one without the other. Now "we know in part —  but when that 
which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be 
done away" . The parts are not perceived in their diversity 
but as continuous manifestations of a single reality. And the 
moment we dissever a part from the Whole, it loses its quality
OL
and becomes an untelligible thing. As Aristotle said, a hand 
cut off from the body is no longer a hand, "except in an equi- 
vocal sense as we might speak of a stone hand". The discrete 
Knowledge of the Understanding is no longer necessary for Re­
flexion is itself the articulate expression of what is inarti­
culate for Understanding. . If we try to explain our actions of 
whose goodness we are convinced, they loose their ingenuousness 
and become doubtful; or if we seek to intellectualise our 
religious Convictions, they lose their sanctity and become 
common-place. As Goethe says, in one of those frequent per­
ceptions which are so true to fact, "though my experience of 
the divine mercy has been of infinite importance to myself at 
the time of its occurAence, the detail would be insipid, and 
perhaps disbelieved, were I to specify individual cases''^ .
And **_William Blake gives a touching instance of the blunder­
ing folly of Understanding when it attempts to articulate 
reflective experience, in his poem on Love's Secret:
"Never seek to tell thy love,
Love that never told can be;
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I told my love, I told my love,
I told her all my heart,
.Trembling, cold, in ghastly fears.
Ah'! she did depart!y
Soon after she was gone from- me,
A- traveller came by,
Silently, invisibly:
»
He took her with a sigh. There is no text-book of 
Reflective Science. Its perceptions are not scientific judg­
ments which are true for all and therefore for no one in parti­
cular, but true for all because they are first true for the in­
dividual. hike the of St. Paul, they are secrets
which are revealed to the initiate. And though we do not see 
the face of the Supersensible, from the cleft of the rock we 
are touched by the glory of its presence while it passeth by, 
and it is by its hand that the eyes of our Understanding are 
covered.
In the conception of Technic, then, we are brought sensi­
bly nearer to the Supersensible. Hypothetical Knowledge only 
gives the thought of free, self-determined, existence, but in 
Reflexion we have its presence and appearance. When the divine 
artisan was polishing the world before he launched it into 
space, he painted parts of it with the hues of the rainbow, 
and in other parts he set up magic mirrors in which the divine 
activity is reflected. The first is the realm of the Beautiful, 
the second the realm of living forms, who in their purposive 
activity show forth the perfect freedom of God. These 
finishing touches Kant calls contingent, not at all in the 
bad sense of his predecessors, but as we should call an Egyp­
tian mummy contingent because the art of embalming has been lost. 
Our Understanding has lost or never had the rule of interpreting 
these data. Such are the unaccountable phenomena of Nature for 
which there.: is no certain law discovered, such are the objects
of inarticulate emotion and the unsearchable essence of life; 
such also are the inscrutable ways of God by which He rules 
the world in righteousness. With the reverence of -the 
Hebrew sage, Kant draws the veil over the appearance of the 
divine Majesty, and realises with him that "it is the glory 
of God to conceal".
OB A P S E S  2.
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Chapter 2.
Although the Critique of Judgment has its place, historically,
as an after-thought in Kant's system, the thoughts it contains
were present to his mind from an early date. As far back as
1764, there is the short essay entitled Beobachtungen uber das
Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen. in which he gives token of
an artistic turn of mind with which he is seldom credited.
Here Kant suggests that even scientific pursuits have an aestheti-
cal character, so that knowledge may become the subject-matter
of Feeling and subordinate to it; thus he speaks of the charm
of which a Kepler was capable, who would not have sold one of
1
his discoveries for a kingdom. In an article in the Kant-
2
studien , there is an elaborated argument to show that as 
Kant's Aesthetical Philosophy is open to the charge of intel- 
lectualism, his Intellectual Philosophy is no more free from 
the influence of aesthetical ideas, as when he follows his 
prejudice in favour of logical symmetry at the expense of truth.
One might say that his elaborate trichotomy is the result of the
free play of his Imagination with his Understanding. It may 
not be readily believed that Kant wrote Poetry, but he actually 
did write five stanzas at least, each of which is devoted to the
memory of one of five colleagues in Konigsberg University.
And the fact that Herder turned one of his lectures into verse, 
surely counts for something in favour of Kant's poetic turn of 
mind. One might also mention a remark of Schiller in his 
correspondence with Goethe. Writing of his impressions after 
reading Kant's little treatise on 'Everlasting Peace' he says: 
“There is in this old gentleman something so truly youthful
1 2 





that it might almost be termed aesthetic". It is difficult
to say how we are to receive the extraordinary intelligence, 
can hardly
which Schiller/credit but which Goethe confirms, that certain
artists are putting Kant's Ideas of Reason into allegorical 
2
pictures! Whether this is to be regarded as indicating the
i
intrinsic poetry of Kant's thought or the madness of human 
nature, must be left iso the Judgment of the reader.
Facts like these, though slight, are a sufficient proof in 
themselves, that this third faculty of the human mind was within 
the sweep of Kant's reflections before the Critique of Pure 
Reason was definitely planned. To these must be added as con­
clusive evidence, that he lectured on Aesthetic practically 
throughout his official career. The Critique of Judgment, then, 
dfces not answer a newly-born demand, so much as the renewed con­
sciousness on Kant's part of what he had felt already. These 
public lectures, however, as we have seen, were originally 
undertaken as a side-light on Logic rather thas as a distinc­
tive treatment of Aesthetic itself. And in the letter to Herz 
of 1772, he has already lost sight of the independence of Feel­
ing, for he brings it in common with Morality under the heading, 
Practical. But in this letter he is concerned with the cen­
tral problem of the Critique of Pure Reason, how an idea can 
refer to an object; and, speaking roughly, one may say that 
from this time on till 1787, there are only two divisions of 
Mind for Kant, the Theoretical and the Practical. In his 
anxiety to subordinate Sensuous Feeling to Moral Law, moreover, 
he does not wait to distinguish the finer and higher emotions 
from those which are lower. But after the Critique of Pure 
Reason was lifted off his mind, we find the distinction again 
forcing itself upon him in the Metaphysic of Ethics, when he
1
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distinguishes "practical pleasure" from "passive satisfaction";
this latter is "not a pleasure in the existence of the object
of the idea, but clings to the idea only", and this feeling of
1
Pleasure "we call Taste". Moreover he goes on to say that
such a thing as Taste can only be treated "episodically" in a
Practical Philosophy, "not as a notion properly belonging to
that philosophy", thus removing Aesthetic Feeling out of the
region of the Practical aspect of Mind. And when, in the
beginning of the year 1787, he sees his Critique of Practical
Reason so far complete that he hopes to send it to press within
a week, he intimates to Christian Gottfried Schutz that he must
2
set about with his Critique of Taste immediately. It was
finally in the same year, in his letter to Reinhold, that Kant
made up his mind about the independence of Feeling. There he
recognises three parts of Philosophy, Knowledge, Feeling of
Pleasure and Pain, Desire: and seeks to find a -priori principles
for the second as for the other two, though he formerly held
this to be impossible; he hopes to be ready with this by Easter
under the title, Critique of Taste. Here we have the
Critique of Judgment coming to the birth; it was published
three years later in 1790.
But though he now recognises three parts of Philosophy,
this does not mean three sets of doctrine: there are three
Critiques, but only two of them are doctrines. He insists on
4'
this in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment. But
while he was formerly inclined to give a subordinate place to 
Feeling, he now excludes it from the dignity of a doctrine in 
order to raise it to a higher plane. By the time Kant had 
settled the problems of Science and Morality, he began to tire 
of Definitive Judgment, Determination, and felt the need of a
1 2
Introd., Abbot, p. 267. Briefwechsel: Kirchmann,p.456.
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judgment which could go as deep as the Moral judgment and have 
all its immediacy, but be as disinterested as Science without 
being Science. Meanwhile, Aesthetics were clamouring for a sep­
arate treatment and the unfinished woof of Teleology trailed 
across the warp of his system. Out of these coincidences 
aarose the Reflective Judgment, which for Kant means a form of 
Experience which is not doctrine in itself but conditions what­
ever doctrine there is. Reflexion it is that has been guiding 
us all along; there is no knowledge but comes to birth with 
its inspiration in the anticipative feeling of unity with the 
object to be known; and even Morality is at best a form of 
reflective' experience and only so far constitutive: "even Free­
dom ... is for us a transcendent conception, and is therefore
incapable of serving as a constitutive principle for determin- 
1
ing an object". We must not say, then, that Reflexion is a 
loose and therefore useless form of Determination, Scientific or 
Moral; it is Determination which is a fossilised or artificially 
restricted form of Reflective Experience.
It is time that this Fountain of all Experience were "criti­
cally" examined. It had already come under Kant's notice as 
the Hypothetical Function of Reason, and Kant, in so many words,
deliberately speaks of this Hypothetical Reason as the Urteils-
2
kraft, the term he uses for Reflexion in‘general. It is one 
and the same power of Judgment which we have in the Dialectic 
and in the Critique of Judgment. In this logical disposition 
of Nature (logische Beurteilung), the Urteilskraft exhibits a 
relation between Nature and the Supersensible: i.e. even in 
knowledge,, the Supersensible is present. But since the function 
of Urteilskraft is here purely hypothetical and therefore nega­
tive, it does not need special justification; it does not pretend 
to be a Science, it does not teach us nor equip us with knowledge^
1 2 
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it is only an exercise of Reason ("der Verstand einer Belehrung
und Ausrustung durch Regeln fahig, Urteilskraft aber ein beson-
deres Talent sei, welches gar nicht belehrt, sondern nur geubt 
1
sein will"). It is the specific quality in so-called mother-
wit, the want of which no school can supply, or, as he said in
the Critique of Judgment, the Urteilskraft is Just "Sound
2
Understanding" (gesunden Verstandes). Every one feels the
Absolute, the Whole, breaking in upon one's relative knowledge; 
one knows there is a Whole somewhere and proceeds on this 
assumption. This is the hypothetical function of Reason.
But the need of a Critique arises when this reflective exercise 
of Reason actually assumes the form of Science, professing to 
determine objects of its own, without falling into antinomy. 
Regulative Reason, whenever it pretended to be constitutive of 
objects, landed in insoluble contradictions, and therefore its 
exercise never rises above a form of inspiration; the Super­
sensible, in the shape of the Ideas of Reason, is present in 
us as the anticipative feeling of Totality, indivisible Unity, 
a feeling, however, which is dissipated, and with it the real 
unity, in the exercise of Knowledge. As Kant puts it, "it 
has no immediate reference to the feeling of Pleasure and Pain". 
But in Reflexion, as it appears in the Critique of Judgment, 
there is such immediate reference, the feeling of unity is not 
dissipated, and something, therefore in the form of an object is 
determined by the Urte^fi.skraft. "This reference is precisely
the puzzle in the prihciple of Judgment, which renders necessary 
a special section for this faculty in the Kritik." Hence 
Urteliskraft in general, since it is purely hypothetical and 
negative, needs no special Justification; it is the Judgment in 
the form of Immediate Peeling that must be established a •priori. 
Deduction, then, of Reflexion is the proof of the validity
of this primary Immediacy of Consciousness which conditions all 
1
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other forms of experience and is itself the highest form of 
experience. Of this Aesthetic provides the aptest illustra­
tion, but the problem itself is much wider. Reflexion, for 
Kant, covers all the different exercises of that free Con­
sciousness, 'I think', which lies at the back of the mind - 
all experience which is distinctively -personal. as distinguish­
ed from Science which is largely impersonal, true for all and 
therefore for no one in particular, and also from pure Morality 
which for Kant must be depersonalised on principle.
Kant's Deduction is characteristically peculiar. It 
consists in carrying back this primary function of Mind which 
is covered by such names as Reflexion, Purposive Activity and 
Peeling, to what he calls the Power of Judgment. Ostensibly 
he professes to find in the formal Judgment of Logic a -priori 
principles for this third faculty, Just as logical concepts 
stood sponsor for the categories. If Understanding and 
Reason have yielded a system of synthetic notions for 
Knowledge and a -priori precepts for the Faculty of Desire re­
spectively, "what more natural," he asks, "than to suppose 
that the latter (Judgment) will contain principles a -priori
1
for the former /Peeling of Pleasure and Pain) Just as well?"
Such statements are not to be taken literally. Kant is 
dealing with Formal Logic as an analogy or type of the real 
activity, and this is shown by the fact that the formal con­
cepts in the Critique of Pure Reason become added to and 
change, in the process of deduction, into principles of 
synthesis. Similarly we are to find the Formal Judgment in 
this last deduction, changing in process of proof into that 
original Free Consciousness which conditions all experience, 
mediate or immediate. Kant significantly names it Urteilskraft 
the Power of Judging in general, though he sometimes uses Urteil 
as equivalent for Urtei1skraft.
1 . ,
Uber Philosophie uberhaupt.Rosenkranz, Werke 1 , p. 588
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There are two steps in Kant's curious proof. The one 
is found in the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, the
•• M
other in the Uber Philoso-phie uberhaupt.
In the first step, Kant points out that Judgment and
Feeling must be intimately related, because they bear a
similar relation to the two remaining functions of Mind in
the respective groups to which they belong. He calls it a 
1
“new ground*' of proof. Feeling mediates in a very real 
sense between Knowledge and Desire, and also the Judgment 
similarly mediates between Concepts and Reasoning. The 
former had already been settled by the Wolffians and may be 
taken for granted, but the latter, which Kant simply states 
in the baldest way, does call for explanation. Probably the 
best way to account for Kant's statement is to say that here 
Logic is changing in his hands. If Judgment mediates in any 
real sense between the two, it must have common nature with 
both • concepts, Judgments and reasonings can no longer be 
distinct as was formerly assumed. A. concept is a Judgment 
from which the appearance of synthesis has vanished: reason­
ing is a form of Judgment in which the original synthesis is 
further developed or explained. But surely that has the
right to the name of Judgment oar excellence which is the 
distinctively
synthetic activity of Mind, in which the relation
of whole and part is seen in the making? Understanding is 
for Kant the faculty of parts without the Whole - to deter­
mine the Whole is to court antinomy; Reason is the faculty 
of Wholes without the parts - there is no differentiation of 
content in the concept of Freedom, it is a case of all or 
nothing; Judgment alone is the function of Mind in which 
Whole and Part are first recognised in relation. The
Judgment, then, may be said to mediate between the microscopic 
the Concept and the extensive Judgment or 
Judgment or/the Syllogism, because it is the original synthetic




Judgment that stands first in the scale of mental activity.
Now when Kant assigns to the Judgment this original power
of Synthesis, he does not mean a particular or actual synthesis
that is a concept - so much as the activity of synthesis itself
in general, without reference to a particular product, in
short, the Power of Judgment. He thus re-establishes the
distinction between Concept and Judgment, but in a way which
does Justice to them both. They are no longer different in
nature, for both are modes of Judgment. But Judgment may be
of two kinds; for while it is "the faculty of thinking the
1
particular as contained under the universal", this subsumption 
may come about in either of two ways. First, both particular 
and universal may be to hand when the particular given is only 
such as cah be determined by concepts of Understanding; this is
the Schematic Judgment: "the law is marked out for it a -priori.
2
and it has therefore no need to seek a law for itself". 
Particular and Universal are adapted to each other by the pre- 
established harmony of the 'transcendental object', and so the 
universal is applied to an intuition which can only be appre­
hended in that order which is necessary for determination by 
the categories. But, secondly, the particular alone may be 
given for which we have to seek a universal, and here the 
Judgment is no longer Determinant but Reflective. Thus, while 
the logical concept and Judgment are both modes of Judging, 
they are different, the one being the prototype of determinate, 
the other of reflective Judgment. Why Kant calls it Reflective 
is not exactly clear. Probably he Just means the activity in 
which the subject reflects on itself and its process. The 
best explanation is given in the Uber Philosophie uberhaupt.
"To reflect", he says, "is to compare and hold together given 
representations either with others or with its own Cognitive
1 2 
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1
Faculty, in relation to an idea possible thereby." Chat is
to say, Reflexion is Just the comparison of a representation
with the Apperceptive Imagination. Kant 'goes on to give it a
very homely meaning. We may call it, he says, the Facultas
Diiudicandi (Beurt eilungsvermogen), the term Baumgarten used to
denote the Critical Faculty, the power of discerning agreement
2
in difference, the answering of means to ends. Nay, Re­
flexion even happens with animals, Kant continues, "if only 
instinctivelv. i.e.not in relation to an idea to be obtained 
thereby, but to an inclination to be somewhat determined",
a sense of the term which seems identical with Aristotle's 
/. 4'T
KptTt K tj * . jn j_-fcS "basal form, then, Reflexion appears to
be a sense of Want. But this may be of two orders. You may
know what you are wanting, and then the Judgment is determinant;
a category or "fundamental idea of the object prescribes the rule
5
to the Power of Judgment", and therefore you no long^ijneed a
principle, its place being supplied by a rule. It is only for
people who do not know exactly what they are wanting that a
principle is necessary. The artist, having a great notion in
his head, yet not knowing exactly what it is, casts about him for
a principle, and in so doing lets his mind run free. Kant gives
an interesting illustration of this distinction; the servant
who is required to obey definite orders only needs Understanding,
while the officer who only receives a general commission which
he must interpret for himself in particular emergencies, requires 
6
Judgment. This free-play of the faculties takes place when 
the mind is undergoing experience for which there is no corres­
ponding category of knowledge adequate, whether it be in the 
appatently passive contemplation of aesthetic perception or in
1
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the originative activity of artistic creation. Nor do we 
need to know what we are wanting, even after it has been realis­
ed. In Reflexion, it is the satisfaction, not the definition,
of purpose or interest that is essential; the free-play of the 
faculties is its own end, the mind having no interest outside 
of its processes. The great difference, then, which Kant 
has in view between the Reflective and Determinant Judgment 
is that the one is free, working under a principle, the other 
is not free, working under a rule which is fixed. Reflective
Judgment is a "mere faculty for reflecting upon a given re-
1
presentation, in behoof of an idea possible thereby"; i.e. 
an idea which may be the very thing you want and so an idea
which is realised as the definite concept of a given representa­
tion, in which case the judgment would become determinant,
both part and whole being to hand. Reflective Judgment
or, as if a determinant 
always works with a view to determinant^/judgment were actually
possible.
It must be clear from the &bove that Reflective Judgment 
is the wider function of which the Determinant is but a special 
case. All thinking is the subsuming of a particular under a 
■universal, i.e, of a sense-datum under a form of thought.
And Reflexion is Subsumption in general, Determination is 
Subsumption in particular. In the Determinant Judgment, 
Imagination, which is the highest faculty of Sense, subordinates 
itself to the law of Understanding. In apprehending a line, 
or drawing it even in thought, the imagination must keep 
reproducing the successive perceptions in order to maintain 
identity of Consciousness and therefore unity of the object: 
the object is cognised to order, it is what we are "obliged 
to think" . But in Reflexion it is quite otherwise. Here the 
Imagination proceeds, not under constraint, but in free play
1
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with the Understanding; it is no longer what we are uncon­
ditionally obliged to think, hut what we are constrained to 
think for higher reasons than the laws of Understanding.
When Kant, then, says that the Judgment ought to provide 
this reflective activity with a -priori principles, he is 
looking to a certain feature inthe Class-Judgment which may 
serve as type for the freedom of Reflexion. The Judgment 
in Formal Logic abstracts from all content, and therefore 
exhibits a quite contingent relation between S and P; and 
Reflexion is like to it in this, that the Subject (Imagina­
tion) is not fixed down to any definite Predicate (the Under­
standing), but maintains a free relation to it, whereas the 
transcendental or Determinant Judgment has for its predicate 
a certain unalterable rule, e.g., the subject must come under
the predicate of causal connection. But in the Judgment of
1 2
Formal Logic, S may come under the class P or p or P .
Kant expresses this distinction thus: "the Understanding is
the Faculty of rules, the Urteilskraft is the Faculty of
subsuming under rules, i.e. of discerning whether something
1
stands under a given rule or not". Kant seems to speak 
here as if Reflexion were Formal Logic over again, but the 
latter is nothing more than a loose type of the former.
For while the formal Judgment abstracts from all content, Re­
flexion holds itself free rather because its content is so 
much deeper than that of the determinate:Judgment; thus, in 
regard to a living thing, it would be a mistake to bind S down 
to the Predicate of Causality, for it may be much more than 
that.
This seems to throw light on the title of the book,
Kritik der Urteilskraft. It is a point on which writers on 
Kant have 1oftil^abstained from giving any satisfactory 
1
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explanation to the bewildered student, for it is not a little 
disconcerting to find that Kant, who had already used Judgment 
in a purely epistemological sense, should without further 
qualification or comment, also use it to denote specifically the 
Reflective activity of mind. No doubt Judgment was the name 
he should naturally use to denote the faculty of Approval. And 
it is interesting to find how exactly this term was defined in 
eighteenth century usage, both literary and philosophical.
Henry Fielding and Baumgarten are practically identical in their 
analysis of Judgment. In Tom Jones G-enius is defined as the 
powers of penetrating into the essence of things, and of dis­
tinguishing their essential differences; and these two powers 
"are no other than invention and judgment". But invention, he 
continues, "can rarely exist without the concomitancy of judgment, 
for how we can be said to have discovered the true essence of^  
two things, without discerning their difference, seems to me 
hard to conceive. Now this last is the undisputed province of 
judgment". (Bk. 9 Chap. 1).. In precisely the same way, Baum­
garten analysed the aesthetic faculty into the twofold perception 
of unity and diversity; of these the first is called invention 
flingon-hrm or facultas identitates rerun cognoscendi) and the 
second a discriminating power (acumen sensitivum or facultas 
diversitates rerum cogoscendi) This shows that Judgment was 
currently understood to be closely connected with G-enius. Yet 
this does not explain the whole matter. The Critique of Pure 
Reason might well have been called the Ciitique of Judgment, for 
it deals with little else, but Kant has so consecrated the term 
to denote Reflexion that he speaks of the Critique of Pure
Reason as dealing with Understanding alone "to the exclusion of
2
Judgment and Reason 11. The explanation, it seems to me, lies 
in this, that for Kant the common feature in both Reflective
1




and Determinant Judgment is subordination. But the Reflective 
is the higher and wider type of subordination; far from being 
the empty tautology of Formal Logic, it is the subordination 
of Nature to Freedom, whereas Determinant Judgment is but a 
subordination within Nature, that of Sense to Understanding.
And it is Kant's final view that it is this wider subsumption 
of Nature under Freedom which makes possible the lower adap­
tion tation of sense to thought; Determination whether moral 
or scientific, is conditioned by Reflexion. Now the Formal 
Judgment provides the type for this higher form of subsumption 
in the free relation it exhibits between S and P, and from it 
Kant would naturally take the name, Kritik der Urteilskraft.
So we might read the above quotation^ as follows : the
Critique of Pure Reason dealt with Judgment (i.e. subsumption 
in particular), to the exclusion of Judgment (i.e.subsumption 
in general without arriving at any particular determination) 
and Reason. Determination is fixed within definite limits, 
Reflexion has for its characteristic absence of determinate 
bounds; the Determinant judgment is like a land-path definitely 
marked, the Reflective is like the roadways of the open ocean:
"thy way is in the sea, and thy path in the great waters,
1
and thy footsteps are not known".. What Kant has secured for 
us, then, out of the Formal Judgment, is really a divine way 
of thinking, of which the forced subordination within Nature 
in the judgment of knowledge, is but the shadow. Hence the 
truth of Hegel's dictum, Freedom is the truth of Nature.
The second step in Kant's proof rests on the subjective 
character of both Judgment and Feeling: "there is here already
a certain conformity of the Power of Judgment to the Feeling 
of Pleasure . .. that whereas Understanding and Reason refer 
their representations to objects ... the Power of Judgment
1
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refers solely to the subject, and by itself alone produces
1
no notions of objects". On tbe other hand, he points out, 
the Feeling of Pleasure and Pain is the only one of the Mental 
Powers which has nothing objective in its representations and in 
only a susceptibility (empfanglichkeit) in the subject appre­
hending. In the first step it was shown how Judgment and
Feeling respectively mediate in a real way between correspond-
argued
ing functions of mind. Now it is agreed- that their relative 
positions in the respective groups is so similar, in respect 
of their subjective aspect, that they must form part of one 
and the same mental function: "if the Power of Judgment
should at all determine anything for itself alone, it can be 
nothing else than the Feeling of Pleasure, and conversely, if 
this (Feeling of Pleasure) ought to have at all a principle
2
a -priori, it will be found alone in the Power of Judgment".
Thus the object of the Judgment, in so far as it has one, 
seeing that it refers solely to the subject, and the subjective 
determination which we call Feeling, are one and the same.
But what exactly can Kant mean by the subjectivity of 
the Judgment? To begin with, as we saw above, Judgment has 
come to mean for Kant the original synthetic activity of Mind; 
and although the Deduction in the second edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason consists in the proof that the subjec­
tive reference in the Judgment presupposes an objective 
reference and 4f| only possible through consciousness of 
objectivity, we must remember that., in spite of this, Kant 
makes a reservation; he insists that the 'I think', the sub­
jective element in the Judgment, is itself an analytic nronosi- 
3
tion. He means that there is such a thing as Cognition in 
general. consciousness of the subject without arriving at any 
1 - . .
Uber Phil .uberhaupt, Rosenkranz, Werke, i., p. 588.
2 „
Ibid. °Watson, Selections. p. 69.
particular determination; and further, it is this Conscious­
ness in general which makes possible the knowledge of the 
Understanding. But this never means for Kant that a purely 
subjective function of mind lies at the basis of all knowledge. 
An enormous confusion arises for us here, because we are 
thinking of a totally different contrast from that which was 
before Kant's mind, as different as from the Cartesian use of 
the terms subjective and objective. Objective for Kant, it 
cannot be too strongly urged, means no more than the objectivity 
of external sense; the sensuous perception of Inner Sense, 
the sense of Time in Imagination, is not for him objective — 
the proof in the Analogies which appears to base outer on inner 
Sense, the permanence of Substance on the Permanent in Time, 
should not be regarded as an exception to' this, but as a fault 
in Kant's argument. What Modern Logic, then, means by 
objective in the Judgment, is what Kant has in view in the 
analytical Consciousness, 'I think': which differs from the 
objectivity of the Modem Judgment only in this, that it is 
not itself so much a system of Consciousness, an objective 
Consciousness, as the basis of all objective Consciousness.
Kant's position nearly veers round to the Cartesian use of the 
1
contrast. They called subjective what is independent of 
individual mind, what underlies the sense-object, and what is 
this but Kant's 'transcendental object'? And, as Kant admits, 
the 'I think' of apperception is really indistinguishable from 
this independent or objective Mind. We should, therefore, 
hit off Kant's view more accurately, in view of the above 
confusion of terms, if we said that the 'I think' of the 
Judgment is not subjective, for this implies a false contrast 
with objectivity, but Personal as distinguished from Divine 
or Absolute Mind. The 'I think* shares the nature of the 
1
I find that Cohen supports this view:"bei Kant bedeutet das 
Subjective ausschliesslich dasjenige, was dadurch gerade und zwar 
allein objective ist." KantsBegrundung der Aesthetic p ioa_4
k L + S °f °°urse recognised that through Wolff and Banmg.Vt— . ' 
Kant was the first to fix the modem sense of these terms ’
See Erdmann. Hist .Phil *TT p..238.
'objective synthesis,' and therefore may be said to lie at
the basis of all knowledge. It is subjective in the sense
that it is personal and free from the obligation to think
the objects of external sense.
The student is more and more impressed with the intimate
1
relation which the third Critique bears to the first.
This subjective character of the Judgment may be put in yet 
another way. It is the same feature Kant is hinting at in 
the contrast he makes between Productive and Reproductive 
Imagination, in the chapter on the Deduction of the Categories. 
The Reproductive function belongs to Psychology, the Pro­
ductive alone to Transcendental Philoso£khy, and "its synthesis
2
is the expression of spontaneous activity". Reproduction 
is an empirical synthesis of Imagination in accordance with 
the laws of Association, but Imagination in its original 
function is the "faculty of setting before the mind in per- 
ception an object that is not itself -present": i.e. though it 
may make use of association in its free activity, it is not 
led by it but leads it, "for unlike sense, imagination is not
4simply capable of being determined, but is itself determining". 
There is no such thing as a purely contingent Fancy which
outrages all the forms of knowledge, and certainly Productive
Imagination is no such contingent activity; rather it conforms
to the categories while it constructs its figurations without
reference to any definite object, i.e. without compulsion of
external sense or fixed direction of association. Hence Kant
calls it the "first application" of Understanding to Sense,
and so "the condition of all other applications of Understanding
5
to objects that we are capable of perceiving".
There is, then, after all something profound in Kant's 
deduction of^Feeling from the Judgment. He begins with the 
1
Cf .Anna Tumarkin in Kantstudien. Band xi.
2
Watson, Selections, p.77. 3Ibid. 4Ibid. 5 Ibid., p 78
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Judgment of Formal Logic, and this changes in his hands into 
the Reality of which, it is but the type, the Original Synthetic 
Activity of Mind. The proof is really reversed and is, that 
Determination is a subordinate form of Reflexion. The usual 
criticism is that he has violated the nature of Feeling, 
particularly aesthetic, by reducing it to a form of intellectual 
cognition. In point of fact, he does quite the opposite.
While in seeming he brings Feeling back to functions of 
knowledge, in the process of proof he lifts up knowledge into 
relationship with the personal, free activity of Mind. Re­
flexion is not debased to Understanding but Understanding is 
elevated by its subordination to Reflexion. Kant, indeed, 
suggests that the fixed forms of the Understanding were originally 
spontaneous in their activity. When we go beyond the limits
of Understanding as it is now known to us, i.e., go beyond
connection
causal connexion, and freely classify Nature into genera and
species 'reflectively', our reflexion is characterised by the
feeling of Pleasure, the mark of spontaneity. And though we
no longer feel pleasure in contemplating the fixed connections
of Understanding, yet it must have been there "at one time", and
"it is only because the commonest experience would be impossible
without it that it is gradually confounded with mere cognition
1
and no longer arrests particular attention". Determinate 
judgments are fossilised 'reflexion^ upon Nature; these un­
changeable forms and connections of Understanding had to be 
discovered at one time, and their discovery was no doubt attended 
by the inseparable mark of all spontaneity, Pleasure.
What takes place in die History of the Sciences is repeated in 
the growing consciousness.. For the child each established 
law of Nature, when it first secures the attention, is a lucky 
hit of Reflexion, a fresh discovery.
1
Bernard, p. 28.
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There is a deeper suggestion here. The bounds of Under­
standing are not fixed but stretch with the advance of Science. 
Science feeds the forms of Philosophy with their content pro­
gressively. In the light of Evolution, we should now add to 
Understanding part of those forms of Teleology which for Kant 
were wholly contingent and reflective. .Scientists largely 
destroy for themselves the pleasure which the forms of adapta­
tion in Nature afford the unsophisticated mind, and later, 
through their knowledge, the general consciousness comes to feel 
"that there hath passed away a glory from the earth". 
But there must be a limit to the encroachment of Understanding. 
If it be the case, as Kant suggests, that the original func­
tion of Mind is the Spontaneous, if Productive is the condition 
of Reproductive Imagination, if the free, personal conscious­
ness, 'I think,1 be the condition of consciousness of the 
objectivity of sense-perception' and independent of it, then it 
must lie in the power of this original function to maintain a 
distinct realm for itself, otherwise the Understanding would 
devour its parent. There is a limit to the encroaching of 
the land upon the sea, whose trackless ways best typify the 
judgment of Reflexion. Therefore Kant is right when he makes 
Understanding, with its fixity, a distinct compartment of 
Mind from Reflexion. He may have drawn the limits prematurely, 
but, in the long run, its Kingdom has an end. It is not 
likely that the Mind will surrender its spontaneity in the 
realms of the Finer Emotions connected with Art, Morality, and 
Religion. Teleology may linger between the two worlds of 
determined and free activity, and it cannot wholly surrender 
to Understanding; the truth may be that it is the bond of 
■union and transitionj^etween these two worlds: Kant seems to
take this view in the half-hearted way he connects it with 
Aesthetic. But the objects of the Fine Emotions are the 
private grounds of the sovereign Freedom of Reason which
19.
Understanding invades only to court defeat. In this sense
M. Basch is right when he says that Knowledge and Will are
sterilised products of feeling; "the individual is more truly
himself when he feels"; habit^, without doubt, blunts "le
timbre sentimental de la sensation". But, he concludes, there
is one sphere where Feeling regains its ancient empire, where
man is concerned, neither to know nor to will, but before all
to feel; where representations reja^omp what they have been
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AESTHETIC AND THE FIRST CANON. 
Chapter 3.
We are now in a position to -understand how, in the last phase 
of his system, Kant sought to commend our confidence in a 
deeper and more immediate interpretation of Reality. We are 
inclined to think of it as characteristically critical because 
of the title which the three Kritiken hear. But the signifi­
cance of the term 'critical' is limited to Kant's age; it is 
the sword which he carried in his left hand to drive away the 
Horonites of Rationalism, and we must not forget the new temple 
whose foundations he laid. This positive tendency is particular­
ly prominent in the thoughts of the third Critique. notwith­
standing its polemical tone, where the function of criticism is 
little more than a concession to his logical scheme. The 
subject which forms the distinctive and greater part of the 
book, Aesthetic, did not need to be critically examined in the 
same sense as Knowledge and Morality, for its claims had not 
been exaggerated. The trouble rather was that its claims had 
hardly been advanced, and Kant's office was not to call it in 
question so much as to call it into existence. The exercise 
of his critical faculty, in this instance, seems to have been 
due to force of habit rather than reasoned conviction, for if he 
had examined with more care the views which he opposed, he 
should have found more cause to excite his admiration than his 
pity. Neither Burke nor Leibniz, the representatives of the 
complementary tendencies in European thought which he held in 
criticism, is in effect less subjective than Kant himself.
Neither says that Beauty resides in objects as a constitutive 
quality. On the contrary, they commit themselves to a sub­
jective theory. For with Leibniz Beauty is a confused Knowledge 
and therefore rests on subjective conditions, the difference
between confused and clear knowledge being a matter of degree.
And for Burke it consists in the comparative pleasure we enjoy
in contemplating different forms. For, notwithstanding his
sensationalism in which the smoothness of objects is a prominent 
feature, his prevailing conviction is that Taste depends for its
existence on our ignorance and the practice of deception in Art:
' 1
"it is our ignorance of things that causes all our admiration". 
(Sublime and Beautiful, Part ii£4: cp.^10.) It follows that 
Beauty is not a sensible quality in things which is passively 
received in sensation so much as a subjective interpretation.
Kant did not understand his authors so liberally. He goes out 
of his way to correct the Leibnizian theory in which he detected 
the shadow of a concept, however confused, and the theory of 
Burke whose physiological language alone was sufficient to favour 
sensationalism. But there is much more in the continental 
theory as it was developed by Wolff and Baumgarten than Kant 
was able to appreciate, and indeed it envisages a point of view 
to which he vainly sought to aspire. For when we candidly con­
sider what is meant by the definition of Beauty as confused 
knowledge, we find that Kant's criticism loses all its point.
He makes out that the knowledge of perfection, even while it is 
confused, remains a form of knowledge with an intellectual content, 
and if this were strictly true, his criticism would be valid with­
in its own limits. But an impartial examination shows that 
Baumgarten, at least, did not assimilate the Beautiful to in­
tellectual form. This exception can hardly be made in favour of 
Leibniz, as we have seen, for his doctrine of continuity provides 
a complete thoroughfare between sense and thought. But Wolff
and Baumgarten had advanced on Leibniz's position. Wolff had
not indeed worked out a Logic of sense corresponding to the 
Logic of thought, but he recognised a distinction between lower 
and higher forms of knowledge, and in his Psychology he gives a 
table of the obscure forms. It was left to Baumgarten to 
elaborate into a science, under the comprehensive title
Sublime and Beautiful, Part ii£ 4: cp. §10.
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Aesthetic which originally means simple perception, those 
inferior modes of apprehension, including feelings and the obs­
cure sense-impressions which are not accompanied by the re­
flective activity of thought. Beauty was thus defined as hav­
ing its place in the region of confused knowledge (cognitio 
sensitiva), and this circumstance takes away our wonder that 
Kant should have employed the term 'aesthetic', both to denote 
the pure perception of objects in space without the activity of 
thought and artistic intuition. Now Baumgarten set out from 
this simple accepted distinction between unthinking perception 
and conscious apperception of objects. It means that mere 
sense-perception is possible, in the simple awareness of presenta­
tion, without identifying the object in the ordinary associa­
tions of apperception which we call Knowledge. Probably this 
is what Kant meant, in what is a rather startling statement for
the author of the Analvtic, when he said, "we can represent a
1
thing as given although we have no concept of it". But, as
the school of Wolff characteristically taught, the content in
every form of mentality is perfection of some kind. Beauty
is therefore the perfection of this obscure knowledge (perfectio
2
cognitionis sensitivae qua talis). And manifestly its content 
is more congenital to intellectual form than to any other, be­
cause perfection means the complete agreement of an object with 
its concept. In no other way is it possible to have a clear 
understanding of what perfection means. This statement at 
once reveals the strength and the weakness in Baumgarten's 
position, as will presently appear. But let me continue. By 
defining aesthetic perception, then, as a lower form of knowl­
edge, he appears only to have meant that the content, and not 
the type of apprehension itself, is of the same kind as in cog­
nition. If his statements are literally understood, as 




Aesthetica, Part 1§14: quoted in Cohen's Kants
Begrundung der Aesthetik. p. 3 4 .
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confusion of intellectual relations,which never comes to clear
expression without ceasing to he beautiful,when it passes into
knowledge. But this would be to suppose what is nonsensical,
that Baumgarten saw the beauty of things in a different way
from us, in a confused haze. However theories may alter, the
experience of the beautiful remains esentially the same. It is
sufficient to recall what Aristotle says, that "a very small
animal organism cannot be beautiful, for the view of it is con- 
1
fused". It was simply the inarticulate nature of feeling
that he intended to convey in the definition of the Beautiful as 
a confused representation. The object of Aesthetic is what 
would be for the intellect a complex of confused relations, but 
this does not imply that the aesthetic perception is itself 
confused, for as Logic is the perfection of thought,. Aesthetic 
is the perfection of sensible apprehension and is therefore in 
its nature intended to have a clear expression peculiar to it­
self. In Baumgartenfs phrase, it is the art of beautiful
2
thinking (ars pulchre cogitandi), and this qualification is 
sufficient to constitute Aesthetic into a distinct type of 
apprehension from cognition. It is therefore misleading to 
say, without further explanation, that for Baumgarten Taste 
is a faculty of knowledge. Every kind of perfection is a 
harmony of differences in unity, and this will be the same in 
sensible knowledge; but while the content is intellectually 
confused, the aesthetic perception is not itself confused, for 
the beauty of a representation consists in the degree of clear­
ness with which it is apprehended, or in Baumgarten1s words, it 
is the perfection of sensible knowledge as such. In the dim 
twilight of the intellect, aesthetic intuition is able to have 
a clear perception peculiar to itself. This interpretation is 
supported by Erdmann's significant statement, that the judgment 
of Taste "rests upon a perception that is (though clear) con- 
fused". How it is the very same distinction that Kant
^Poetics, vii, 4: Butcher, p. 31.
2Erdmann: Hist. Phil, ii, p. 239.
*%ist. Phil, ii, p, 240.
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sought to establish in his theory of* indeterminate knowledge,
or as it is otherwise expressed, the consciousness of an end
without any determinate end. This is identical with Baumgarten1 s
confused or indeterminate perception of relations in a unity.
But neither in Kant nor in Baumgarten does this mean a confused
apprehension or indeed an intellectual activity of any kind.
I therefore think that Basch has misunderstood both his authors,
1
when he criticises Kant on the same grounds as Baumgarten.
Indeterminate knowledge does not mean for Kant a hazy conception,
it does not mean knowledge of any kind, but the original- mental
disposition by which all determinate knowledge is conditioned,
and which is more akin to feeling and conation than to cognition
itself. Basch has certainly a strong case against Leibniz,
when he observes that on his theory all confused representations
would be indiscriminately beautiful, which- in fact they are not,
and that therefore he cannot provide an aesthetical criterion.
But this criticism hardly applies to Baumgarten with the same
force. He could have replied, that a confused representation
which is not able to hold our admiration for any length of time
without thinking about it, is not beautiful, and that it is
beautiful when we are able to dew dwell in the mere perception
while the activity of thought is suspended. Hor is it necessary
2
to suppose with Basch, that on this theory the Beautiful would 
cease to exist with the completion of Science; for the Beautiful 
is independent, even for Baumgarten, of the growth of Science, 
and it will remain for Science a confused representation so long 
as it makes it worth our while to think it beautifully. It is 
the content, then, that is intellectual for Baumgarten in 
aesthetic intuition, but the type of apprehension need not 
itself be intellectual. It is the same content that is differ­
ently apprehended in Logic, Ethic and Aesthetic. As the 
Beautiful and the Good appear to the Understanding only as Truth^
1 , /
L'Esthetique de Kant, p. 186.
2
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and as the Beautiful and the True are for the Will only the
Good, so the True and the Good are for sensuous knowledge only
the Beautiful; just as a singing "bird exists only as tone for
1
the ear, and as colour and form for the eye. As Schasler 
says, this conception lifts Baumgarten at one stroke above the 
confusion of the Beautiful with the Good, which we find in 
Plato and later in the English and French Schools.
But we must not be misled by Schasler's generous apprecia­
tion. I have only contended so far, that in attributing an 
intellectual theory of Beauty to Baumgarten, we should be careful 
to place the accent on the content apprehended rather than on 
the aesthetic apprehension itself. This latter he conceives, 
as he only could conceive it, in the form of feeling and in­
determinate sense-perception. But this implies a contradiction, 
and it is here the real criticism falls. For it may well be 
asked if it is possible to apprehend intellectual relations, as 
such, in a form of apprehension which is not itself intellectual. 
How the content, not only in Aesthetic, but in every form of 
mentality, is primarily and essentially intellectual for Baum­
garten. His theory is based on the rationalistic assumption 
. that the world is perfectly ordered by Reason and is the best 
possible. He therefore does not mean, as we should say, that 
. Aesthetic is the expression of the same content which in an­
other form is expressed as Truth, but that it is the sensuous 
expression of that whose first and proper expression is Truth,
;and he therefore defines it as the Beauty of Truth (pulchritudo 
cognitionis). He has no idea of Aesthetic as the inevitable 
expression of a content which may indeed be described in in­
tellectual terms, but never in a way that is adequate to its 
meaning; or, that Aesthetic expresses just that quality in the 
content of which we can have no clear conception. The real 
error in Baumgarten's theory, then, is the contradiction that an 
intellectual content can coexist with a form of feeling which is
1
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not itself an intellectual mode of apprehension, or as Wolff 
defined feeling, an intuitive mode of knowledge (cognitio in­
tuit iva). Kant saw this clearly enough, hut instead of re­
pairing the error hy providing Aesthetic with a content 
peculiar to itself, he deprived it of all content whatsoever. 
Accordingly, where Baumgarten fell short in the lofty theory of 
Aesthetic with which he is accredited hy Schasler, was in main­
taining an assumption which is the cardinal and intractable 
error in Kant's position, that significant expression is im­
possible without logical form. The only theory which could 
call for serious criticism, and what Kant really thought to 
burn in the genial effigies of his predecessors, rtwas not the 
view that Aesthetic is intellectual, but the rationalistic im­
plication which had been nourished in mediaeval speculation, 
that Beauty is an evidence of the Divine Reason in a perfectly 
ordered world. This would make Beauty a part of the economy 
of Mature and degrade it into something that is good to eat.
But such a "fat weed", even for Kant's remote observation, 
could hardly flourish in the clarified air of the Romantic 
Revival, which was nigh half a century old when he gave final 
expression to his opinions.
Altogether we receive the impression, that criticism has 
not the same original force in the third Critique as in the first. 
This is not to say that Kant has made no advance on his pre­
decessors. We shall see presently that he was the first to 
iplace Aesthetic on a secure foundation. But the very points in 
|which his criticisms appear to count are those in which he shares 
; the same fault. Thus, while he sought to escape Baumgarten's 
| contradiction by severing form from content, he fell into the 
S same formal conception of Beauty as a symmetry of relations in 
■his theory of pulchritudo vaga. It is in the implications of 
his theory which he neglected to develope that Kant outstrips
his predecessors, and therefore our interpretation will be more 
successful if we consider his work as constructive rather than
8.
critical. I have already tried to explain -what the new faculty 
means, which he calls Reflective Judgment. It will he sufficient 
to remember that it is not a judgment in the logical sense, al­
though it has a certain affinity to logical judgment which Kant 
is quite able to justify. Reflexion covers the whole domain of 
feeling, intuition and unthinking perception, and its objects are 
just what is inarticulate for knowledge. And the problem is^ 
whether these unthinking intuitions can be entertained with at 
least the same degree of reasonable conviction^as thoughts whose 
claim to truth can be demonstrated. Those contingent forms which 
the material substrate of Nature presents to our Understanding, 
are quite unlike the causal connection of phenomena. They 
constitute a purpose in themselves or in our apprehension which is 
not necessary, so far as we can see, to their existence as pheno­
mena. Things do not need to be organic or beautiful in order to 
appear, but as phenomena they are necessary because completely 
dependent on our Understanding - der Verstand ist der Urheber der 
Natur. While, therefore, their existence as phenomena is 
necessary, their existence at all or their purpose is not 
necessary but contingent, and we can only regard them as emana­
tions of the Supersensible. Of these contingent forms the beauty 
of Nature, including its ideal imitation in Art, and the adapta­
tion of means to ends in her organic forms, are the two outstand- 
~"ing instances. These are not matters of fact so much as favours 
of Nature in which the Unknown Matter, disports itself before our 
eyes. But although they are both made intelligible by the same 
Ifaculty ©f reasonable Peeling, they are yet very distinct; and 
Kant has scarcely attempted to show what they can have in 
Icommon to justify us in bringing them under the same principle . 
Whether and how far this is possible will form the conclusion to 
our study. Meanwhile we proceed to consider the first of these, 
and here Reflexion becomes the Aesthetical Reflective Judgment.
Not so very long before the Critique of Judgment appeared,
Kant did not think that a philosophy of the Beautiful was possible.
He makes this admission in the Transcendental Aesthetic, where 
he seeks to justify his use of the term 'aesthetic' to denote 
pure perception in space. The G-ermans, he says, are the only 
people who have availed themselves of this word to denote 
Philosophy of Taste, and they have done so in the mistaken hope, 
which Baumgarten entertained, of finding a rational basis for it 
and raising its principles to the dignity of a science. But all 
this labour is vain, for the principles which govern Taste are 
in their sources empirical and therefore cannot take the place 
of a -priori laws. A judgment of Taste is rather the peculiar 
touchstone of a -priori laws by which their weakness in this 
domain of experience is discovered. It were therefore advis­
able to reserve the term for what is true science, the pure
forms of sense, and in this we are much nearer to its original
\  v ^
use among the Greeks, with whom ULiTthtTxL Y^y'TX-
1
was a prevalent division in Knowledge. This was in 1781 when 
the Critique of Pure Reason first appeared. He then thought 
that the Beautiful could not rise above the low level of 
psychology, being only capable of empirical principles. Ex­
perience gave rise to certain rules, as conventional as the rules 
of Taste in wine or any other agreeable object; it could not be 
said that in the very nature of the Beautiful there were princi­
ples which conditioned experience, corresponding to the constant 
and original factors in knowledge such as the principle that all 
sensible objects must have extensive magnitude. In the second 
edition, some six years later, he repeats this note with the 
significant alternative, that Taste may share the name Aesthetic
with speculative philosophy and then Aesthetic will be received
2
partly in a transcendental, partly in a psychological sense.
But the second edition introduces other modifications which 
Hartenstein apparently thought were original. Instead of saying 
that the principles of Taste are empirical in their sources,
Kant now says that they are only empirical in their main sources
1 . . . .  2
Hartenstein iii, p.56 — 7., note. See Hartenstein's re­
marks on above citation
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(vornehmsten Quellen) f and it, is not a -priori laws that we
cannot discover in Aesthetic hut determinate a priori laws. 
(hestimmten Gesetzen).!
/All these little things count. It means that he does not
despair of the sources. What appears impossible is not to 
discover a priori principles hut determinate a priori principles 
corresponding to those in Science,.and in his most mature con­
clusions in the Critique of Judgment he never aspires to deter­
minate principles. Then in the well-known letter to Reinhold, 
already quoted, and written in December of the same year (1787), 
he advances his new confidence in an undertaking which he 
formerly held to he impossible, with engaging candour: "I can
assure myself without being guilty of self-conceit, that the 
further I advance on my way, the more unconcerned I am that a 
contradiction could ever arise or that even an alliance (such as 
is not unusual at present) could do considerable damage to my 
system". The alliance he contemplates is evidently the adop­
tion of Taste into the system of philosophy. He has an inner, 
growing conviction that even in researches where he does not
know his way, he has only to glance at his table of the Elements
2
of Knowledge to get an opening: He is convinced that no realm
of Nature is accidental. We may not have a certain knowledge 
of the Beautiful, perhaps it is not even desirable, but we can 
and must have a reasonable appreciation. It is possible to 
show that the aesthetic sense is an activity of the Human Spirit 
as primary and essential as Knowledge or morality, so that with-
1 out it we are not complete. Indeed Kant comes to show that in
[
1 Aesthetic we make the nearest approximation to divine Understand- 
j ing, for its objects are those which our mind would create for 
j itself if it had creative power. It is true that Taste is 
j formed in society and modified in the growth of civilisation, 
i but it is not therefore formed contingently at the wish and will 
I 1
| Kuno Fischer, Kant und seine Lehre ii, p.408 - 9: cp
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of circumstance, for the Human Spirit has already its idea of 
what, the Beautiful should he. Ho account of Taste is satis- 
1 factory which explains it in terms of other mental functions,
I 1
j and assimilates it to these. It is not a derivative hut an 
;j original faculty. It is neither a modification of knowledge
' i
4 nor of volition nor of sensation.
He begins his proof hy laying down as the First Canon that 
the Judgment of Taste is disinterested (ohne alles Interesse).
■s This is an unfortunate expression and fore-shadows all the 
' false formalism in Kant's theory. But particularly withthis 
author, we must take one step at a time and content ourselves 
meanwhile with its narrowest meaning. All he should intend to 
say is that Aesthetic has no interest in the existence of its 
objects. In this respect he compares it favourably with the 
Pleasant and the G-ood. It should he said at once that these
contrasts are miserable and are never clearly defined. Un­
fortunately we shall have to notice them later, hut this much 
at least should he said now, that while the case of Pleasure is 
notorious, the contrast is not so obvious in the Good. In the 
first place, we hardly expect it from Kant for whom the Will 
has no Interest of any kind, not even personal, in its objects.
But this just indicates the modifying influence of his later
reflections on his moral theory. He now seems to speak of the 
Good loosely, as one would speak of good things; he states ex-
 ^ plicitly, however, that he does not mean the useful only hut
; 2 
ialso"that which is good absolutely and in every respect".
I
iHe appears to have felt the need of explanation, for he adds in
[
;ja note, , that pure moral judgments "may he quite disinterested.
[hut vet very interesting, i.e. not based upon an interest, hut 
] 3
'bringing an interest with it". This does not constitute any 
3
| contrast, for the same is eminently true of the Beautiful.
j
[ ^Cp. Ueher Philosophie uberhaupt: Rosenkranz, p. 586.,
f where he deprecates attempts to reduce knowledge, Feeling
^and Volition to a common principle.
Critique of Judgment & 4 i Bernard, p.53.
3 T
ibid.A 2: Bernard, p. 48.*
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But Kant meant it seriously, and it is the burden of* his 
third canon which will be discussed in its proper place.
The Beautiful, then, has only to do with the form of
things. But this is not the ordinary distinction between
form and matter on which Kant's doctrine of phenomenalism
rests. For in the Beautiful even the pure representation of
space, which is the form in phenomena, is excluded because it
1
is an ingredient in cognition. By the form he means rather 
the way in which the thinking subject is affected. Beauty is 
not a perceived quality in the object but exists in our minds. 
It was well said by Hegel regarding this canon that it is the 
first rational word concerning Beauty, and it is Kant's single 
triumph over Baumgarten though he did not use it to great 
advantage. He showed for the first time that the outlook in 
Aesthetic is peculiar to itself and that the activity in 
aesthetic perception is of an order distinctly its own. In 
this sense it may be said with truth that there is no natural 
beauty, for beauty does not consist in the fact of impression 
but in the contemplative state which accompanies the impression. 
This is proved by the fact that our artistic impressions of the 
same objects vary and sometimes do not return to us at all; 
they are not constant effects like the impressions in sense- 
perception but depend altogether on the state of the subject.
It. was to ensure this condition that Kant called aesthetic per­
ception a form of Judgment, for which he has been much maligned 
as, for instance, by Victor Basch. But Kant has really some­
thing to say for himself. In the first instance Aesthetic is 
perception, as the word originally means. But if it is to be 
anything more than a mechanical consequence of sensation, the 
impression must be mediated through some form of reflective 
activity akin to what takes place in logical Judgment.
1
ibid. introd. vii. Bernard, p.29 - 50.
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A savage cry of pleasure is not aesthetical because it is an 
immediate effect of sensation. low Kant noticed, that while 
the basis in an. aesthetical Judgment must be sensation 
(empfindung), for otherwise it would not be aesthetical, "there 
is only one single so-called sensation which can never be an
1
idea of an object, and this is the feeling of pleasure and pain"; 
and it is this sensation alone, and not any other, that forms the 
basis in aesthetic perception. This at opce brings it into line 
with logical Judgment, for the feeling of approval or disapproval 
is decidedly an apperceptive function, or as Kant would say, the 
distinctive giark of an aesthetical Judgment consists in the 
comparison of a representation with other representations and with 
the whole reflective faculty. While therefore Aesthetic is 
primarily sensuous, there must also be the activity of Under­
standing. But I cannot proceed further without remarking that 
here Kant has brought himself into difficulty. We are only 
concerned at present to cut a clear path; the sheaves can be 
bound and gathered afterwards. He saw that there is a spurious 
kind of Judgment which is at once aesthetical because its basis 
is sensation, and also a reflective activity akin to what takes 
place in Judgment^because its basis is Just that peculiar form 
of sensation in which all sensation is apperceived. Let it be 
said here for the sake of clearness, that the immediate sensation 
of pleasure or pain is not the same as the feeling of pleasure 
and pain; the former is reflex emotional expression while the 
latter is a function of conscious apperception. Well, this 
spurious Judgment is no other than that abhorred brood, the 
Pleasant. In the Judgment, 'Wine is pleasant', the basis is 
not immediate sensation but as it is mediated through our 
appreciation, and therefore "an aesthetical Judgment of sense
(asthetisches Sinnenurtheil) is possible".^
1
Ueber Philosophie uberhaupt: Rosenkranz 1 ., p. 598.
2
ibid: p. 597.
Now Kant is 1301111(1 over not to admit the aesthetical Judgment
of Sense to the same rank as Aesthetic proper, and. he therefore
distinguishes the latter as the aesthetical reflective Judgment.
But he nowhere makes a satisfactory distinction between them.
The point of difference for him is that there is no comparison
in the aesthetical Judgment of sense^and that in consequence it
cannot pretend to the universality of the aesthetical reflective 
1
Judgment. But this admission cancels the peculiar character 
of pleasure-pain as distinct from mere sensation, and indeed 
this is what happens, for we find him saying that the basis in 
an aesthetical Judgment of sense is "that sensation which is
2
immediately produced by the empirical perception of the object%  
The truth is that the Pleasant is not so conventional as Kant 
imagined.
Let us now return to the more important question which will 
bring us on to the main track again, how we are to distinguish 
the aesthetical form from the logical Judgment, or what is the 
same thing, Reflexion from Knowledge; for the logical Judgment is 
pre-eminently apperceptive, the synthetic unity of apperception 
being the supreme principle of Understanding. In the Judgment, 
'Rust is a form of the process called oxidation', the presenta­
tion first receives adequate meaning in being assimilated to a 
general process, which is the same in kind whether as found in 
the burning of a candle, an explosion, or the physiological 
function of respiration. But while in this instance the 
associations which make the presentation intelligible are necess­
ary connections in experience, and may therefore be said to be 
reproduced in imagination, the apperceptive function in Re­
flexion is productive, because the associations are ideally 
selected from the necessary context in experience and placed in 
a new relation. The process in aesthetic perception is on a 
parallel with what takes place in reminiscence. Our memory of
1 '
Ueber Philosophie uberhaupt; Rosenkranz 1 ., p., 59Q.
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the past is always an ideal unity. Dissevered from the 
pragmatic interest which we felt at the time and which is 
now diminished in intensity or forgotten altogether, events 
are reproduced selectively with the impersonal regard of a 
dispassionate spectator. Even excessively painful occurences, 
which are fresh in recollection, are subject to the same 
principle. For we either seek to banish them from our minds 
as intolerable, or the acuteness of recollection is so modified 
that we are able to retain them as detached from our immediate 
well-being, and then our interest is no longer personal but 
dramatic and we contemplate them with the sublime pleasure 
that we feel in tragedy. It is the same kind of activity that 
is at work in Art with the difference, that while in reminis­
cence the events are past, it is from the sensational effect 
of present events that we detach ourselves. It is true that 
knowledge is also selective. The impressions of sense which 
rain down upon us are not passively received, but organised 
with a methodical intention into the unities which we call 
objects. Our selective interest, however, is confined within 
very narrow limits, being determined by the systematic connec­
tion of experience; the associations reproduced are strictly 
those which contribute to the existence of the object, and our 
purposive activity is restrained by the end of knowledge as a 
^system of necessary relations. But in Aesthetic our activity 
is purposive without being controlled by any determinate purpose, 
for it has no end beyond the harmony of its own processes; it 
is the thinking part of our mind working unconscious of its 
accustomed end, or in Kant's words, it is the free play of 
Imagination and Understanding.
If Kant had developed the principle contained in this 
canon to its full consequence^, he would have said practically 
all that needs be said in a philosophy of the Beautiful. If 
Aesthetic is an activity akin to Judgment and yet, unlike 
Judgment, takes no cognisance of existential relations, it
16.
will "be the exercise of an ideal Understanding and therefore 
a truer and purer interpretation of Nature than is given in 
Science, without itself being Science. But the unconscious 
Understanding as it appears in Productive Imagination is for 
Kant a more general and abstract faculty than the Understanding 
itself, and consequently its objects are not the ideal forms 
of Nature stripped of their contingencies in the conditions of 
existence, but a more remote description of Nature which is 
so general that it has no meaning at all. His principle that 
every ingredient of cognition be excluded, should mean no 
more than Oscar Wilde's aphorism, in his preface to Dorian 
Gray, that "all art is quite useless". As the useful Arts, 
according to Aristotle, political, economic, industrial, bring 
to completeness the ends which Nature can only realise imper­
fectly, so the Art of the Beautiful envisages the ideal in­
tention of Nature, but with this difference which Aristotle 
appears not to notice, that unlike the useful Arts, the end of 
the Beautiful is exhausted in the harmony of our own subjective 
processes and we have no purpose of bettering Nature or any­
body else. It is interesting to find Oscar Wilde paralleled 
in Kant's Logic Lectures of 1772_^  where he says, "Das Schone 
soli immer ungebrauchlich sein". But Kant took so seriously 
what Kant has only truth as an aphorism, that his theory of 
the Beautiful is useless for the aesthete as well as for the 
scientist or moralist. He appears to speak of the Beautiful 
as if it were subjective to the second power and so at two re­
moves from Reality, phenomena being already subjective representa­
tions, and further of the Sublime as a third degree of abstract ior 
But his position that the elements of beauty which we find in 
objects exist in our minds and not in the objects themselves, 
must be understood as a peculiar consequence of his theory of 
Knowledge. A harmony of relations like every appearance of 
1
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purpose in Nature, organic or inorganic, is in Kant's opinion 
contingent for Understanding, because we cannot see that this 
character in phenomena is necessary to their existence as 
objects of knowledge. But anyone who has read Kant with 
sympathy will agree that the Subjective in all its forms, moral, 
aesthetical and teleological, has for him more worth and reality 
than the objective region of Science; the one misfortune is 
that its reality cannot be demonstrated. And it is specially 
important for us to carry his principles to their g farthest 
limits, wherever he gives us encouragement to proceed, because 
we are not immediately concerned with his aesthetic theory 
except as it sheds light on the interpretation of his whole 
system. The value of his aesthetic principle consists in the 
discovery of different planes in Subjectivity. The modern 
commonplace that there are degrees in Reality would be expressed 
by him as degrees in Subjectivity. And in his theory of 
Genius he shows, if only incidentally, that he had a true con­
ception of what is meant by the subjective quality of Aesthetic. 
For Genius does not reproduce Nature according to a rule of 
Understanding, but works up the material supplied to it
according to the law of association "into something different
1
which surpasses Nature". It is not an imitation but an ideal
imitation, in Aristotle's sense of the term as when he saya
that dancing 'imitates' character, emotion, and action, where
' 2
it is equivalent to expression. The original elements of 
Beauty must no doubt be found in Nature and in this sense 
Beauty does reside in Nature; yet it is not these elements as 
they are scattered and dispersed in Nature or as they are im­
perfectly organised into appreciable unities which are hampered 
and obscured by contingencies, that the artist depicts, but as 
they are ideally selected to form that aesthetic semblance 
which their appearance suggests to the artistic mind alone.
1
Critique of Judgment. 49: Bernard, p. 198.
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And. what h© imitates is not the actual hut what Katun© tried 
to express and failed. This is the proper and only sense in 
which a work of Art should be true to life. What the poet re­
presents is not what is but what may be and even what ought to
be, if we conceive of Beauty with Schiller as an imperative
1
when he says, ‘'I call Beauty a duty of appearances". All 
Art seeks to give to the soul of things the expression which 
is most fitting to its nature. So far it will be a reproduc­
tion of what is actual, but as Aristotle says of portrait-
painting, it is a representation "which is true to life and yet
2
more beautiful". For the first time Nature becomes beautiful 
when she is interpreted by artistic genius. It is not a re­
production but a production, not an imitation but a creation.
And what takes place in the mind of the artist is enacted by the 
ordinary consciousness in a less degree. To have aesthetic per­
ception is to exercise in limited measure the creative activity 
of G-enius. A clear understanding of the intention in Art is 
the only standard of criticism. Otherwise we shall oppose the 
products of G-enius as realistic or idealistic, the former alone 
being true, in the most bewildering confusion. The truth is 
that realism and idealism in Art come to the same thing, for 
while the idealist represents the universal as it may exist in 
conditions which it chooses for itself, the realist indeed re­
presents what is actual but at the moment when it is most ex­
pressive of the Ideal. The intention of Art in Dickens is the 
same as in Balzac and Tolstoi. The characters in Dickens move 
in an atmosphere of such august universality that they barely 
touch the ground, but if Mr. Micawber, Mrs. Gamp, the brothers 
Cheeryble, Mr. Mantalini or even Captain Bunsby, are hardly 
capable of existing in sensible conditions, it is not because 
they are unreal but because they are too true to life. And,
1
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Komer of Oct. 20, 1794.
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€on the other hand, a realistic writer like BalzaO betrays this 
common intention in Art, when he makes us feel that he is over­
straining realism as in Old G-oriot, and this is because it is 
not necessarily the actual as it exists that he is describing 
but as it is most representative of what may be. A crucial 
instance for the unsophisticated mind is George Meredith. Here 
is an artist who can be indifferently regarded as realist or 
idealist, the former because he dissects the most delicate and 
intricate operations of the human heart with so fine a touch 
that the ordinary mind cannot perceive them nor even believe 
that they are actual when the author tells them so, and for 
this very reason he may be ^regarded as idealist^ The same 
principle applies to Painting and Statuary. Turner is 
popularly called an idealist, but in Ruskin's opinion he was 
the most realistic painter of his age. There remains the sub­
sidiary but important criterion of poetic truth^that it must 
be internally consistent or have ideal necessity; otherwise, 
even as fiction, it will be alike improbable and impossible.
This conditional necessity is what Kant's Fourth Canon, the 
modality of the aesthetical Judgment, means when adequately in­
terpreted. It is really a corollary to the Second which treats 
of the universality in the Judgment, and it would be pedantic 
to take it separately. We therefore propose to restrict our 
selves to three canons.
Kant's principle is capable of a further and final application 
which brings it to the test, and which raises the i/hole ques­
tion of imitation in Art. If the space-form, as an ingredient 
in cognition, be excluded from Aesthetic, what has he to say 
of those objects which are nothing but representations in 
Space? I mean geometrical figures. This is discussed m  
the opening pages of the Teleology, | 62. As might be ex­
pected, he wavers and gives no satisfactory reply. He refuses 
to call aesthetical a simple figure like the circle, because
it is capable of many intellectual combinations. He will 
not even call it intellectual Beauty, because this would destroy 
the proper meaning of Beauty as free from every notion which 
contributes to the existence of an object, and prefers to re­
gard it as a relative Perfection. In shortjit is classed with 
the objective-formal type of Teleology. It is also discussed 
in § 2 2  where he gives his unqualified opinion, that our in­
terest in geometrical figures is not properly aesthetical at 
all but intellectual. His point is that we cannot think of a 
circle or cube without a concept of mathematical necessity, 
which puts a constraint upon Imagination; only those drawings 
can be beautiful which are the work of free fancy, such as 
arabesques and bizarre decorations of like kind, and which do 
not serve any intellectual purpose. Here we see the sinister 
intention in Kant's first Canon; he could not understand how 
an intellectual interest can be compatible with aesthetic feel­
ing. But it is really not important what he says. I only 
mentioned his opinion in order to introduce a wider problem. 
There are certain geometrical figures such as the ellipse, 
Zeising's golden section and Hogarth's undulating line, which 
are acknowledged to be simply beautiful apart from any mathe­
matical implications. And the question is, if these represen­
tations whose significance is exhausted in their linear form, 
have nothing to offer which Art can improve, whether the artis­
tic imagination is not restricted in its activity to imitation 
in the literal sense of reproduction. We are now scraping 
the bottom and must look out that we do not run aground. Even 
here Kant's principle still holds in spite of his own opposi­
tion. Expressed in its most general terms the question is, 
as Signor Croce has recently been reminding us, whether all 
intuitions as the adequate expression of impressions are not 
aesthetical. Here there is implied a distinction betweem 
Beauty and Art which may be differently conceived and which 
must be more or less artificial. Stated abstractly, it is
the difference between the Greek conception of Beauty as 
formal symmetry and the Romantic as characteristic expression. 
Aesthetic manifestly is more than Beauty in the narrow sense, 
for it includes the ugly, the sublime and tragic representa­
tions which are not immediately pleasing in their form. We 
do not need to deceive ourselves in thinking that the dwarfs 
of Velasquez are beautiful men, but they do give aesthetic 
pleasure because they are made perfect of their kind; they 
are not beautiful in their form, for this is repulsive, but 
in their typical expression of what a dwarf should be. The
difference is seen in the different kinds of pleasure. The
perception of formal symmetry is merely contemplative, or to
use another phrase of Kant's, it is what pleases in "the
1
mere act of judging", while the pleasure in sensuous expres­
sion as the perfect embodiment of an idea is expansive, soar­
ing, dynamic. Kant himself had indeed observed a distinc­
tion between Beauty and Art which has become notorious in 
criticisms of his theory, but he drew the line at the wrong 
point. He maintained that while Art has intention, pure 
Beauty has none, and therefore Art cannot be beautiful. We 
should rather say that while a representation which has no 
meaning at all may be considered beautiful, the typically 
beautiful is only found in Art. How the question is not 
whether certain intuitions as the simple but adequate expres­
sion of sense-impressions may be beautiful. This is ad­
mitted. The ellipse has undoubtedly acquired content as the 
orbit of the heavenly bodies and may now be regarded as the 
aesthetic symbol of infinite spaces, but before this astrono­
mical discovery was made it was beautiful, as a Greek vase 
is beautiful of which it is the geometrical form. A Greek 
vase is beautiful for no reason in the world and not because 
it is the perfect embodiment of an idea, for there is no 
1
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good reason why a vase should he elliptical. The same is 
true of flowers, musical melodies and harmonies which are 
only made to- please. The question rather is whether this 
narrow conception of Beauty is not the whole of Art as Art 
for Art's sake, in the "decadent" use of the aphorism. For 
Signor Croce the distinction only means the difference be­
tween simplicity and complexity in expression, while Tolstoi 
drastically cuts the knot by excluding the Beautiful as mean­
ingless expression from Art, which must always be infectious 
expression. Happily we are not called to enter further into 
this unsettled problem, and may content ourselves by observ­
ing that the limits of the discussion are fixed for us in the 
opposing views of Lessing, who made expression subordinate to 
Beauty, and Tolstoi, who subordinates Beauty to expression.
We may fearlessly admit that simple intuitions can be aestheti­
cal without the least danger of degenerating into a mimetic 
theory of Art. For if our perception is aesthetical, it is 
never mere reproduction in imagination. The representation
is beautiful, not because we perceive it at all, but because
should
we perceive the very form we shar33r produce ourselves if our 
imagination were free to create its own objects. The test 
of its aesthetic quality is that our perception is of the 
same productive nature as the creative activity of G-enius.
For the first time the form receives its aesthetic sanction 
from artistic imagination. Thus a perfect reproduction as 
in photography may have aesthetic quality, for though it is 
received as Nature gives it, it is not because Nature gives 
it; it is chosen. As Kant says, the important point is not 
what Nature is, "but how we take it".l And these simple in­
tuitions which Art cannot improve are aesthetical, because our 
choice rests on grounds which are the same in kind as those 
1
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on which subjects are chosen from Nature for artistic treatment. 
We have already recognised that the elemental source of the 
Beautiful is Nature herself. Without actual perception of 
form, colour, sound, emotional expression and character as it 
is enacted in life, the works of G-enius could never arise. In 
this elementary sense Nature is the beginning of all Art. Kant 
did not take this into account in his official theory, where he 
seems to speak of the Beautiful as the mere subjective product 
of our own minds. But he otherwise does recognise the Super­
sensible, in the disposition of Nature to our Understanding, 
as the ultimate source of these favours: were it only what he
says in contrasting it with the Sublime, that "we must seek a
1
ground external to ourselves for the Beautiful of Nature".
Now we are to acknowledge a further concession on the part of 
the Supersensible. In striving to equip herself to the best 
advantage, Nature gives token that she is capable of artistic 
treatment by throwing out, as it were by accident, certain 
symmetrical collocations, which have this at least in common 
with the products of Art, that they are wholly undesigned.
-And just as, in Aristotle's opinion, certain historical facts 
may be legitimate subjects for Poetry, whose criterion of truth 
is quite different from History, because they are capable of 
adapting themselves to the ideal conditions of poetic truth, 
so do those meaningless symmetries commove us to aesthetic 
admiration because, in their utter destitution of all signifi­
cance, they emulate the ideal conditions of artistic truth.
As by-products of Nature they have only hypothetical necessity, 
and by this circumstance they are detached from the actual world 
and claim affinity to Art. Both St. Augustine and Schopen­
hauer have independently remarked how plants invite our admira— 
'tion>as if they would compensate|for their want of conscious- 
j ness by becoming known. It is their very poverty of meaning
I '1 2
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that, gives rise to an aesthetical illusion in which we think 
them capable of more than they are, and perhaps their barren 
beauty is best described as due to a kind of aesthetic pity. 
Certainly to one who has the acquired insight of a botanist or 
the independent and intuitive insight of Genius, the flower in 
the mossy dell may be a pure aesthetic symbolic as the typical 
expression of its kind; and our contemplation is capable of a 
still deeper poetical emotion. But this is not the place to 
introduce the fine sentiments of Schiller and Wordsworth, for 
these are sublime rather than beautiful, and the Sublime forms 
a separate part of our study. Taking the problem at its 
lowest , we are asking ourselves just now what happens when a 
person, who has no scientific apperception and a minimum of 
poetical feeling, pronounces a flower beautiful in all its 
simplicity. In Signor Croce's words, it is a perfect expres­
sion of impressions, and is it therefore aesthetical? A Greek
vase is beautiful because its form is elliptical, but why 
that , .
should which is nothing but a representation m  space, apart
from all astronomical implications, be beautiful? I think the 
true reason is that, by their appearance of ideal necessity, 
they decoy the same mental powers as are at work in genuine 
Art into activity, holding out the hope that something will 
come of it, which hope is vain. In the smell of a rose and 
in the simple sight of it, there is an indeterminate foreboding 
of significance which really arises from sheer nonentity - 
Please forget about the last rose of summer - and which we 
fondly imagine to contain a fearful depth of inexhaustible re­
flection, but we have to turn away from it Unsatisfied, a cer­
tain sign that it is not aesthetical, or we turn and fall to 
again but every time like Sancho Panza are robbed of our feast. 
But once the Powers have begun to move, there is no going back! 
Our aesthetic appetite once whetted, we in desperation want to 
oat the rose or shed its glory with our hands. The truth is 
that we are gently flattered by these empty presentations into
25.
an incipient aesthetic emotion, and in virtue of that strange 
contradiction which pervades human nature, we maintain the 
double consciousness of truth and error. Our conclusion, then, 
is that formal representation of unity in variety which is 
destitute of meaning, is not the Beautiful itself so much as 
its shadow or reflection.
There is thus no place in Aesthetic for imitation in our 
sense, whether we speak of Taste or Productive Art. Even 
when a presentation which claims to be beautiful has nothing 
to offer which artistic perception can improve, it is apper- 
ceived in Productive Imagination, if only incipiently and 
negatively, and there is no question of mere reproduction. 
Photography can be aesthetical when it is not a random repro­
duction but the choice of what is representative and recurs 
most frequently in a landscape, which is so far ideal that it 
can stand out from its actual context with increased signifi­
cance; or, again, it may be able to catch the typical ex­
pression in a face. On this ground alone can it aspire to the 
dignity of Art, and even this is a modest claim, because its 
selective choice is restricted to the field of vision and does 
not extend to the particular features, except in so far as 
these can be modified or eliminated in the negative. But as 
an imitation of Nature which is faithful to the minutest detail, 
it is a second-hand copy which falls far short of the original. 
This is the truth in Plato's mimetic theory, in which the artist 
has less to say for himself than the carpenter and is at three 
removes from Reality. And the reason for this, and what makes 
Photography inferior to Art, is,that it is obliged to attempt 
what true Art never dreams of doing, to rival Nature. Art 
shows its superiority in recognising its inevitable limitations.
It knows that the actual can never be reproduced in the wealth 
and complexity of detail nor with the original thrill of sensa­
tion. For while in Nature form and matter are germane to 
each other, Art must fashion a body for the soul which it
imports from another world out of a foreign substance. What
have pigments, marble or words in common with aesthetical ideas?
From the point of view of Art, of course, the medium peculiar to
each art has everything to do with it. Ihere seems to be a
natural affinity between the marble, with its "bluish veins of
1
blood asleep", and the conception. But this is only to say
that, as the elements of semblance, matter and form are congenital
heterogeneous
Out of this unequal mixture of bebereg-eneue elements, one Nature
more of the same kind could not be reproduced, but only an
aesthetic semblance which cannot compete with the substantial
entelechies in Nature. No painting can compare with natural
colour, no description can adequately translate the verve of
action. Indeed, as R.L. Stevenson observes, literature is not
the imitation of life but of speech, and the nearest approach
to a reproduction of life is to be found in the stories of the
2
first men, seated around the savage camp-fire. No Pygmalion 
can ever again feel the hard marble of his statuary yielding to 
the pressure of his hand and changing into living flesh and blood. 
Recognising this limitation, Art contents itself with an inde­
pendent and ideal imitation, knowing that out of its indifferent 
material it can never reproduce a second Nature. The artist’s 
one method, to quote Stevenson again, is "to half-shut his eyes 
against the dazzle and confusion of reality"; and in surrending- 
ering all pretension to the actual, it not only rises superior 
to photographic imitation, but within the confines of its in­
dependent world outrivals even Nature: perfecting the actual
in the higher nexus of imaginative truth, transforming the con­
tingent events of history into the reasonable sequence of ideal 
necessity, and interpreting the motiveless passions of men as 
"kbe inevitable consequences of ideal grounds, in a world where 
character and circumstance are congenital factors in the same 
1
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causality which makes up human destiny. Othello was "not 
easily jealous , hut in his unsuspecting nature Jago found his 
opportunity, and the tragedy consists in the fatal adaptation 
of apparently contingent circumstance to character. "It is 
impossible hut that offences will come, hut woe unto him 
through whom they come". The hrute necessity of fact is 
translated in the world of poetic and religious truth into a 
moral causality.
But Photography is condemned to an inferior place because 
it attempts the impossible. In still life it is more success­
ful as a reproduction because the features of Nature are 
relatively constant, though even in this instance it is at a 
disadvantage for Nature is never really the same. The 
trouble for the painter is to catch the representative moment 
in the ever-changing tints of light which to the ordinary eye 
are a constant impression, while Photography, because it is 
instantaneous, can only be successful if at all by happy acci­
dent. But when it' attempts to reproduce the mobile, it miser­
ably fails. Photography is supposed to have proved that no 
artist has ever been able to catch the exact curve of a horse's 
legs in motion. But this does not indicate that Art is in­
ferior as an interpretation of the actual. On the contrary, 
it is Photography that is unreal because it is subj'ect to the 
risk of choosing a moment that is not capable of continuity 
with the flow of living being. Such a beautiful sight as a 
flock of gulls makes a disappointing photograph because it takes 
in too much from the point of view of Art, and too little from 
the point of view of Nature. No gull ever exists in such a 
moment of isolation; the phases which Photography abstracts 
a^re never meant to be stationary, which they must be when the 
impression is instantaneous. We have all seen the Prime 
Minister or some other notable on his way to the House of 
Commons in the Daily Mirror. What a leg the man has! stuck 
UP behind him at an angle of forty five degrees like a hen in 
her oognitative cogitative moods. Surely he does not exist
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in that way. T h e  moment of impression must have b#en w r y  
inauspicious, But any instantaneous moment would be egas&ly 
unreal, for the moments in the mobile do not exist as discrete 
successions hut as continuous transitions, like the flew of 
water, in the ever—changing stream of life. And if is the 
genius of A r t  t h a t  it is able to preserve this original c o n ­
tinuity of existence in an impression which purports to be a 
single moment of time, but which has really nothing to do 'with 
temporal succession at all. To use a simile of M,
Bergson's, Experience is not like the steps of a stair but a
1
gentle declivity (pente douce) , no section of which exists in 
isolation, and of which Time with its discontinuous moments of 
succession is the destroyer. And therefore if the most fleet­
ing moment in this indiscerptible continuity be represented in 
the form of temporal succession, it must be shorter than the 
shortest conceivable moment, and so will escape the most in­
stantaneous photographic impression. Art does not seek to 
imitate the continuous duration of the actual, but represents 
the mobile in a timeless symbol, or to come back to Kant again, 
every ingredient of existence in the object is excluded. But 
this is its gain and not its loss. For Time as the endlessly 
divisible is never actually present, while the moment of Ar , 
in being timeless, is also Present as only the absolutely 
durationless is present, and as what is truly now, the rev 
■tion of the eternal. In the words of Houston Stewart Chamber- 
Tain, “the Present in the sense of durationless is shorter than 
^be shortest conceivable moment, and longer than all 
eternity-2 . Like the moment of the Beautiful in Fau^t, if is 
at one© fleeting and imperishable.
We have now pushed Kant's principle as far as it ’ go
<«Hl have found it capable of a reasonable interpretation. I
w*sh to close this chapter with a brief notice of a fairly recent
L'Evolution Cr^atrioe, P- 3.
 ^ . Band ii, p. 955.
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criticism of the principle as it, has passed into aesthetic 
theories generally, Kant practically says that no intuition 
can he aesthetic unless we are able to forget that it is an 
intuition. To this Signor Croce stands opposed,and maintains 
that all intuitions as the adequate expression of impressions 
are aesthetic. Intuitions are, like this lake, this brook, 
this rain, this glass of water, (p.36.). Aesthetic is thus 
the science of Perception and unites in one the two kinds of 
perception which Kant had treated separately under the same 
name. To be true intuitions they must have successful expres­
sion; imperfect expression is no expression at all, it is pure 
sensation, (pp. 13. 129). The distinction which we make between 
simple apprehension and artistic intuition is for Croce only 
quantitative, the former being simple, the latter complex. If 
now we look away from the method he has chosen and suffer our­
selves to be influenced by the motive of his work, we are held 
in admiration. Somewhat in the spirit of Tolstoi, he seeks to 
reclaim the outlying region of common experience which has been 
banned by aristocratic Art. He refuses to recognise a double 
order of imagination and thinks it impossible to define the 
limits between intuitions which are artistic and those which 
are not. Even the y  utterance of a syllable, if it is perfect­
ly expressed, is aesthetic. This is a praiseworthy intention, 
but Signor Croce is quite unable to maintain his position.
Indeed his book is to be enjoyed as a piece of literature rather 
than studied as a philosophical criticism. We only wish to 
dicate that his opposition to our principle is superficia , 
that he really veres round to Kant's standpoint. If 
taken seriously, we should understand him to say that besides 
intuitions, which are all « aesthetic, there is nothing else but 
Pure sensation. Yet he admits that though all impressions can 
become aesthetic expressions, "none are bound to do so . (p.30.
1
Aesttiet 1 c as Science. of Expression and General Linguistic.
translated from the Italian by Douglas Ainslie B.A. Oxon.
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Must they, then, remain impressions meanwhile,which cannot 
he organised into simple perception unless the expression is 
completely successful? And in his 'Address to the fhird 
International Congress of Philosophy1, he gives away his 
whole case. He admits that the perception of a physical 
object is not a pure intuition hut a construct, an impression 
with arjabstract concept, and therefore it is not aesthetical; 
and we could only have pure intuitions if objects were things 
in themselves . (p. 398). Thus it turns out that, even for 
Croce, aesthetic intuitions are not so plentiful. They 
only become intuitions when we refuse to recognise their 
"unsuccessful expression" in Knowledge and give them form in 
aesthetic imagination. That objects be things in themselves 
and not abstract conceptions of impressions, is indeed the 
criterion of aesthetic intuition, and in Kant's theory 
aesthetic perceptions are things in themselves because they 
are the objects of an independent order of imagination^ which 
transcends the opposition of thought and things. It is a 
weak evasion when Croce protests against this dualism, the 
admission of which destroys his theory of Art as pure intui­
tion (p.398). The dualism is there, whether it be ultimate 
or not, and is to last out our phenomenal term of life. So 
long as there is unsuccessful expression, there are phenomenal 
constructs which are not mere sensation,, and these carry in 
themselves an inevitable distinction between Appearance and 
Reality,
AESTHETIC AMD CAUSALITY - THE SECOND CANON.
IKE SECOND CANON IN AESTHETIC.
Chapter 4 .
In the realm of the Beautiful, the old things have passed 
away and are become new. But in the rigorous pursuit of this 
first canon, Kant has slipped his moorings. We have cut our­
selves adrift from the familiar roadsteads and are floating 
outwards on the open sea. Every ingredient in knowledge, 
every character in objects by which they can be recognised as 
existing parts in a common world, have been sacrificed, and 
we are landed in a region of impenetrable cloud and ice where 
-no knowledge is. It would seem that the Beautiful is purely 
subjective and only exists in imagination. But this is the 
conclusion which Kant expressly sought to avoid. At some 
considerable risk to the security of the Beautiful, he main­
tained its complete independence of cognition in order to 
vindicate its distinctive position as an original, and not a 
derivative, type of experience. He must now look around and 
provide in a new way the universality which he wilfully threw 
overboard. So the Second Canon ordains that the Beautiful 
must also be universal.
As Kant himself thinks, this canon follows naturally from 
the first; because, when our contemplation is disinterested, 
the pleasure we feel is of such a kind that it can be shared 
with all, while in the case of the Pleasant our private 
interests render community of Taste impossible. Although 
this may be accepted as a convenient contrast, it is not fair 
to the pleasurable feeling which is more than sensation but is 
not admitted to the rank of Aesthetic, and altogether only 
yields a favourable presumption. Kant, however, states it 
more precisely in a technical form which is quite misleading, 
and it is a good illustration of the way in which his 
theoretical assumptions impaired the expression of his thought.
He observes ‘that an aesthetical Judgment in its very nature
must be singular because it is a Judgment of* perception: thus,
the Judgment, ’This rose is beautiful', is aesthetical, while
the Judgment, 'All roses are beautiful’, is purely logical.
But it is peculiar to the aesthetical reflective Judgment that
it is at once singular and universal, for it is not based
merely on a feeling alone but is at the same time instructed
1
by the intellectual faculties. The italics are Kant's. It is 
otherwise with the aesthetical Judgment of sense. The Judg­
ment, ’This rose is pleasant', is singular, and because it is 
singular and nothing more, it is said to be without universality. 
This is false. Kant is here confusing logical universality with 
transcendental universality or the a priori in knowledge. The 
logical Judgment, 'All roses are beautiful', does not contain 
a more constant factor than the singular Judgment. Indeed its 
transcendental quality may be regarded as secondary, for as 
Kant himself says in this section, it is an aggregate of singu­
lar Judgments. The universality in the logical Judgment is 
only numerical, and does not affect the a -priori validity of 
experience. In the Judgment, 'The earth goes round the sun', 
there is no numerical quantity at all, and yet it has trans­
cendental universality. The difference between a universal 
and a singular Judgment, in respect of logical quantity, is that 
the one is a complex and the other a simple synthesis. Each is 
a synthesis of elements which is given in experience; but the 
constant factor in cognition, which enables us to recognise the 
synthesis as necessary and therefore not as conditioned by but 
as conditioning experience, is the same in both. The real 
contrast which Kant had in view in this confusion of logical
with transcendental universality, is his old distinction of the 
Prolegomena between Judgments of perception (Wahmehmungsurtheile) 
1
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and judgments of experience (Erfahrungsurtheile) . A judgment 
of perception is,'This room is warm', or, 'This is sweet', and 
Kant says that it can never become a judgment of experience 
because it is confined to individual feeling. This is a dis­
tinction which of course cannot be maintained, for it is flatly 
contradicted by the central argument in the Analytic Tthat not 
even the perception of a pure representation in space is 
possible without the original mental synthesis which makes 
experience possible. Kant, however, clung tenaciously to 
this artificial distinction, as is evident when we consider 
that it appears both before and after the decisive proof in the 
Analytic. Before he has come to grips with his main problem 
he says there, that "objects might certainly be presented to
us, even if they were not necessarily related to functions of
2
Understanding, as their a •priori condition" . Then there is 
the later passage in the Prolegomena and also the still later 
statement in the Critique of Judgment, already quoted, "that 
we can represent a thing as given although we have no concept 
of it". But the point of the contrast here is quite proper, 
because the basis of comparison between the two judgments is 
their transcendental universality, and there is no question of 
logical quantity at all. And still this is not Kant's pro­
blem, which is much more subtle. To understand his position, 
we must turn to the Ueber Fhilosophie uberhaupt, which is rich 
in suggestion on this as on many other points. What he has to 
prove is a peculiar kind of transcendental universality, whether 
there is a constant and spontaneous factor in a form of judg­
ment which is neither a judgment of perception nor a judgment 
of experience, and it is in respect of this reflective
universality that the comparison between the Pleasant and the
1 c
Mahaffy and Bernard, p .55., Hartenstein iv. 618.




Beautiful must be made. A judgment is aesthetical when it 
has for its basis, not a sensation to which there is an 
object corresponding but merely an affection of the apprehend­
ing subject, the feeling of pleasure and pain. But of this 
there are two kinds: the aesthetical reflective judgment, as
when I say, 'This rose is beautiful', and the aesthetical 
judgment of sense (Sinnenurtheil). as when I say, 'This wine is 
pleasant'. In neither is there any reference to the constitu­
tion of an object. Now Kant wants to believe that the aestheti­
cal reflective has universality while the aesthetical judgment 
of sense, or the Pleasant, has none. To put it briefly in our
own words, he says that while in the case of the Beautiful the
elementary apperceptive function of pleasurable feeling is ex­
tended to the intellectual faculty, not in the form of particu­
lar representations for then it would be ordinary apperception, 
but to the faculty itself as the conditions of knowledge in
general, the Pleasant somehow never gets beyond the bare feeling
1
of pleasure and pain . So far this distinction is plausible 
enough and suggestive of very fruitful ideas. It could mean 
that our experience of the Beautiful has significance while 
pleasant experience has really none at all. In the former
kind of apperception it is our whole personality that is
called into activity, in the harmonious play of Sense, Thought 
and Will; but the latter can only be named apperception out 
of courtesy, for it is a meaningless reiteration of the same 
feeling which never gets beyond itself. All people who are 
destitute of ideas are limited to this low kind of aesthetic 
approval, if aesthetic it may be called. The gourmand smacks 
his lips and keeps telling himself and others how good it is,
lest the counterfeit moment, which has no soul to stay and 
never is, should take its flight; the unlettered plutocrat and
firassa minerva alike betray their anxiety to keep up the 
show of apperception, in chasing round the fruitless feeling
^See Rosenkranz 1 , p. 598 - 9 .
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with which we approve a mere sensation: after seeing some
grand sight, they want to tell you it was fine, and again, 
'That-was very fine, you know', and yet again hut this time 
in lowered accents and some show of caution, for the moment 
has no stuff to feed on and is going, 'I tell you that was 
fine, and don't tell me'. They try to make up for depth of 
feeling by a prolonged vigil, while the true artist in a 
flash of intuition gains the still Beautiful, and is content 
to know that it can never die. The Beautiful has indeed the 
preference in point of universal appeal, just because it has a 
significance which the Pleasant never has. If we wish to 
maintain that this is true, however, we must not restrict the 
Beautiful to aristocratic Art, but define it with Tolstoi as 
the infectious expression.of the elemental bond of sympathy 
among a people, as it is found in their religious feeling.
Apart from particular criticisms which will no doubt be challeng 
ed by those who are competent to speak, Tolstoi may be said to 
have wrought out in prose, in his book What is Art?, the lesson 
of Browning's poetry that Art is love. When, in his vision of 
Easterdav. Browning volunteered to give up the realms of earth­
ly delight, of Art and Mind in succession and made love his 
final choice, he did not meet with the approval he had expected 
from the Spirit, who rather reproached him that he should choose 
at this late hour what he should have found long ago in the 
pursuits of his soul:
What gives its worth to the show or the aesthetic semblance is 
the Name. If it be not the joyous expression of self-efface­
ment, Art is a tinkling cymbal and a hollow symbol, for this is 
what makes it the common possession of all. There are people 
for whom the Pleasant has few charms and who can do without it, 
but even the most ardent hater of Lady-world can be humoured by
tf Now take love! Well betide
Thy tardy conscience! Haste to take 
The show of love for the name's sake"
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a good raconteur or by any form of skilful expression, which 
communicates the personal but at the same time disinterested 
feeling of the individual. But Kant has got himself into the 
difficulty, which was noticed in the previous chapter, that he 
has made the distinction between the Pleasant and the Beautiful 
altogether too sharp. The consequence is that the peculiar 
privilege of an aesthetical judgment, whether of sense or re­
flexion, that it is based, not on a sensation, but on that form 
of feeling in which all sensations are apperceived, seems to be 
destroyed; and then the aesthetical judgment of sense is prac­
tically identified with an ordinary judgment of perception which 
always implies a systematic judgment of experience, and is 
therefore no longer aesthetical but cognitive. And so Kant 
says that the aesthetical judgment of sense is determined by
"that sensation which is immediately produced by the empirical
1
perception of the object" . The fact is that the Pleasant is
/
not to be put down so easily. The roue observes too much taste 
in his rouses to be lightly dismissed with a transcendental 
waive of the hand. When it is said that a certain wine is 
pleasant , the judgment is not confined to individual feeling; 
for this pipe of wine cost more than others, and this argues a 
corresponding consensus of opinion in the public taste. Even a 
pure sensation is not incommunicable feeling, except in the 
sense that all our thoughts and feelings are our own and can­
not be experienced by anyone else, for it is a sensation which
all the world would feel under the same conditions. Since
2
Mr. Bradley exploded the categorical nature of the singular 
judgment, it has been recognised that the demonstrative^]! the 
judgment, 'this' and 'that', are really kinds of universals; 
they are particular expressions for all particulars, and so when 
it is said, 'This is a sensation of coldness', the use of the 
universal form 'this' which can apply to anything indifferently,
1 2 
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intimates that this particular sensation is open to all. If 
the wild vagary of a dream is totally confined to our experience 
and cannot he reproduced in another person, it is because the 
same conditions cannot be realised. Let us take Kant himself 
for an illustration. With all his puritanic rigorism, he was 
no stranger to the all-pervading Pleasant. Wasianski, who 
would seem to have kept a record of his master's breathing,
to judge from the painfully minute account he gives of his death­
bed, says that Kant's health was so exquisite that his sense of
1
organic pleasure was positively acute. Obviously this was a 
well-grounded sensation and Kant could not think of keeping it 
all to himself. But the question to be considered from the 
point of view of Aesthetic is, whether there is anything in this 
sensation worth communicating to others which will infect them 
with genuine appreciation. When a man begins to discourse on 
his organic sensations, his audience intimate by their stony 
looks that they do not wish to understand him. But Kant would
naturally take a different view of the matter. Here is a sensa­
tion which all should be anxious to experience by taking pains 
to cultivate the required conditions; and it is on record that 
when he was packed up for the night by Lampe, "swathed like a 
mummy" or "self-involved like the silkworm in its cocoon", he 
would often say to himself aloud, as if for the profit of man­
kind in general, "is it possible to conceive a human being with 
more perfect health than myself?" Whoever has cultivated a 
good taste in wine,communicates his.pleasure with a disinteres­
ted intention which has some aesthetic quality. Kant himself
2
was aware that he had pushed the contrast too far, and recognised 
that the Pleasant may have a relative universality. His astoni­
shing statement that the Pleasant is not sociable can only be
1
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explained as a national characteristic. Anyone who has 
attended a students'. Kheipe knows that it is not conducive to 
conviviality; it is a solemn conclave of taciturnity and 
devout sentimentality, an aggregate of units under martial rule,
who stand to singtheir songs at the stroke of the hammer, and do
/
everything to order except drink - very different from the hilari­
ous and roaring fun of Tam O'Shanter. The tippler insists on 
others sharing his pleasures; he regards it as a maxim that 
private pleasure is a contradiction, and when he is compelled to 
enjoy himself alone, he addresses himself as an independent 
personality. Kant would have succeeded much better if he had 
straightway acknowledged the universality of the Pleasant as 
communicable. For by making unreserved concessions, he could 
have covered it, heaped coals of universality on its head, until 
it finally disappeared as an independent type of experience and 
stood declared for what it truly is, a parasitic consciousness 
which feeds on the bodies of sensation, an empty form of apper­
ception in which sensations are approved without getting beyond 
them, a threadbare warp of feeling which, if it be not fed with 
the woof of mind, , becomes indistinguishable from sensations 
themselves.
But although Kant did not develop his position nor even 
define it clearly, it is important to understand his meaning; 
for the distinction he sought to establish between the Pleasant 
and the Beautiful,really turns on what is known as the doctrine 
of the aesthetic senses. The feeling of the Pleasant is the 
aesthetic apperception of sensation, but in the Beautiful the 
elementary apperception in the feeling of pleasure is only the 
occasion of the aesthetic process, or in Kant's words, it is the 
sensation which gives rise to the harmonious play in the subject 
1
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of Imagination and Understanding. The Beautiful has only
to do with the form of things, while the Pleasant is more
immediately connected with the matter of sensation; therefore
the aesthetical Judgment of sense may be said to contain
material, but the aesthetical reflective Judgment formal,
2
teleology. Now this distinction between the form and the 
matter of sensation, which is characteristic of Kant's whole 
position and was afterwards developed to great advantage by 
Schiller, is properly a distinction among the senses themselves. 
All the senses are avenues of sensation, but some of them are 
more easily detached from the sensational stimulus. Parti­
cularly in Sight and Hearing, we are not conscious of the affec­
tion of the organ as we are in Touch, Taste and Smell; and 
therefore these two senses have been distinguished as intellectu­
al, disinterested and sociable and have become known as the 
aesthetic senses. Kant himself was aware of this; he isolates 
Sight and Hearing as "the only sensations that imply not merely 
a sensible feeling but also reflection upon the form of these 
modifications of Sense". We may say with Schopenhauer,that
the other senses are identified with the feeling of the whole
4
body and are subservient to Will; or with Spencer,that they are
immediately connected with the furtherance of the life-serving
5
functions, particularly Taste; or in Schiller's rhetorical
style: "importunate matter is repelled from the senses by the
eye and ear, and the object with which we come in direct contact
through the lower senses, is placed at a distance --  the object
of Touch is a force which we suffer, the object of the eye and
6
ear is a form which we create". It should be said, however, 
that the modem tendency is to extend the number of the aesthetic 
1
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senses. Schopenhauer recognised, that there may be a touch 
which is neither pleasant nor painful. The feeling of velvet 
gives in a way peculiar to Touch the same disinterested per­
ception that we have of peachy skin, which is an inseparable
element in feminine beauty. And even the sense of Smell has
1
been championed. Taste is undoubtedly the Caliban of the
senses, for it is immediately connected with the life-promoting
functions. From this distinction between the senses as they
are immediately or indirectly identified with sensation, may
be said to arise the comprehensive principle recognised by
Spencer and Grant Allen, that Aesthetic is the pleasurable state
of feeling in which there is a maximum of stimulation with a
2
minimum discharge of nervous energy. It is a higher rate of 
apperception.
Having cleared the ground, we may now state the problem.
As Kant says, we must not "grope about empirically among the
judgments of others" and base our judgments on a collection of
their suffrages; our idea of the Beautiful must arise spon-
taneously within ourselves. The problem, then, is the same
as in the Critique of Pure Reason on a different plane, how
are synthetic judgments a priori possible? The point in this
time-honoured formula is that we are not to be dependent on
experience.' It does not require that in order to be a -priori.
our judgment must be free from all mixture with empirical
shall have
elements, but only that it h-arS a more original sanction than 
the conventional congruity which is produced by repeated 
associations. Logically prior to and coincident with experi­
ence must be our aesthetic sense. The question, then, is 
whether the feeling of Beauty is an acquired sense or whether 
there is not some original direction of our mind which gives 
the lead to experience. Is it only an aimless voice crying 
in the wilderness which awakens no echo in our soul, or is it 
1
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not rather the reasonable expression of our own nature which 
is able to prepare the way? What occasions a problem is the 
conjunction of the two factors, synthesis, which is a posteriori 
because it is the putting together of apparently unrelated 
elements, and analysis, which is a priori because it is the 
breaking up of a whole in which the particular elements are 
originally connected. The judgments of Geometry and Arith­
metic are easily synthetic a priori and do not constitute a 
problem, because the synthesis, though real, is made by our­
selves. Geometrical relations are purely logical and have 
nothing to do with actual succession in time; the elements 
being connected in the relation of ground and consequence, the 
judgments are incontinently true. But it is very different 
when we have to pronounce upon the succession of events in 
time, for these are real changes which we do not make and 
which do not follow one another with the logical certainty of 
a geometrical consequence from its ground. These changes 
simply happen as matters of fact, and unless we had an a priori 
conviction that every change must have a cause, the synthesis 
in experience would have no necessity and our judgment^ would 
be purely empirical. To be synthetic a priori, there must 
be a veritable connection of elements which we could not 
manufacture for ourselves but which must be presented in ex­
perience as an independent fact, and yet it must be a result 
which we can approve with absolute confidence as if it were the 
product of our own thought.
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant showed that our 
knowledge of objects is a -priori, because we realise before­
hand that they must be presented as extensive magnitudes and 
as parts of a necessary system in reciprocal relation; and 
when they are so presented, our conviction amounts to the 
belief that it is we who put them in their places. Mow the 
forms of experience which make up aesthetic feeling are 
combinations of elements which are brought into quite a new
13.
relation, something in advance of what our knowledge gives.
They are not representations in space as these are simply 
perceived hut as they are felt; and the question is whether 
there is a new kind of a priori to validate these syntheses.
Let us keep in mind the entire extent of the problem. On the 
one hand, they are real syntheses which are not made by us any­
more than rocks are. They are not even made by Genius, they 
are discovered. They are facts of Nature, whether we speak 
of natural or artistic Beauty, which are not the products of 
mechanical association nor of contingent fancy, but combina­
tions which have significance as objective and outside of us as 
if God had made them beautiful by His own hand. They are not 
obvious analyses, synonymous expressions for what we know al­
ready, they are a new language with a real synthetic element 
which strikes us forcibly; "they go beyond the concept and even
beyond the intuition of the Object, and add to that intuition
1
as predicate something that is not a cognition". As free 
productions of the human spirit, they have yet all the appear­
ance of having been predestined. This objective character of 
the Beautiful is seen most of all where we find the greatest 
freedom in aesthetic experience. Nothing is withdrawn of what 
has been said of the creative factor in Aesthetic, its complete 
subjectivity, its disregard of existential relations. The 
marvel in Aesthetic is that it can combine this freedom with a 
new objectivity, as independent and as factual as any given 
synthesis in Nature. The work of Genius, while it appears to 
be the facile play of capricious fancy, conceals a serious pur­
pose of Understanding. The more we dwell upon it, the more 
it is found to embody a coherent unity of meaning. The numbers 
flow spontaneously from the lips of the poet, while every verse 




comes warm from the brain of Genius as the free creation of 
his mind, while its structure is arranged on strict mathema­
tical rules. As Kant says in a striking passage, "Taste, 
like the Judgment in general, is the discipline of Genius; it 
clips its wings, it makes it cultured and polished, it gives 
guidance as to where and how far it may extend itself if it is 
to remain purposive. And while it brings clearness and order 
into the multitude of the thoughts, it makes the Ideas suscepti­
ble of being permanently and, at the same time, universally
assented to, and capable of being followed by others, and of an
1
ever—progressive culture". Imagination in its greatest free­
dom conforms to Understanding, for it is Productive Imagination 
and this is just unconscious Understanding. On the other hand, 
besides this synthetic element, a genuine a priori factor is 
discovered. The Beautiful appears as if it were the transparent 
analysis of a whole known to us already, for it conceals its art
and looks like Nature: "Art can only be called beautiful if we
2
are conscious of it as Art while yet it looks like Nature".
It is familiar without being obvious, new without being strange. 
The more we feel its influence, the more does it realise for us 
the inarticulate, shadowy, forms of our spirit which we have
sought to express in vain. It is ourself, for we find ourselves
reflected in it. It repeats itself without ceasing to lose its 
interest for us, because it was not made but always is. As 
Schiller says in his poem An die Freunde, it is only what has 
never happened anywhere that never grows old:
Alles widerholt sich nur im Leben,
Ewig jung ist nur die Fhantasie;
Was sich nie und nirgends hat begeben,
Das allein veraltet nie.
The Beautiful is a real association of elements which yet has
never anyvtfiere come to pass in mechanical Nature. Can this 
1
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trie flow of the passage.
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15.
a priori be justified?
Technically Kant's proof is very simple. What he calls 
the deduction, a term borrowed from jurisprudence, or more 
simply the justification of synthetic judgments a priori in 
Aesthetic, is little more than an appeal to what was already 
proved in the Critique of Pure Reason. In his analysis of
Aesthetic, which practically contains all that he has to say 
in the special proof, he carries it back to the ground—work of 
cognition* This need not mean, as Basch seems to suppose, 
that Aesthetic can only acquire universality by becoming in­
tellectual, when it ceases to be feeling altogether. He saw
that knowledge "is the only kind of representation which is
1
valid for everyone". With a certain latitude of meaning, in 
the sense of language as articulate expression, this statement 
may be allowed to stand. But he also perceived that a communi­
ty in representations implies a common mental disposition 
(Gemuthszustand) which is not itself intellectual. This 
original disposition is the purposive activity of the same 
faculties as are at work in knowledge without arriving at any 
particular determination; it is not knowledge but the trans­
cendental or the original and at the same time immanent con­
ditions which make knowledge possible, not representations but 
the mental powers themselves by which representations are pro­
duced; it is a kind of knowledge in general (Erkenntniss 
uberhaupt). In this medium lies the peculiar function of the 
Urteilskraft or indeterminate Judgment. And Kant’s argument 
is that if knowledge be a fact, this indeterminate mental pro­
cess must be a fact too. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
showed, that Imagination and Understanding, or the faculties 
of Sense and Thought, must be united in every act of perception. 
But in this case the faculties are compelled to unite in a fixed 
relation, for the associated elements which go to make up a 
perceived object must be reproduced in Imagination in a 
1
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determinate order; otherwise we should lose consciousness of 
ourselves, our perceptions would have no necessity and would he 
the capricious play of mental images. Conceive now the facul­
ties of knowledge delivered from this compulsion and united in 
a free relation. Perhaps I may he forgiven for bringing in a 
mechanical illustration from the common steam-crane. By means 
of the contrivance called the clutch, the side -of-cog-wheels 
can he detached from the main axle' . And as these run in 
free play, still in conformity to mechanical law, it is true, 
hut without arriving at any particular determination, so do the 
Powers, released from the serious business of Understanding, 
revolve at a higher rate of apperception. To use a phrase of 
Plato' , our perceptions are no longer "hound by the tie of 
cause ", and yet they do not walk away. This is quite a 
fair description of Kant's theory on its negative side. He 
thought that we are only aesthetically free when our minds are 
off the clutch, and the state of pure aesthetic contemplation, 
as he conceived it, hardly rises above the disinherited re­
flection of a person idling in his chair and twirling his 
thumbs. This state, then, is a fact because it is a necessary 
implicate in the most ordinary knowledge; it is "a procedure
of the Judgment which it must also exercise on behalf of the
1
commonest experience". All knowledge is conditionedby pur­
posive processes of indeterminate attention, of which we may 
be aware as a feeling of harmony. No doubt in the great part
of ordinary cognition, this feeling can hardly be said to exist
e
at all. We experience no agreeable exci^ment in becoming 
aware that 2 + 2  =4. But "this pleasure has certainly been 
present at one time, and it is only because the commonest ex­
perience would be impossible without it, that it is gradually
confounded with mere cognition and no longer arrests particular 
2
attention". This original factor is most easily discovered 
when our knowledge is of a more primitive and genetic order.
1 2 
Bernard, p e 169. ibid: p. 28.
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When we are not able to make up our minds about an object, 
our apprehension is of such a kind that it cannot be said to 
have a^definite content, but what Dr. Stout has called an 
intent or indeterminate content which specifies itself in 
tentative judgments. To this order of apprehension the fore­
casts of induction belong, whereby we seek to organise the 
contingent relations of material existence into the systematic
unity of teleological judgments, and these are "the ground of a
2
very marked pleasure, often even of an admiration". But when­
ever a definite object emerges, the attention is shifted from 
the process to the object of thinking, the anticipative feeling 
of . pleasure dies away, and the infinite possibility of choice 
is checked by a certain, determinate judgment which we are 
obliged to accept. The reflective, free spirit, ranging at 
large, must at length rest in a concept which is strictly 
limited by presentation. It is the double nature of Judgment 
that Kant has in view; it is both logical and psychological, 
a content or meaning and a process of thought,. If we devote 
exclusive attention to the thought, the judgment is logical and 
our consciousness of the activity is suppressed; if we with­
draw ourselves from the thought, the process of thinking comes 
into prominence and then the judgment is psychological. Now in 
Aesthetic, it is not the object as the logical definition of a 
content that occupies us but the way in which we are effected, 
or more simply still, it is not the object as it is perceived 
or thought but as it is felt. It is true, as we shall see 
later, that Kant does not succeed in providing a new signifi­
cance peculiar to Aesthetic itself. And the general criti­
cism that his theory is intellectual, Is incontestable in so 
far as he appears to think,that there can be no coherent mean­
ing which is not expressed in logical definition. But it is a 
1
2
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different matter and, I think, quite unfair to say with Basch, 
that Kant is interpreting Aesthetic as a form of knowledge 
(c1est-a-dire un connaitre). The subjective conditions of 
knowledge surely do not need to be themselves any kind of cog­
nition. The significance of Kant's deduction is that if 
knowledge is an a -priori function of mind, this original dis­
position must also be universally communicable and may be said 
to be a sensus communis. And in fairness to Kant it might 
ought to be said, that in a decisive passage such as that in 
which he discusses the delicate problem whether the pleasure 
precedes or follows, he is careful to use the specific term 
Beurteilung to denote the aesthetical judgment, a term which is
synonymous with Mendelssohn's faculty of approval (Billigungs- 
2
vermogen). What calls for criticism, then, is not so much 
the aesthetical deduction itself as the original deduction in 
his theory of knowledge.
Probably there is no part of Kant's system which is so 
hard to interpret. The Critique of Judgment gives no adequate 
explanation of the aesthetic process, and we are left to con­
jecture what takes place from what we know of the mental pro­
cedure in cognition. The Play of the Powers (Spiel der Krafte) 
seems the most natural conception in the world, but it is the 
most elusive and puzzling to anyone who has tried to understand 
Kant's theory of knowledge. The aesthetic Powers of which he 
speaks in so prodigal a fashion, are discovered to be simply 
the two cognitive faculties, Imagination and Understanding. 
Sometimes he practically reduces them to a single Power, as 
when he speaks in a more concrete way of the Representative 
Powers (Vorstellungsvermbgen). for this expression, which is 
needlessly suggestive of a plurality, indicates a special order 
of Imagination which includes the activity of Understanding.
1  /
L'Bsthetique de Kant, p. 181.
2 ,Hartenstein V; f 9. p. 222.
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Perhaps we should avoid confusion by refusing at this stage
to identify the cognitive faculties (Erkenntni ss v ermogen) with
the mental Powers themselves (Gemuthskrafte)« of which they are
only a specification, as Cohen seems to do. Rightly regarding
it as a want of method on Kant's part when he restricts the
aesthetic Powers to Imagination and Understanding, Cohen makes
them co-extensive with the tni entire range of mental Powers as
the Bewusstseinskrafte Twhich is just another name for the
1
Gremuthskrafte. He evidently implies,that the behaviour of the
Powers in Aesthetic is more catholic and objective than the
limited and subjective direction which they receive in knowledge ,
in their specified form as the Erkenntnissvermogen (vom glei^chsam
2
subjectiver Seite zusammengefasst). This is indeed the in­
tention in Kant's theory as we hope to show. But if we-
straightway identify what we are only faculties of knowledge 
with the mental Powers themselves, we shall miss the point of 
his deduction.
In the Critique of Pure Reason. Imagination and Understand­
ing are distinct directions of mental activity, the one being 
sensuous, the other conceptual. If knowledge is to be possible 
at all, there must be a mediating factor which is at once sensu­
ous and conceptual. This is the transcendental Schema . In 
no other way can we understand how an abstract thought should 
disti represent an individual object. Kant's definition of 
the Schema as distinguished from an image, is careful and acute.
It can never appear as an image and exists "nowhere but in 
thought". Again, it is not an image but "the consciousness 
of a universal process of imagination, by which an image is 
provided for a conception". The distinctive nature of the 
Schema is seen most clearly in those representations where an 
image fails us. If we are to think of a very large number, say 
1
Kant's Begrundung der Aesthetic, p. 252
2 *-u-ibid: p. 173. o Watson: Selections, p. 8 6 .
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a thousand, we cannot have an image of a thousand points in
succession, and our thought is rather of the method of counting.
The Schema is this rule of procedure in Imagination. It is
not even the most attenuated form of a generic imagej it is the
hare consciousness of possession.
Now I think it is misleading to say, without qualification,
that this is simply psychology and has nothing to do with the
problem of knowledge. It has everything to do with it. The
criticism is certainly obvious that the process in which we come
to apprehend, does not effect the metaphysical relation between
our knowledge and an object. But what Kant evidently intended
the Schema to be a transcendental element, without ■which no
knowledge would be possible. His general account of the Schema,
ipdeed, is the denial of a psychological explanation. His
observation tha^schemata and not images lie at the foundation of
our pure sensuous conceptions, evidently announces the doctrine
1
of Implicit Apprehension formulated by Dr. Stout. When we are
listening to a.speech, we do not apprehend the meaning by the
revival of distinct images corresponding to each word, but by a
kind of divination which is no other than the transcendental
Schema or dynamic faculty of representation. The Schema is of
course not required when our apprehension is completely implicit
the
and does not anticipate/tendency of our thought. But when we 
can be said to understand to any purpose, we are in a creative
mood and.our apprehension is schematic. So far, then, Kant
rules out psychology from the problem of knowledge, for the 
Schema, thus understood, is not itself a process but the govern­
ing consciousness of a process. But he failed to maintain this 
level and drifted into what looks very like psychology, because 
he assigned to the Schema an utterly false role as having a 
peculiar affinity to succession in time, and in consequence 
1
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practically identified it with what is really a discursive pro­
cess. It will be noticed that all his schemata are time-im- 
plications, as he expressly remarks: thus, the Schema of Quantity 
is number, "the idea of the successive addition of homogeneous 
unit to homogeneous unit"; even the Schema of Negation can 
only be thought as the gradual ascent from the vanishing-point 
to an increasing degree of continuous reality in time; the 
Schema of Substance "is the permanence of the real in time";
the Schema of Cause is "the real which is supposed never to exist
1
without being followed by something else". These are the 
chief*, and in all of* them temporal succession is said to be a 
necessary implicate, positively or negatively. The simple in­
sistence on time need not in itself excite serious criticism, 
for it might only mean that the discursive process which is ini­
tiated by the Schema, and not the Schema itself, is in time.
But Kant meant to contrast schemata with the pure conceptual 
categories which are themselves inapplicable to experience, just 
in respect of this very feature of time—implication, and then he 
falls into confusion and talks of mysteries. The contrast which 
he really had before his mind was quite different. It was from 
mathematical conceptions exclusively that he originally drew his 
definition of a pure category, and then he extended this defi­
nition without warrant to abstract ideas such as Substance, 
which are already genuine shhemata but which Kant thought re­
quired a sensuous modification. The first transcendental dis­
covery he made was the pure category as the conjunction of 
Understanding with the pure forms of intuition, particularly 
space.2 how there is a very rigid distinction between these 
geometrical conceptions which only deteimine the formal aspect 
of experience, and the principles we apply t© concrete ex­
perience. In Kant1 s own terms, the former are mathematical, j
I
1 ' 
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the latter are dynamical, categories. A mathematical category 
contains the synthesis ©f its elements analytically, a given 
antecedent being the ground of its consequent; thus, *in an 
equation of proportions, the fourth term may be inferred if the 
other three are known. But when we are dealing with actual 
changes in experience, which are not the timeless relations of 
geometry but real successions in time, our category is dynamical; 
because we cannot infer with mathematical precision what the 
required term will be, and can only state that there is such a 
term. Experience alone can tell what particular effect will 
follow a given antecedent. On the basis of this valid distinc­
tion, Kant, should have recognised different orders of schemata 
which are distinguished by the nature of the objects to which 
they apply. But instead of doing so, he contrasted schemata 
with pure conceptions as figurative with purely intellectual 
forms of synthesis. Thus the pure conception of a plate would 
be "the pure geometrical conception of a circle", and he says
that the empirical conception of a plate, or just its image, is
1
homogeneous with this pure geometrical conception. But in the 
very next sentence he proceeds to say that a pure conception is 
quite heterogeneous from an empirical conception, and requires 
a mediating term before it can ever be realised in an individual 
perception. Evidently he has drifted away from his special 
discovery in transcendental philosophy, that there are concep­
tions which are immanent in sensuous experience, into Platonic 
Idealism. He has quite forgotten that the categories are al­
ready limited by the forms of sense and are not notions in 
general. He speaks as if the Schema for the first time imposed 
a limit on the pure conception, and favours the suggestion that
these nure "hold true of things as they really are
*
while the schemata present them only as they appear. Let it 
be observed once more that a mathematical category, such as the 
1 .
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pur© conception of a circle, is the only pure category which is 
in question; and if the image of a plate is already homogeneous 
with the pure conception, no schema is required. Kant was aware 
cf "this and he seems to have reasoned in the following wayi I 
see that mathematical conceptions apply immediately to individual 
■objects. Now the kind of experience to which dynamical categories 
apply, is quite different from mathematical objects. But if I 
can show that the mathematical and dynamical categories have 
something in common, namely, an essential implication of time,
I can then assume that there, are schemata corresponding to the 
dynamical categories, and which apply t© actual changes in ti#e 
with the same immediacy as mathematical conceptions apply to the 
logical relations of ground and consequent. Then events will be 
determined a -priori in the relation of cause and effect with the 
same necessity as we find in mathematics. But this is as false 
as it is needless. The Schema of a geometrical figure has no 
peculiar connection with time. It certainly takes time t© 
draw the figure on paper or even injthought, but this does not 
make the a -priori intuition of the figure a time-relation, any 
more than the fact that it takes time to pass from the major 
premiss to the conclusion affects the timeless nature of the 
syllogism. Thus the category of Quantity has Number for its 
schema, and Kant says that Number manifestly implies succession 
in time. Certainly the process of enumeration is in time, but 
the Schema itself is the feeling of Number which is not a 
succession in time at all. M. Bergson gives a good illustration 
of the way in which Number is felt as a quality rather than per­
ceived as a quantitative succession. The bell of a neighbouring 
clock is sounding, but he has not noticed it until several strokes 
have sounded. Evidently he cannot be said to have counted the 
number of strokes, and yet he is able to infer from his sense of 
duration, the exact number of strokes which he never heard.
Suppose that four strokes had sounded before his attention was 
arrested; if he courpbesJd^Hwards to three strokes, he feels that
24.
there must he one more, because the total effect of three
strokes is qualitatively different, like a kind of musical
^ 1 
phrase, from his actual sense of duration. The Schema pre­
cedes and conditions the consciousness of succession. In a 
communication to Goethe about the psychical origin of a drama, 
Schiller shows the difference between the schematic conception 
of a drama and the successive experience in which it is repres­
ented. "With me", he says, "the conception has at first no 
definite or clear object; this comes later. A certain musi­
cal state of mind precedes it, and this, in me, is only then
2
followed by the poetic idea". Ned Dennis, the hangman in 
Barnabv Rudge. had a pronounced Schema for "working people off". 
No doubt this Schema would be a tendency in consciousness to­
wards varied activity in a specific direction, a procedure in 
imagination which is eminently suggestive of succession in 
time. But it was Ned and not his Schema who wanted to be in 
time.
And this device is also unnecessary, because schemata do
not need to be derived from pure conceptions. Amon^sychical
elements, there are five possibilities open to our choice. We
may have a full-blown image, a generic image, a verbal or other
once
attentuated sign, a Schema, or a pure conception. At one the 
most elemental and virile of these is the Schema, it is the
nerve of thought. There remains to decide its relation to a
A conception # .
pure conception. / =3Si3=iS= may be of two kinds: first, it is
completely empirical in origin, being an abstraction from 
particular images, and as an implicit form of apprehension it 
may or may not be attended by a generic image; secondly, it is 
an extinct schema which has lost its light like what are known 
as dark st§,rs in the sky. I call it an extinct schema whem it 
is a concept whose content is exhaustively specified, such as 
the concept of a cone; for the sections of a cone are 
1
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demonstrated to be these and no others. The conception will 
be schematic to one who approaches the study for the first 
time, but for the practised mathematician it is a case of 
completely implicit apprehension or automatic analysis. Such 
also would be the category of Causality, if it were true that 
this category completely specifies all the different causal 
connections in experience. But it remains a schematic con­
ception because it does no such thing. It only announces 
the bare principle that every change must have a cause; what 
the particular cause or effect shall be, is in either case 
decided by experience alone. From this it is evident that, 
in so far as the categories of Understanding are taken to be 
determinate principles which exhaustively specify the in­
dividual instances in experience, the proper place for 
schemata is not among the principles of Understanding but 
among the regulative Ideas of Reason. Kant gives a crucial 
instance of a conceptual category as distinguished from a 
Schema: "substance, for instance, viewed apart from the
sensuous determination of permanence, simply means, that 
which can be thought only as subject, never as the predicate^ 
of anything else. But such an idea has no meaning for us".
On the contrary it may have a world of meaning for us. What 
lies at; the root of the philosophy ofnthe Upanishads, the 
Pure Being of Parmenides and the G-od of Spinoza, is the 
mystical schema of a subject which can never be the predicate 
of anything else. If there are such things as Platonic Idea s, 
it is because there are schemata, like the concept of the
Beautiful,in the Fhaedo.which generates what beautiful things
were
there are. Platonic Ideas as they give interpreted by 
Realism are schemata whose original force is spent,without 
duration or change. But the fate of Platonism is the destiny 
which awaits the history of the fcraman mind. With every 
1
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increase of detail in the exact sciences, the possible range 
of presentations is further exploited, the content of our 
schemata is more and more exhaustively specified, until at 
last they lose their dynamical character and become fixed con­
cepts. Our pure schemata are going the way of the dark stars, 
and what remains is little more than their reflex activity. In 
his Romanes Lecture of November 1909, Mr. Balfour raised the 
interesting question why our aesthetic pleasure should diminish 
in intensity with age. Why should he have read sensational 
stories in his youth, with a more vivid pleasure than the great­
est works of Art can minister to day? It is because our 
schemata are freezing before the mustering ranks of presentations 
which despoil them of their spontaneity. The mental life of 
youth is a presentational continuum with a conceptual background, 
the mental life of age is a conceptual continuum with a presenta­
tional background; in the former our thought' is predominantly 
implicit and therefore schematic, in the latter explicit thought 
occupies the foreground and is decreasingly schematic. Hinc illae 
lacrvmae. Thanks be to Pragmatism for helping us to regain 
possession of our wasting inheritance!
But Schematism, as Kant conceived it, is a constituent part 
of his system, and not less essential to his theory of Aesthetic 
than to his theory of knowledge. The difference between 
Aesthetic and Cognition is, that in the latter Imagination is 
reproductive but in the former it is productive. In its re­
productive function the Imagination is subject to a fixed rule 
of Understanding, without which the associated elements would 
never constitute an object or necessary synthesis. But while 
in Aesthetic the Imagination is said to conform t© Understanding 
in some mystical way, it is not subordinate to Understanding ,and 
it would seem that its elements are not associated in any 
necessary order. There are thus within the same medium of 
Imagination two distinct orders of consciousness, the one the 
necessary consciousness of our own identity in systematic
experience, the other a mystical kind of* consciousness or 
Inner Sense, m  which we are not properly conscious of* our 
states and can only he said to be aware of* them. Perhaps it 
will seem strange t© identify Productive Imagination with the 
fictitious faculty of Inner Sense, for the one is an active 
power and the other is expressly understood to be a passive 
receptivity. But where else are we to put it? Probably 
the fact is that what Kant at first called an Inner Sense, 
simply to maintain the parallel in his view of Psychology as 
co-ordinate with Physics, each having a receptive faculty and 
material of intuition given, he now introduces in its real 
character under the name Productive Imagination. And this 
would be natural enough, for the contents which are peculiar 
to mental life may at once be described as spontaneous pro­
ducts and as our affective states, as if they were modifica­
tions of an internal sensibility. In the earlier part of 
his system, Kant would appear to favour the Cartesian position 
that the immediate data of consciousness are our own affective 
states, for in order to be objects of consciousness phenomena 
must be mental syntheses or objects in consciousness. But this 
is only half his position. His completed view stands opposed 
to the Cartesian doctrine that the knowledge of objects in 
space is an inference from the prior consciousness of ourselves. 
Rather it is the knowledge of our own states that is an abstrac­
tion from our consciousness of objects, as he shows in the 
second edition of the Deduction and in the Paralogisms. And 
he never succeeded in evading this abstract view of mental life, 
as the external reflection of consciousness upon a contingently 
associated manifold. It is surely what Plat© calls a bastard 
kind of thinking that can be aware, without integrating the 
material of intuition into coherent unities. Probably Kant 
was never quite satisfied with this position. If we may infer 
the tendency of his thought from a passage in his Posthumous
28.
Work, he seems to have believed that the synthetic process by 
which objects are determined, does constitute a knowledge of 
ourselves as object. But this is of merely historical im­
portance, The consequences of Kant’s doctrine of Inner Sense 
are inevitable so long as we apply the same method to psychical 
events as to physical objects. If we are to look for the same 
kind of objectivity in both, it is obvious that our method will 
fail just where the criterion of permanence in physical objects 
is absent, namely, the qualification of space. The conclusion
is inevitable,that "in the internal sense no permament intui-
2
tion is to be found". But what right have we to suppose that 
mental states should conform to this criterion? Does not the 
distinctive circumstance that they are the states of a con­
scious subject, require a different method and a different kind 
of coherence? It is an unmeaning question to ask if we can 
be conscious of them when it is already of their essence that 
we should be conscious in them. Kant is right indeed when he 
urges that the source of the categories cannot itself be 
determined by the categories. But is it needful or even desir­
able that it should be? And still we are not reverting to the 
Cartesian position when we immediately identify our mental 
states with the primary fact of self-consciousness, for Kant's 
principle remains true that the consciousness in our states 
presupposes our consciousness of objects. To take the problem 
at its highest level, the world of Poetic Truth is indeed in­
dependent but has only a meaning in contrast with the world of 
Pact, and would not be possible apart from this basic implica­
tion.
1Denn das Subject ist diesen Pormen nach ihm selbst 
Sinnenobject. Das Subject, welches sich die Sinnenvors- 
t el lung von Raum und Zeit macht, ist ihm selbst in diesem 
Act zugleich Object. Vom Uebergange von den metaphysi- 
schen Anfangsgrunden der jNaturwissenschaft zur Physik
herausg. von Albrecht Krause, p. 29.
2
G-eneral Remark on the Principles of Understanding;
Meiklejohn, p. 176. cp. Transcd. Aesthetic, p. 30.
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What then are we to make of1 this lawless activity of* Pro­
ductive Imagination? Strictly understood, Kant has made no 
provision even for that elementary connection which is necessary 
to the consciousness of our own identity. He felt that it 
would he a contradiction to say that the Imagination in its 
freedom is subject to the fixed procedure of Understanding, and
proposes instead the evasive and mystical formula that it con—
1
forms to law without a law. And yet even the most contingent 
vagary of fancy must he governed, within limits, hy the deter­
mined sub-sequence of fact. For example, I am chased hy a hull 
in a dream and run away, when suddenly the chase stops and I 
turn round to confront a zinc—pail. But while the chase lasts, 
a kind of causality must he maintained. Must I not reproduce 
my steps in consciousness in order to keep up my own identity? 
There must he connection and coherence up to a certain point in 
our thinking when it is not conditioned hy actual presentation, 
though the kind of connection is certainly different from what 
we find in the systematic knowledge of objects. Now it is i m ­
possible to believe that Kant thought of psychical events as 
undermentiQHBed undetermined in time. However contingent the 
play of our affective states may he, they always presuppose 
the consciousness of an order which is not contingent and there 
fore the necessary consciousness of ourselves. And in his 
more sober moments, he would not countenance this unreal distinc­
tion in the procedure of Imagination. In the Critique of_Pure 
Reason,he presents it as a concrete faculty with a lower and a 
higher form of activity: "imagination can give a perception
corresponding to the conceptions of Understanding, only under 
the subjective condition of time. Imagination therefore per­
tains to sensibility. At the same time its synthesis is the 
expression of spontaneous activity; for, unlike sense, imagina­
tion is not simply capable of being determined, but is itself 
1
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determining". in another passage he speaks of "the empirical 
faculty of productive imagination" as synonymous with Repro­
ductive Imagination, and even a schema is defined as the pro- 
due of pure a-priori imagination. Above all, we must not 
forget the supreme function of Productive Imagination in his 
theory aif knowledge. As he says in the first edition, "there 
is thus in us an active faculty of the synthesis of this mani­
fold, which we call Imagination and whose immediate exercise 
in perception I call apprehension". And in a note to this 
passage, Kant practically announces himself as the first 
psychplogist to have discovered that Imagination is an essential 
factor in perception; it escaped the notice of former psycholo­
gists, partly because they restricted Imagination to repro­
ductive activity, and partly because they believed that.sense 
in its receptivity alone, is able to unify impressions into
objects, which is impossible in Kant's opinion without synthesis 
3
of Imagination. Why then does he appear to make a qualitative
difference in the Critique of Judgment between the Productive
and Reproductive Imagination?
The answer is not far to seek. It is because determined
succession in time was the only criterion by which he could
identify the actual knowledge of objects as distinguished from
ss
cognition, in general (Erkenntni/uberhaupt). In the case of
coexistence in space, which forms the subject of the First 
Analogy, it is quite clear that the consciousness of our own 
identity in time proves an objective order in our representa­
tions. If there were no such order, our successive percep­
tions would be discrete units without connection in consciousness. 
But Kant has undertaken to prove more than the permamence of a 
world coexistent in space, and it is not by any means clear
II 1
^Watson: Selections, p. 77. 2Watson: Selections, p. 87. 
3Hartenstein iii., Nachtrage aus der ersten Ausgabe, p.579.
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what this proof has to do with Causality. If we wish to 
understand what Kant thinks of Causality, we had tetter sus­
pend the proof in the Second Analogy. Causality is undoubt­
edly the nous assinorum in the Critical Philosophy. His 
normal view is contained in. incidental passages scattered 
throughout the Critique, and is quite unpretentious. He is 
prepared to acknowledge with Hume, that by no analysis can we
ever resolve a  c a u s a l  "connection into the identical relation of
1
Ground and Consequent» It. is a relation of fact which Reason 
cannot justify. But he went beyond Hume in asserting that 
the category of Causality must be a priori, because we could 
not be aware of Qualitative change unless the events were so 
related,/in apprehending th®fi we could maintain the conscious 
ness of our own identity. This is a modest claim. There is 
an open appeal to experience, Let it be carefully observed 
that the fact of change is presupposed as given, and the proof 
consists in the principle that causal connection, though giv 
independently in experience, is more than empirical, because 
it has some necessary connection with our consciousness of Time. 
Two passages may be cited in evidence; in the -General Remark 
on the System of Principles-, the representation of motion in 
space is required as the intuition corresponding to the category 
of Causal iiyjar.d in the -Critique of All Theology’, it is said 
that the category only becomes synthetic in experience, and 
apart from experience has no significance at al 
principle is not so gratuitous as it looks, and may be justi-
Thru Treolv bo tfee elementary ques- 
fied In the following way- 131 y
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background in Space. There must, then, be a transcendental 
ground of connection which conditions the entrance of sensa­
tions into consciousness. Obviously this transcendental 
ground need not imply causal connection. It only indicates 
the permamence in coexistence. The sole merit in the 
Second Analogy is the clear distinction drawn between a 
succession in our perceptions and a succession in the presen­
tation itself. To take Kant's example, I have successive 
perceptions in perceiving a house, but this does not imply 
that the parts of the house apprehended are themselves 
successive. The true direction of Kant's argument in favour
of Causality seems to start from this point. Over and above
coexistence in Space, there are real sequences in Nature and 
not simply successions in our perceptions. In the first in­
stance these are simple changes which do not call for a 
causal explanation, like the motion of a boat down a stream. 
This instance is not an illustration of the special kind of 
connection to -which Causality gives its name, and the same is
true of Kant's other example, the successive perceptions of
1
water in its liquid and its frozen state. The position of 
the boat at any moment is not the cause of its position lower 
down; it is a simple succession of events. Now when we
consider the absolute continuity of Space and therefore also
of Time, these simple sequences may be run back as corollaries 
to the elementary proof for coexistence. However these 
changes arise, they need not put us out of our reckoning, for 
they obviously suppose the permanence of coexistent elements 
in Space. Further, there are qualitative changes which come 
under the special relation of cause and effect. This is a 
partieular conjunction of elements, in which the effect 
emerges as a quite different event from the cause, for example, 
a chemical transformation. But again we consider the con­
tinuity of Space and Time, and think it impossible that these 
1
Meilkejohn, p. 99. Hart.iii. p. 133.
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conjunctions of events should stand in singular isolation 
from the simple sequences and coexistence which are only 
quantitative. Thus Causality will "be run back to the argu­
ment from Self-Consciousness which proves the possibility of 
knowledge at all; and the conclusion will be, not that Change 
is unreal, being ultimately explained in terms of coexistence, 
but that every instance of sequence and all coexistence are 
due to a form of synthesis, which in the long run is similar 
in kind to that form of connection which we observe in 
Causality.
But in his official proof as it is contained in the 
Second Analogy, Kant steps beyond this reasonable position.
The special significance of this proof for our discussion is 
its connection with Inner Sense. His argument now turns 
wholly upon Time, and Causality is defined as the law of in­
variable sequence in Time. In itself this may not appear to 
be different from the principle we have just considered. But 
observe the point of emphasis. While, in the former proof, 
Causality is to be regarded as a corollary inference t© the 
elementary act of Cognition in coexistence, and has only 
hypothetical validity, being as much a regulative Idea of Reason
as Organic Teleology, he now seems to discover a purely a priori
and
criterion for Causality in the consciousness of Time,/which is
quite independent of intuition in Space. He thus confuses two
different propositions, We can say that an event can only
form part of experience if it corned under the dynamical relation
1
of cause and effect; if it were wholly contingent as what is 
preceded by non-existence, it would be something of which we 
cannot be aware. On the other hand, we might say that the 
simple consciousness of determined succession in Time is itself 
an indubitable evidence, that our perceptions are events which 
stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. Kant’s 




process', the consciousness of Time in the one case being only 
a factor in Causality, while in the other it contains Causality 
'eminently'. Given the perception of change, we can then say 
that the events must stand in necessary relation, for otherwise 
we should not have been conscious of them. But it is a differ­
ent proposition if we say that from the bare consciousness of 
Time, we can anticipate the perception of change with a priori 
certitude. And this is Kant's conclusion in the Second 
Analogy.
how the reason why the real prop in this argument, an in­
tuition in Space, is only covertly acknowledged in the Analogies
although it is explicitly stated in the following "Remark on the 
1
Principles', is Kant's adherence to his doctrine of Inner Sense. 
He saw that the real difference between inner and outer objects 
is the form of space. But, in the Inner Sense itself, it was 
necessary for him to establish a difference among representa­
tions, apart from the qualification of space altogether; other­
wise he should have to explain how there can be, in the same 
medium of Inner Sense or Time, two different kinds of content, 
the one realising itself in space-relations, the other being a 
mer^play of representations which are in perpetual flux. While
the contents of inner dome and outer Sense are held to be the
2
same, as is maintained in the Transcendental Aesthetic, no 
explanation would be necessary. But Inner Sense has a peculiar 
content o'f its own, thoughts, feelings and desires, which have 
nothing to do with position in Space and may never be realised 
in space-relations. The difference can now be explained only 
by discovering a mark of distinction in the Inner Sense itself, 
and this mark Kant finds in determined succession. That is
why he says with an air of finality, as if he wished to prove a
3
point, that all schemata are "in some way relative to time" .
1
Watson, p. 127, Meiklejohn, p. 176.
2
"in the internal intuition, the representation of the 
external senses constitutes the material with which the 
mind is occupied". Meiklejohn, p. 40.
3 Watson: Selections, p. 90.
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We are to understand, then, that schemata, as principles of 
determined consciousness in Time, have no serious application 
to the peculiar contents of Inner Sense, and that consequently 
we have no coherent consciousness of them hut only a vague aware­
ness. Perhaps the clearest statement is contained in the sec­
tion on 'The Application of the Categories to Objects of Sense*. 
In either case, the Inner Sense is to be regarded as "the passive 
subject". When there is genuine synthesis, the internal sense 
is said to be affected by the transcendental act of Imagination 
"which I have named figurative synthesis", that is, the transc­
endental Schema. The Inner Sense, on the other hand, contains 
merely the form of intuition in the empirical representation of 
Time as a continual flux, "but without any synthetical conjunc­
tion of the manifold therein, and consequently does not contain
1
any determined intuition". What makes all the difference is 
the Schema. In the one case,the Schema simply ignores the con­
tents of Inner Sense altogether, which therefore remain an un­
determined succession in Time, or as we find it in the Anthropo—
logy, the affective states arising from the play of our thoughts
2
(G-edanken spiel); in the other, the Schema effects a synthesis. 
There is thus no apperception of our affective states. We 
might plead as a saving clause in Kant's impossible theory, that 
if we regard the pure, analytic unity of apperception, not ~str 
mueh as a fact of consciousness as a scientific ideal for 
knowledge, it is also possible for us to understand the passive 
consciousness of Inner Sense, as the lower limit of synthetic 
unity in empirical science and not as an existing mental state; 
for however clear to ourselves our affective states may be, they 
can never be defined with the precision of objects in space.
But Inner Sense is too deeply embedded in Kant's philosophy to 
be dismissed so lightly. Since it was necessary to make the 




Hartenstein vii, p. 473.
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in the Second Analogy to suppress the appeal to space-intuition, 
and threw the ■whole weight of* the proof* on sequence in Time.
It only remained to cover his traces by illegitimately conse­
crating the consciousness of determined succession in Time to 
causal connection, while to the other order of succession in 
Time he denies the authentic recognition of consciousness.
Inner Sense is the surd in Kant's Epistemology.
We can now understand the hopeless position in which his 
theory of knowledge has placed him; it is not by any means 
clear how Aesthetic may be demonstrated by a simple appeal to 
the theory of knowledge. The doctrine of Schematism was the
discovery of a radical difference in nature between two orders 
Mind;
of/the Pure Understanding whose principles only contribute to a 
knowledge in general, and the corresponding schemata of Applied 
Understanding which can procure determinate knowledge of objects. 
And the cardinal feature of distinction is the implication of
Time. On this basis he is able to maintain a boundary between 
the Reproductive and the free or Productive activity of Imagina­
tion; and it must be that the Productive Imagination obtains 
its freedom in Aesthetic by forfeiting all implication of 
succession in Time. This is a strange conclusion, but it is a 
fair inference from the confused ideas which Kant has thrown out. 
Whatever be peculiar to Kant's doctrine of Inner Sense, it is 
certain that our aesthetic states fall within the region over 
which this mysterious and sleeping partner of our consciousness 
presides, a region which corresponds exactly to what Spinoza 
calls the 'Affects’ and to Locke's ideas of Reflection. And 
while the Inner Sense is for Kant the very and only faculty of 
Time, it appears that the affective states peculiar to Inner
Sense cannot be identified as elements in Time at all.
^For the parallel with Spinoza, see the reference to the 
Anthropology just cited; Der xnnere Sinn ist nicht die 
reine Apperception, ein Bewusstsein dessen, was der Mensoh 
thut, denn dieses gehort zum Denkungsverraogen, sondem was 
er leidet. Hart. vii. p. 473.
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Here we are left entirely to conjecture his meaning. A little 
light may gather if we carry into the region of Inner Sense, 
the distinction which he applied to coexistence and succession 
in Space. Perhaps he thought of our affective states as re­
versible; what our Inner Sense observes as an external succes­
sion has only psychological significance, the elements do not 
heed to appear in that or any other order and may never recur 
again; in spite of the fact that they are the objects of a 
sense, they are nothing more than a conceptual play (G-edanken- 
spiel). There is a certain amount of truth in this which no 
one will deny. The connection of ideas in a dream or medita­
tion is certainly not the same as what we find in objects of 
Mature; even our artistic impressions are variable and may 
never recur to us again in the same order of association. But 
whatever the difference be, it does not lie where Kant has 
placed it. He believed that schemata, or more simply our 
principles of thought, only realise significance when they are 
supplied with sensations, or what is the same thing, when the 
contents of inner and outer sense are the same; with the soli­
tary exception of a moral event, he regards nothing in the 
nature of a fact which does not resonate against the sounding-
board of Space. But these floating images are not secondary
produced
affections of our Self in its passivity/by the friction of 
apprehended facts; they come to us unbidden with all the force 
of the actual, as objective and outside of us as stones and 
rocks or the motion of a train. The birth of a poem is as 
actual as a splash of colour or a fall over a precipice. Indeed 
they are more aggressive and outwith bur control than the ob­
jects of sense, for we can escape from these by suspending our 
perception; we can shut our eyes and think away a world. But 
if I am possessed of an idea, whither shall I flee?
What is remarkable, however, in the Critical Philosophy is 
that it provides an antidote, like the bark of the cinchona tree, 
in the immediate vicinity of its infected areas. Already in
38.
the Second Analogy we find the corrective to this false theory 
of our affective states. Kant has a double view of Time. On 
the one hand, there is the empirical representation as a succes­
sion of continual changes, and this, in Kant's later opinion, 
is the only perception of Time which we can have. On the 
other hand, there is an absolute Time which "remains and changes" 
not", a permanent substrate; if we did not postulate this 
absolute Time as what is not itself affected by succession and 
change, we should have to think of another Time in which this 
Time came to be, and still another Time and another unto in­
finity. Therefore all succession and coexistence are only so 
many modes or determinations in absolute Time. Here Kant breaks 
with his early view in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that Time 
is a whole of perception corresponding to the perception of an 
empty Space, for he repeatedly asserts in the Analogies that 
"Time in itself cannot be an object of perception". But his 
position has not really changed. What he renounces in his 
earlier view is the perception of Time as a quantitative whole 
of which the successive times are limitations; otherwise he 
contends, as in the Analogies, for an original consciousness
of Time as "unlimited" or absolute, and this Time "does not 
1
change". The Time, then, which we perceive always under the 
form of representation in Space, is only appearance; the real 
in Time is not thus perceived but felt as the consciousness of 
absolute duration. This is the distinction within the Inner 
Sense which Kant ought to'have taken, and not the unreal opposi­
tion of determined succession and an anomalous succession which 
is no succession, in which we cannot have authentic consciousness 
of ourselves. This absolute duration, and not the spurious 
flux' of Inner Sense which is conceptual rather than sensuous, 
is the medium of Productive Imagination. In it alone does true 
Time exist, while determined succession is a phenomenal 
1
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translation of Time into the language of Space, and never is 
but always is to be. Kant is right in saying that we do not 
and cannot perceive real Time in this sense, for like the 
musical state of which Schiller tells us, it is felt before it 
is noticed. And now when we turn to the Critique of Judgment, 
we find that the factors which Kant employs in Aesthetic are 
not a timeless Imagination and a disinterested disinherited 
Understanding, but these faculties as they exist in their most 
concrete form. What does a faculty of representation in 
general, as distinguished from particular representations, mean 
if not a schema? The whole point in the conception of a 
Schema is the distinction between discursive processes, and the 
intuitive or dynamic element which cannot itself be representa­
tion. It is schemata that are at play in Aesthetic, and these 
schemata exist in the medium of qualitative Time whose faculty 
is Peeling. Thus Science, Conduct and all their specifications 
in human activity are the'raw fibre of Aesrthetic. Their schemata 
forgather on the common ground of elemental play£ like the Gods 
of Greece, their foreheads are smooth, clear of the furrows of 
toil and serious care, knowing neither the compulsion of external 
force nor the constraint of moral laws.
There are a few passages in the Critique of Judgment which
are able to bear this schematic interpretation of Aesthetic. It
1
is said that the Imagination "schematises without any concept". 
More explicit is the passage where he speaks of aesthetic pleasure 
as involving causality, "madntMnlnS without further design the 
state of the representation itself and the occupation of the 
cognitive powers". We are able to "linger over the contempla­
tion of the Beautiful, because this contemplation strengthens and
reproduces itself". But Kant has no title to this interpreta­
tion until he first revise his doctrine of Inner Sense. He
1 2 Bernard 35. Bernard 12, cp. p. 197.
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believed that schemata refuse to take the contents of Inner 
Sense seriously because he misconceived the function#' of 
schemata, and regarded the ambiguous product as merely ideal. 
But ti it would be quite as true, perhaps more true, to say 
jzhat the determinate perception of objects in space is merely 
actual. Since he denies objective reality to what he calls 
theg^  mere contents in time, it follows that there can be no 
Science of Psychology. And this is true, if it be meant that 
it has no objects corresponding to those in Physical Science. 
But if there be no Science of Psychology on some other inter­
pretation of the inner life, neither can there be a theory of 
Aesthetic, for the objects of Aesthetic, according to his first 
canon, have no ingredients of cogniaion cognition, are not 
supported by the form of Space as such and exist exclusively 
in Imagination. And it is not only Kant who says so. No 
sound aesthetic theory will deny at least this difference be­
tween perception and aesthetic intuition, that in the latter 
the objects of perception are sympathetically interpreted; our 
cold scientific interest gives way to personal interest, we 
confer on them our emotions and life, until finally we are able 
to ignore their symbolic character and persuade ourselves into 
the belief that they are impersonations of ourselves. This 
is entirely the work of Imagination; the objects presented to 
us, whether they are in Space or only arise within our own 
minds, are the materials of this supposed Inner Sense . They 
are, moreover, objective syntheses as factual as anything in 
Nature although they are not Nature. They have for us the 
significance of objects, they have more meaning for us than 
objects in Space.
A N C IE N T  AND MODERN -  T H E  T H IR D
C h a p te r  5 .
THE THIRD CANON IN AESTHETIC.
Chapter 5 .
Kant's doctrine of Inner Sense was favourable to the eighteenth- 
century theory of Freedom which affected his whole philosophy.
On the other hand, he had a genuine, if fugitive, insight into 
the positive expression of Freedom, although he refused to re­
cognise it in the life and works of his contemporaries. This 
opposition is most sharply announced in his Third Canon, It
says that the Beautiful is the representation of a purpose with- 
1
out a purpose. In itself this canon is little more than a 
repetition of the first and second; for it excludes an in­
terest, and it might also be taken as synonymous with the 
formula in the second, that the aesthetic state is conformity 
to law without a law. But it was convenient and even necessary 
that Kant should bring it forward, as indicating a further stage 
in the proof. The universality in Aesthetic was based upon 
the conditions of Knowledge; and it is hard to forget that 
knowledge in any form, let it be quite undetermined, is still 
a modification of cognitive processes, employs concepts, ob­
serves relations among elements and has a final end in view.
He must therefore insist in yet another canon, that Aesthetic 
has the universality of knowledge without being knowledge, or 
that it is a purposive (zweckmassig) activity without intending 
any purpose at all. This completes the argument. Obviously 
this moment in the Beautiful is capable of a double interpreta­
tion, It may be understood in the sense of implicit intention 
or as the absence of intention altogether. It is not diffi­
cult to decide which of those views Kant really entertained.
His negative conception is in great part theoretical, and, as 
in the proof for Causality, his true position is obscured by 
1
Bernard. 10-17.
his illustrations. A superficial reading of eighteenth- 
century literature is sufficient, to understand this opposi­
tion in Kant's mind.
The eighteenth century is known in European Literature as 
the Age of the Individual. The quantity of autobiographies, 
for which Rea-son Rousseau had set the fashion in his Confes­
sions , and the dislike of all corporations and guilds, in
which individual freedom is hampered by the collective will,
1
are characteristic of the age-spirit. The lifeless ortho^doxy
into which the Reformation had hardened, enslaved both mind and
conscience, and it was in emancipating the individual from
dogmatic authority that the Aufklarung had its first significance.
An enlightened Pietism revolted against a form of religion,
whose votaries, in some instances, sought to accentuate the
supremacy of faith over works by making a parade of loose 
2
living. As Paulsen says some where in his Life of Kant,
Pietism was Luther rising up against Lutheranism. And it 
should be remembered that, however defective Rationalism may 
have been in G-ermany, it made common cause with Pietism, and 
was thus distinguished from the materialistic phase of the 
movement in Prance by an earnest moral theory, although it did 
not go veiy deep. But while it was undoubtedly an age of 
Humanism, it was old before its time. It was the Humanism of 
the Renaissance without its youthful vigour. It glorified the 
individual and made his happiness the chief end of existence, 
but it was the indifferent individual of abstract thinking, 
not the historic individual of Rousseau, Lessing and Kant.
The Humanism of the eighteenth century only simplified the 
achievements of a former enlightenment, it did not interpret 
them with a deeper significance. It was the momentary appear­
ance of the mild light of Mediaevalism which had lived secure 
on the treasures of past ages, and the same degenerating 
1




tendencies which, characterised mediaeval times now threatened 
to corrupt German life. It was not the healthy enthusiasm 
which attends every re-birth of the human spirit, as it is 
challenged by the wealth of conquests to be won; it was the 
much less worthy, though more pleasing Humanism of the spirit 
tolerating itself. It was comprehensive and ambitious at 
the cost of being shallow and pretentious.
We are not, then, surprised to find this movement offend­
ing in the very faults which it sought to improve. A false 
conception of human brotherhood, in the vague latitude of an 
indiscriminate, cosmopolitan culture, preceded the birth of a 
national spirit which alone is able to justify the cultivation 
of a cosmopolitan feeling. To become citizens of the world, 
we must first be true citizens of the city in which we were 
born. Now Germany did not awake to the consciousness of her 
national unity until the year 1806, when at the decisive battle 
of JEena the Prussian forces were routed by Napoleon. She 
still cherished the idea of the Holy Roman Empire; and while 
each separate principality was governed by its autocratic prince, 
supported by his unscrupulous minister and all-powerful favour­
ite, no national conscience could exist. The want of a nation­
al spirit is nowhere illustrated so clearly as in the person 
of Frederick the Great, himself the incarnation of Enlighten­
ment. He hated his own language and would hear of nothing 
but French literary models, which all ran on the traditional 
lines; and by with-holding his encouragement, he all but 
stifled the first beginnings of the German Drama. But a very 
curious phase in this cult of Reason, is the exercise of 
authority which qualified the supposed indulgence of illimit­
able freedom. It is recorded of Frederick that he threatened 
to dismiss one of his officials, if he should refuse to visit 
the theatre. And in his famous dictum that the King is the
first servant of the State, we may readily believe that the accebb
1
was placed on -premier rather than on domestique. These are
1
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characteristic indications that the boasted emancipation of 
Reason was an ill-concealed dogmatism. The philosophy of Wolff 
which gave intellectual expression to the spirit of the age, under 
took to demonstrate, by the cogency of Reason alone, the exist­
ence of everything from God down to municipal regulations; and 
wherever^ this facile solvent failed, the law of identity was 
replaced by the dogmatic assertion that it was the best possible 
which God could have made, and there was an end of it. Like 
every imperfect phase of development, the age was marked by a 
double and contradictory character in its strange fascination 
for logical consistency and inconsequent freedom. The in­
dividual of the eighteenth century, unfed on the riches of Nature, 
at length grew dizzy on an empty stomach with the whirling revolu­
tions of his reasoning processes, and, losing his vaunted self- 
control, showed his true nature in the irresponsible freedom of 
the French Revolution, which proved by blood, not by syllogism.
The individual, Which it took for its ideal, was little more 
than the wraith of the lusty individual which came to life at 
the Renaissance. In spite of national differences the broad 
principles of Enlightenment are the same, whether we look to the 
Deistic School in England, to Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists 
in France or to the Rationalism of Wolff in Germany. The re­
solutions it offered to explain all things in heaven and on 
earth, were far too simple to be true. Life was represented as 
being much more easy than it is actually, and an unreal optimism 
lent a false glow to the darkest problems of existence. In his 
little essay on the question *What is Enlightenment', Kant had 
gauged the situation correctly; if it be asked whether we are
now living in an enlightened age, the answer is, "No, but in an
1
age of Enlightenment" .
It was against this shoddy criticism of life that the Age 
of Genius, inaugurated by Schiller and Goethe, rebelled. The 
last quarter of the eighteenth century leaves a confused im­
pression on the mind which it is difficult to analyse with clearness.
1
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Probably this cpunter movement is best described as a revolu­
tion within a revolution. Historically judged, and in spite 
of its reactionary appearance, it was a further development 
of the Era of Enlightenment. The latter had preached liberty 
of conscience, political freedom, happiness in time and 
eternity, but society was not reformed. To this reactionary 
criticism Kant had made the most permanent contribution in his 
monumental works. Fichte, following on his lines, required 
that the particular should be reinforced by the universal.
But the universalised particular may be as abstract as the 
particular itself. It was Schiller who first grasped the 
philosophical significance of the Aufklarung. and up to the 
last his romantic ideas were restricted restrained by a 
lingering conservatism. In the individual of Rationalism 
he saw at least the type of true freedom, the ideal of the 
Greek; and while he acknowledged a qualified allegiance to 
Kant’s moralism, the early influence of Shaftesbury, who 
echoed the ethical optimism of the Aufklarung in the union of 
virtue and happiness, had made a more favourable impression on 
his mind. The regeneration of the individual, through the 
aesthetical harmony of Sense and Reason, is the final end of 
culture.
In the mad pranks enacted by the ’Storm and Stress' party
under Goethe's revolutionary influence at Weimar, Schiller
took no part. With the sanction of their genial patron, the
Duke Karl August, court etiquette and dress were disregarded-:
blue-coat, yellow waistcoat and hi^i boots were affected;
long walks into the country, perilous rides, skating-parties
at night and dances in the country with peasant maidens ,formed
1
part of their programme. G-oethe did not like to look back 
on these early days of boisterous exuberance, and it soon 
sobered down into serious devotion to classic form. Now, 
what grated on Kant's puritanic sense was the literary and
1
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romantic affectation which followed in its wake, such as 
anacreontic, odes and the night-singers. In the closing de­
cades of the century, a sentimental cult was in vogue which 
took the form of excursions into the country, in feeble imi­
tation of Saussure's travels in the Alps, an account of which 
first appeared in 1779 and for which Kant professed the high­
est admiration. Another, and perhaps the more immediate 
source of inspiration, was Sterne's Sentimental Journey. In 
what is an evident allusion to this movement Schiller says in
so many words, that this sentimental taste is not by any means
2
the same as a love of Nature for her own sake. And, so far, 
Kant was justified when he reproached his contemporaries with 
trifling and wantonness: "our age is the century of pretty 
nothings, bagatelles or sublime chimeras". He found the true 
standard of Taste among the ancients alone, for they were 
nearer to Nature. This was a criticism, moreover, which 
Schiller candidly acknowledged. While his aesthetical edu­
cation of Man has the forward view, it. has also, from another 
side, a retrospective aspect. The regeneration of humanity 
is the becoming again -what it was, a return to Nature as she 
was known to the childhood of the race. In his 'Naive and 
Sentimental Poetry', he contrasts Goethe as naive with himself 
as sentimental poet. The difference between the two orders 
of poet is this. In Goethe's Olympian nature he saw one for 
whom the Ideal was already actual, and in this naive character 
he resembled the Greeks, for the divine Ideal with them was no 
remote conception but an embodiment in individual form. In a 
very fine passage, he describes this perfect union of Grace or 
humanity with Dignity or deity in the Greek statues: “with
softened splendour the Freedom of Reason rises in the smiling
1 p
Bernard h 29. Ueber Naive und Sentimentallsche
Dichtung. Sammtliche Werke. xii.p.200.
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Fragmente aus dem Nachlasse. Kirchmanh, Vermischte
Schriften. p1. 3311.
mouth, the gently animated glance, the serene brow, and, sub­
lime in its setting, Natural Necessity subsides in the noble 
majesty of countenance. On this ideal of human beauty are 
the antique statues modelled, and one recognises it in the 
divine form of a Niobe, in the Apollo Belvedere, in the winged
geniusof the Villa Borghese and in the muse of the palazzo 
1
Barberini". But while the naive is already natural, the 
sentimental poet strives to become natural by realising the 
Ideal. It is the difference, conceived in an abstract manner, 
between Hellenic and Romantic. Schiller naturally wavers be­
tween these conceptions of the Ideal, corresponding somewhat to 
the vacillating tendency between aestheticism and moral ism, 
which runs throughout his poetry and prose. In his poem The 
Pilgrim, the only possible conception of the Ideal is the 
sentimental; for the heavenly goal recedes ever and ever 
farther from the pilgrim who embarks on the rolling sea of life, 
in search of the Ideal. In The Ideal and Life, published in 
the Horen the same year as Naive and Sentimental Poetry, 1795, 
he recognises the naive conception; for beside the world of 
pure spirit there is the Olympic world of Beauty, which exists 
within the sense-world as the mirror of man's perfection. But 
Schiller does not mean by this contrast, that Nature was known 
to the Greeks alone. On the contrary, it could be said with 
equal truth that they never knew Nature at all. In either 
case Nature has a different sense, and the conclusion of his 
argument is to coordinate the naive or Hellenic, and senti­
mental or Romantic, attitudes to Nature as complementary.
Thus, arguing from the other side, and this time in defence of 
the Greek conception, we find him saying in a letter to Goethe, 
that characteristic and formal Beauty is only a logical dis­
tinction; and he thinks that the absence of characteristic 
expression in the Greek conception of Beauty has been over-stated
by critics. In his opinion Aesthetic is at once the serious 
1
IJeber Anmuth und Wurde. Sammtliche Werke xi . (1836 )p. 457.
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pursuit, and the serene, unthinking possession, of the Ideal,
or, to adopt the words of the adage, Art is at once ernst and 
1
heiter. ’What, then,is the difference? Why, he asks, are
we so different from the Greeks? They describe Nature as they
would a mechanical product or any work of technical art.; they
have no sentimental feeling for Nature, while we worship Nature.
The answer is that the Greeks worshipped the human form, but
Nature was in the human form for the Greeks as it is not for us;
and they had no eyes for unconscious Nature, only because their
connection with her was so close as to admit of no intermediary
reflection. It was not Nature in her passivity that they saw,
hut Nature as animated by the very human form they worshipped,
in the shape of Nymphs, Naiads, Satyrs and Fauns. For us,
Nature has disappeared from Humanity and we must seek her
2
again in the unconscious world.
But Kant had no proper understanding of the contrast be­
tween ancient and modern, as Schiller saw it. While he 
professed veneration for the ancients as having been nearer to 
Nature, there is no evidence in his writings of an apprecia­
tion for Homer or the sublimity of Hebrew Poetry, the two 
great models of antiquity. In the early struggle of his 
countrymen towards a national literature, he failed to dis­
tinguish the substance from the shadow. It should have been 
enough for him, one would think, that in the Age of Genius the 
dissolving criticism of Voltaire had been exchanged for the 
naturalism of Rousseau, and that, in the love of Nature for 
her own sake, man might regain the naive conception of his 
humanity which he had lost. These, then, were the alternatives 
presented to Kant's choice. The rationalistic and romantic
conceptions of Freedom were both untempered and irresponsible,
but in very different ways. The ebullition of the 'Sturm und 
Drang' was a genuine renaissance of the human spirit; as the 
1
Schmitz: Correspondence. Letter 342. Vol. 1. p. 378.
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Ueber Naive und Sentimentalische Dichtung;. Sammtliche
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first phase in a constructive movement, its extravagant ex­
pression had an implicit intention. But the Aufklarung was 
the passing of the human spirit through a destructive moment; 
its conception of Freedom was contingent, and by a natural 
transition pretentious Reason completed its course in the 
passional abandon of the French Revolution. Yet it was in the 
latter of these that Kant sought the type of aesthetic freedom.
Consequently, the exposition of his third canon turns on 
a sharp distinction between Free (pulchritudo vaga) and Depen­
dent Beauty (•pulchritudo adhaerens). In the Dependent type 
of Beauty Kant has in view the confused representation of per­
fection, which was received in the Wolffian School as the defini­
tion of the Beautiful. It is the Beauty of whatever exhibits 
intention, external or internal. All objects of industrial Art, 
and Kant would include Beautiful Art, may have this kind of 
Beauty. In these the intention is external, it is wrought into 
them, and their Beauty will consist in the relative perfection 
with which they embody this imported purpose. There are also 
objects which have an internal purpose, as they are found in 
organic Nature; plants, animals and, highest of all, man, 
realise the idea of their kind, and are judged aesthetically in 
the degree that they approximate to the generic idea. Thus a 
flower, although it is Kant's stock example of Free or Indepen­
dent Beauty, may from another side be taken as Dependent, when, 
it is the object of intellectual satisfaction for a botanist who 
knows its history and structure and can appreciate how far it 
fulfils the idea of its kind. The judgment of the botanist is 
teleological, and whatever Beauty he sees in the flower is mixed 
with intellectual ideas; it is therefore said to be impure or 
dependent because it is not inherent but adherent. This re­
lative perfection Kant calls the Normal Idea; it is the generic
image such as is obtained by stereoscopic observation or by 
Gal ton's process of generalised photography. But he goes a 
step further. It seems that he considered the Noimal Idea as
10.
the highest type of Dependent Beauty* in earlier editions of
1 •
the Critique of Judgment. Now*however, he sees that it is
in.
quite/adequate and only provides the necessary conditions for 
realising the highest perfection. It is so far indispensable* 
for when the expression beoomes extravagant and does violence 
to the Normal Idea* it is caricature. But when individual 
character is suppressed in favour of generic purity* the 
product is a lifeless abstraction whioh contains •nothing speci~ 
fioally characteristic", and is ''merely oorreot". The Ideal 
must have individual expression* it must be an individual plant* 
an individual animal* an Individual man. Now the individual 
which most perfectly embodies the idea of its Kind is the Ideal, 
This and not the Normal Idea is highest type of Dependent Beauty, 
Kant restricts the Ideal to the human species because it 
alone is capable of mp moral expression. He means that Man is the 
only being who contains the end of his existence in himself* or 
to put it in another way, Personality is the only instance of a 
real individual. This oonoeption of the Ideal is the key to 
Kant’s Teleology of Nature, It implies that all the categories 
which fall below Belf-consoiousness* including those of Biology* 
are only reflective predicates whioh are due to the dialeotioal 
nature of our Uhderstanding; they are descriptions of objeots 
whioh have no supersensible substrate* and consequently their 
purposive activity is not the expression of a nature in the 
objects themselves but only an appearance for us. Thus the 
Ideal of a flower is inoonoeivable for Kant* and Myron’s Cow 
is not an Ideal because it has not a moral expression. We
have to remember, however* that, as the highest form of the 
Dependent type, the Ideal loses in aesthetic quality as it gains 
in significance. It may be said to be at two removes from Pure 
Beauty* for it is informed by a moral qs well as an intellectual 
purpose. It is now easy to understand what free Bequty means j
Bosanquet . HiBt.Jteethetio. p.*T*




it is the representation which is neither normal nor ideal, 
completely void of all intention^, intellectual, moral,or both 
together. Such are the meaningless symmetries of decorative 
art, arabesques and fanciful embroideries which are only made
1
to please, and purposeless formations like flowers and crystals. 
Even geometrical figures are excluded because they presuppose 
an intellectual purpose. The Beauty of a representation is 
only pure when it is unconditionally free. Even the thought 
of a purpose must not enter into, our judgment. As an extreme 
instance, Kant mentions stone implements which are found in 
old sepulchral tumuli, with a hole in them as if for a handle. 
The purpose of these implements is quite unknown to us, but
they are not therefore beautiful, for we know very well that
2
they were originally made for a certain use. Similarly in a 
work of Art, our aesthetical judgment is hampered by the inten­
tion of the artist; and Kant thinks that if our judgment is to 
be pure, we must be able to abstract from the intention alto­
gether and confine our contemplation to the mere appearance.
This principle is plausible and might be accepted as a useful 
test in settling disputes on Taste; it could be pointed out, 
in a case of disagreement, that for one person the Beauty con­
sists in the mere act. of contemplation, while the other person 
tries to understand what the artist sought to convey; and it 
might happen that he could criticise the former's taste on the 
ground that he was applauding a work of Art, in which, however 
well executed, the intention was poor or even improbable. But 
it is precisely this opposition in judgment which is not ad­
mitted in a true theory of Aesthetic. The fault in Kant’s 
principle consists in making a dispute possible where there 
ought to be none. If, as we say, the conception in a work of 
Art is poor or impossible, nothing in the execution can make up 
1
Bernard, pp. 81,‘211. ' "
2 . . .
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for this defect. It will remain a body without a soul, and 
whatever pleasure it may minister to us is only what arises 
from the resemblance in an imitation; possibly it may have 
less aesthetic quality than a well-made lioe . On the other 
hand, we must not be deceived into thinking that a work of 
Art is meaningless because the intention is too vague to be 
grasped. When we speak of the conception we do not mean that 
the intention ought to be capable of definition, but that the Hbl 
work has an artistic motive and is really the expression of a 
significant state of mind, though it may be less understood by 
the artist himself than by the critic. If what is nothing 
but a study in colour is successful, it is not by any means the 
empty representation of symmetry in visual sensations, for 
colour like music is spiritual expression. In so far as I am 
able to understand Meredith's meaning in his Hymn to Colour, 
it is a metamorphosis of Love which, in this shape, becomes 
bridegroom to the Soul and opens her eyes to the truth of things. 
Life and Death are substantial forms only because we see in them, 
not Love, but our "craving self": in the language of Spinoza,
they are born of Desire, or as Schopenhauer would say, they are 
representations due to the pragmatic Will. But in the presence 
of approaching Love, Life and Death, which walk with the Soul 
on either side, are made to seem as shadows, forms of light which 
borrow from each other tints and shades of colour:
"Death begs of Life his blush; Life Death persuades 
To keep long day with his caresses graced".
And thus these two substantial fofims are seen to be nothing more 
than the abstract factors which make up the variety of existence, 
as it is expressed in colour. So much may colour mean:
"he leads
Through widening chambers of surprise to where
Throbs rapture near an end that aye recedes,
Because his touch is infinite and lends
1
A yonder to all ends".
^Poems. Vol.ii. A Reading of Earth.
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A successful study in colour alone, is the expression of an 
artistic state which may have its roots as deep as Life and 
Death where they meet. However unconscious the artist may 
have teen of any such intention, the spiritual meaning will 
nevertheless glow in his work, and whoever does not see some 
glimpse of it there, is not entitled to an aesthetical judgment 
on the matter at all. It is interesting to notice that Kant 
had a very different opinion in his lectures on Aesthetic. There 
he says at least three times over, that you cannot tell whether a 
thing is beautiful until you know what it is for, "that the Beauti­
ful cannot be demonstrated a priori. and that the idea of the 
thing as it is found in experience must always be presupposed.
In reading these remains, one naturally finds that Kant is com­
paratively free from methodological caution in delivering his 
opinions; and this seems to be true even of the time after the 
Critique of Judgment was published, as may be seen from the date 
of the last quotation in the note. It clearly shows that, when­
ever he sat down to systematic exposition, his mind was over­
driven and misdirected by theoretical exactions. And- when we 
consider his moral disposition, we have no difficulty in under­
standing why he should have chosen the Rationalistic rather than 
the Romantic type of Freedom. He could hardly rejoice in the 
legal Freedom of Reason. But human nature must enjoy something, 
and his aesthetic theory looks as if it were prompted by the re­
venge of violated Sense on unsympathetic Reason. Since Reason 
in her freedom was so prudish, it was inevitable that Sense, 
secured by no weightier influence than a nominal conformity to 
Law, should become nonsense. notwithstanding his anxiety to 
exclude all that savours of Sense, his aesthetic theory becomes 
in fact the formula for decadence. A theory of Art which pro­
fesses to have no content, which sacrifices meaning to the 
1Wir Kc5nnen eine Sache nicht eher fur schon halten, als bis 
wir wissen, was es fur eine Sache sei, und was da schon sein 
soil. An thro polo gy~T 7 7 9 urine die* mindeste Beziehung auf Nut- 
zen Konnen wir Keine Schonheit finden, wenigstens darf sie ihm 
nicht widerstreiten. Anthropology 1784. Ob etwas schon sei, 
lasst sich nicht vordemonstrieren. Es ist bios durch die Erfah- 
rung zu erkennen. A priori wurde er das Schone als solches
14.
nicht gelten lassen. Anthropology 1791. Schlapp's 
Kant's Lehre vom G-enie u.s.w.. pp. 201, 281, 393.
cultivation of refined sensations, is, in the long run indis­
tinguishable from vice. This was in substance Schiller's 
criticism, perhaps the most penetrating judgment ever passed 
upon Enlightenment, and it is a criticism which has lost nothing 
of its force when applied to the downward movements in subse­
quent literature. He saw that the unsanctioned Freedom of the 
individual did not seek to realise the true infinite of Reason, 
was not even conscious of its presence, but readily confused it 
with the specious indeterminate of sense-affection. What the
individual pursues is not the infinite but an infinite finite, 
an individual unlimited extension of his individuality, an 
inexhaustible material instead of form, an eternally during mu­
tation instead of the immutable, and the absolute security of
his temporal being; "while the infinite dawns upon his dazzled 
heart
imagination, his/has not yet ceased to live in the partial and 
to serve the present moment". Incapable of abandoning his 
individuality to meet the demands of Reason, he lets fall his 
eyes on something in his sensuous nature which nearly resembles 
the uncaused causality of Reason, the law of his members which 
knows no law; and since he cannot lay the questioning intellect 
to rest by discovering a final motive within himself, he at
1
least brings it to silence through the idea of causelessness.
But Kant has saved his theory from this disastrous conse­
quence by a special application of his first principle, that no 
ingredients of sensation shall be admitted into Aesthetic.
This restriction is now introduced with particular reference to 
the two forms of sense-affection, Charm and Emotion. So much 
has been already conceded to this insatiable phantom of negative 
Freedom, that it is hard to think what remains. The precious 
toil of Science and the ennobling discipline of Morality, can 
1
Aesthetical Education of Man. Letter 24. Sfl-mmtliche Werke 
xii (1836) Weiss's translation, pp. 145-7.
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contribute nothing of their treasures; and. it would seem 
that even Sense, the aether Beauty breathes, is sacrificed.
The reason for his strictures on Charm (Reiz)is sacrificed 
characteristic. The charms of Sense are empirical, and there­
fore cannot be s assimilated to what must be an a priori acti­
vity of mind. This is a good instance of Kant's weakness for 
a priori and is a consequence of his doctrine of Sensation.
In the concrete act of perception (Wahrnehmung), there are two 
factors: the constant forms of intuition (Anschauung), Space
and Time, and the variab 1 e(Empfindung). There is thus a 
constant factor in Perception, which Kant ultimately believes 
to be produced by the synthetic activity of mind; this is 
how it is stated in the first edition of the Transcendental 
Deduction: "now this synthesis of apprehension must be exer­
cised a -priori also, I mean for the sake of representations 
which are not empirical. For without this synthesis, we 
shpuld neither be able to have a priori representations of 
Space nor of Time, for these can only arise through the
synthesis of the manifold, which is offered by Sensibility in
1
its original receptivity". But the variable in Perception 
is empirical, and is not accountable to our minds for its 
coming and going: at the most we can have 1 anticipations1
of its behaviour; we know a -priori that it will ]p.ave some 
degree of intensity, but what degree it will have and that it 
should enter into perception at all, is outwith the jurisdic­
tion of the mind. It is this specifically empirical element 
that Kant excludes from Aesthetic under the name of Charm.
His criticism, however, is not indiscriminate. Up to a 
certain point it is the commonplace observation, that Beauty 
is not enhanced but spoilt by the excrescences of barbaric
1




taste. An ornamental sword, which is not serviceable
in the field, is less beautiful than a plain but well-made
sword, which is perfectly adapted for use. When Aristippus
asked Socrates if a dung-basket can be beautiful, he replied,
"Yes, by Jupiter, and a golden shield may be an ugly thing,
if the one be beautifully formed for its particular uses, and
2
the other Mat ill-formed". But Kant's strictures go much 
deeper. Hr reverts to his original distinction between 
aesthetical Judgments of Sense and aesthetical Judgments of 
Reflexion, or more simply, the distinction between matter and 
form. How, Aesthetic can always be adequately defined as
what deals with the form of things. But if we are to inter­
pret Kant by his illustrations, he evidently does not mean 
aesthetical form which is something quite new, transcending 
the elementary opposition of matter and form in sense—percep­
tion, but the formal perfection of objects as unities in 
variety; and this, of course, is not aesthetical but abs­
tract perception. In a halting manner he does recognise, 
that there are sensations whose matter may be exhausted in 
the form and are so far aesthetical, such as simple colours 
and tones. But this concession is only made on the ground 
that they are pure; for, in themselves, the simple tone of 
a violin or the green of a grassy plot are mere sensations, 
and ought to be called pleasant. The point now to decide is 
what he means by being pure. Well, in the first place, since 
he cannot find a distinction of matter and form in these 
representations, he all but invents one. He should like 
to think, if he could settle his doubts, that the mind actu­
ally perceives the rhythmical vibrations of the aether which 
constitute sounds and colours; then it would be easy to ex­
plain why simple tones and colours are thought beautiful, for
^  2Bernard.§ 13. Xen.Mem. iii.8*6 Bohn.
3
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they would he the perception of unity in a manifold of sensa­
tion. But failing this improbable expedient, he falls back
on aesthetic apperception: "we cannot assume that the quality
1
of sensations is the same in all subjects". That is to say,
those who apperceive sensations aesthetically, will distinguish
between the variable sense-affection itself (Reiz)and the pure
element which alone is capable of universal communication. But
this apperception does not constitute aesthetic form. As appears
from his later treatment of the subject, his distinction between
pure sensations and those which are mixed with the affection of
the organ, is an elementary recognition of the aesthetic senses;
and by the pure form which is universally.communicable, he only
understands a moral symbolism: thus, the white of lilies suggest
innocence, red suggests sublimity, and each of the seven colours
2
has its appropriate moral.
Kant's conception of aesthetic purity either means the
abstract constant in perception, or lapses into analogical
symbolism corresponding to Hegel's symbolic stage in Art, where
relation
the sign is in contingent/to the thing signified, like the Bull 
the symbol of Deity. This is illustrated in his theory of the
arts. In Painting it is the drawing and not the colouring that 
is essential, in Music it is the rhythm and not the pitch of 
tones. This statement almost justifies the gratuitous criticism 
that • a. colourless painting and a toneless music are nonentities 
We have already said a little to indicate the spiritual nature 
of colour. In Music, there is something which goes beyond 
the tones, the ineffable which Abt Vogler touched by accident 
on the keys of his organ and could not recover. The tones 
are not any kind of analogical symbolism, moral or intellectual,
but the pure and direct expression of what is otherwise in­
articulate. Kant seems to have caught the idea in his subsequent
^Bernard &14.p.74 
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opinion, that musical composition is a kind of language which
■ 1
expresses the "unspeakable wealth" of aesthetical Ideas. But 
a cursory inspection shows, that this wealth in the aesthetical 
Ideas is not inarticulate because of its quality or meaning, 
but because there is an inexhaustible quantity of possible 
linguistic signs in the musical composition; it is a wealth of 
extensive, not of intensive, symbolism. This interpretation is 
confirmed by the fact that he assigns the lowest place to Music 
among the arts, as being merely a beautiful play of sensations 
without contributing to the expansion and culture of the mind.
Ee regards the tones as accidental signs, corresponding to the 
elements of speech, which indicate the affective state of a 
person speaking, qnd by mechanical association, communicate the 
corresponding idea in his mind. But as Schopenhauer, in his 
remarkable discussion, has shown, the true parallel iB not be­
tween musical expression and speech but between musical expression 
and Nature. All the other arts are imitations, although ideal 
imitations, of Nature; they are always particular representa­
tions of events and things. Painting, Sculpture and Poetry 
do not indeed represent events and things as they exist in 
their contingency, but in their ideal forms; and therefore 
what they copy is the Platonic Ideas. 'Now Music is distinguish­
ed from the other arts in this, that it does not resemble a re­
presentation of life and events at all; there is no likeness 
in musical expression to a world of things, as there is in a 
painting. What Music copies- is not the ideal forms of
things but the Supersensible itself; it expresses "the quintes­
sence of life and its events "without resembling any of them.
The Platonic Ideas, although they are immediate, and so far 
complete, organisations of the Supersensible, are after all 
limitations of the Supersensible; they are a plurality of ex­
pressions from different points of view. But Music passes over 
the appearance of the Supersensible, whether as ideal or as




phenomenal world at all. It does not express the Supersensible
in terms of Nature* but is as direct and immediate a revelation
of the Supersensible as Nature is in her totality* ideal and
aotual* Music,then ,oannot be a language whose elements are
conventional signs of the ineffable* but the peculiar language
Which makes the Supersensible articulate* co-ordinate with the
language of Creation. Schopenhauer confirms his theory by
observing a certain parallelism between these two expressions
of the Supersensible in Nature and Music: the mass of
inorganic Nature corresponding to the bass or fundamental note*
the vegetable kingdom to the the third* the animal kingdom
1.
to the fifth* and the kingdom of Man to the ootave.
She truth is* Kantvs opinion of Musio was prejudiced by certain 
intrusive forms of the art with which he was painfully fwailior* 
When an author deoends to a foot note* he generally takes the 
reader into his oonfldenoe. In thetext he has been re* 
preaching the noble art with a want of urbanity* beoause it 
extends its oharais beyond what is desirable in the neighbour*
hood? and then* in a note* he gives way to his grief against
prayers
the ranting ohorus of his neighbours 01 at family wmkxbp .Bernard 
reoalls his letter to the burg anas ter* in whioh he complains 
of the annoyanoe oaused by the v devotional exeroises of the 
prisoners in the adjoining jail* and suggests the propriety of 
olosing the windows*
purity
This false conception of aesthetic/as the abstract sohema 
in perception* is simply a misoonoepyion of what a priori means 
As was remarked above* it Is not aesthetic fora but mathematical*
His exclusion of Charm prooeeds on the supposition* that
in ,
d*1- a. priori ls/oonsi stent with empirical mixture* go*while 
Aesthetic ought to be regarded as a representation which is j| 
Priori f he identifies it with the constant faotor in an a priori 
representation* If we shall speak of the Beautiful as a fruit*
!•
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what Kant has given us is a dry preserve. But this is not
Pure
what a -priori means in the Critique of ^Reason. Knowledge is
surely never identified with its abstract conditions. And
in another work, Kant was forced to admit that a priori does
not exclude what is empirical. He was pulled up[Ln the Leipsic
Zeitung for having made contradictory statements in the Critique.
He had said that there is no empirical mixture in pure knowledge
a priori: then, two pages forward, he used the same example
to illustrate pure a -priori knowledge which he had just used
to illustrate a mixed proposition, namely, 'every change has a
cause'. To this Kant replied, that by a pure a priori he
meant what is not dependent on empirical elements (die von
nichts Empirischem abhangig ist), and not what is absolutely
1
free from empirical mixture. This is an important admission 
which ought to be printed on the fly-leaf, in every edition of 
the Critique of Pure Reason.
Apart, however, from his mistaken conception of a -priori 
and his consequent theory of aesthetic purity, the principle
which underlies Kant's restriction is sound. If, as Lessing
2
said, Charm is Beauty in motion, those arts which are representa­
tions in Time, Poetry and Music, can have no expression at all 
without charm. But otherwise, charm is not essential, and, 
like the belt of Venus, sits loose to the person of the Beauti­
ful. Schiller took ujthis idea from the Greek myth, and
\
worked it out in his essay on 'Grace and Dignity'. It is the
least satisfactory of his philosophical works, and it is almost
impossible to gather its contents under a single, systematic
conception. This That it was not successful,-is sufficiently
evident from the fact that it pleased neither Kant nor Goethe.
Having studied Kant's aesthetic theoiy before he wrote this
essay, -which' first appeared in 1793, his main purpose was
naturally to correct the prevailing subjectivity in Kant's view
1 • ,
Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der 
Philosophie. Hart. iv. pp. 495-6.
2
Laokoon xxi. Reiz ist Schonheit in Bewegung.
by an adaption of Shaftesbury, and as a consequence to prove 
also against Kant, that in the beautiful character inclina­
tion and duty are reconciled. He observes that without her 
belt, which gave charms even to the ugly, Venus is still the 
beautiful Venus, while her beauty she can only give away with 
her person. Those on whom this favour is conferred, retain 
it as something external to themselves, and so far the charm of 
their beauty would seem to be subjective. But the marvel in 
the myth is, that while they have the belt in their possession, 
it constitutes an objective characteristic of their person and 
is not a mere appearance for the spectator. (Sie Kommt
dem G-egenstande selbst zu, nicht bloss der Art, wie wir ihn 
1
aufnehmen) . How motion is the only change which a subject
can suffer without losing his identity, and thus Charm or Grace
can be an inherent attribute of the subject without being a con-
2
stant, objective quality. Schiller advances to his conclusion 
in what is a chapter of contradictions, which we must pass over.
He would emphasise that the motion must be voluntary and in 
other places he insists that it must be involuntary. He means 
to say that Grace is involuntary, not in the sense of reflex 
action, but the involuntary element in the actions of a moral 
disposition; it is what is characteristic in emotional ex­
pression, or just that form of expression which follows immediate-
3
ly on a state of feeling before it has passed away. But 
Schiller has thus restricted characteristic expression to the 
beauty of character, and we can now understand why Goethe did 
not like his paper. It i^ arks the middle period in Schiller's 
aesthetical development, where he tries to co-|ordinate aestheti— 
cism and moralism. Evidently he has taken the Greek conception 
for all it is worth, but, instead of applying it to inorganic 
Nature as Goethe did, he has confined it to the Individual of
^Ueber Anmuth und Wurde. Sammtliche Werke. xi. p. 386. 
ibid. p. 385.
3
ibid. pp. 407-413: See especially pp.408 and 413.
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the Aufklarung. to ’whom he looked back with fond regret. His
conclusion is practically the same as Kant's denial of an Ideal
to what has not a moral nature. He thinks that the hair of a
beautiful head does not move with grace any more than waving 
1
com. This statement is one in principle with Kant's cruel 
criticism of Myron's Cow, that it is merely correct because it 
has not got a moral expression. But Schiller has advanced on
Kant in bringing out the signifinanee of his principle when it
is properly applied. He has shown how charms can be objective 
as entering into characteristic expression, although they are 
not essential to Beauty. To put it epigrammatically, there 
can be Beauty without charms, but charms must.be the expression 
of a beautiful nature. This somewhat ambiguous place assigned 
to Charm may be clearly understood by a simple illustration.
We have seen the features of an ugly musician becoming trans­
formed under the influence of the music he is playing. Girdled 
for the momerit with the belt of Venus, the expression on his
face is a real part Gif himself. But when the music ceases,
this expression dies away and the features resume their for­
bidding appearance. In one of his stories, Tolstoi tells of 
a musician who found his way to a ball in a most filthy condi­
tion. He volunteered to play, and "at each note that he played, 
Albert grew taller and taller. At a little distance, he had
no appearance of being either crippled or peculiar. ---- --
His face shone with complete, enthusiastic delight; his eyes 
gleamed with a radiant, steely light; his nostrils quivered, 
his red lips were parted in rapture". But now the time is 
approaching when he must give up the bel£ to the Goddess; "at 
the end of the next variation, Albert's face grew serene, his 
eyes flushed, great clear drops of sweat poured down his cheeks. 
The veins swelled on his forehead; his whole body swayed more 
and more; his pale lips were parted, and his whole figure ex­
pressed an enthusiastic craving for enjoyment. Despairingly
swaying with his whole body, and throwing back his hair, he 
1ibid. pp. 386-7.
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laid down his violin, and with a smile of proud satisfaction
and happiness gazed at the bystanders. Then his back assumed
its ordinary curve, his head sank, his lips grew set, his eyes
lost their fire; and as though he were ashamed of himself,
timidly glancing round, and stumbling, he went into the next 
1
room" .
Now Kant himself recognises, when he comes to treat of the
Sublime, that charms are compatible with Beauty because the
aesthetic state is a feeling of the furtherance of life, an
interplay of the Powers in which they promote one another to
2
increased activity. This clearly indicates that he con­
ceived of Aesthetic as an objective,concrete state; it is the 
significant play of our mental Powers as fulfilling an end of 
our being. But while he makes this concession to Charm, he 
will not hear of Emotion (Ruhrung). for this is the feeling of 
Sublimity and is not play but earnest activity. Emotion he 
defines as "a sensation in which pleasantness is produced by
means of a momentary checking and a consequent more powerful
3
outflow of the vital force". It is not intellective but voli­
tional, and therefore not aesthetical but a modification in our 
moral disposition. But with this final limitation, we shall 
have passed the lower limit of polemical criticism and entered 
on Kant's constructive phase.
This moral emotion, in its most general form, is simply the 
feeling for Nature which Kant had throughout presupposed in the 
background of his theory. The insipid simper of Free Beauty, 
which he thought already sufficiently charming, is only a cari­
cature of the softened splendour in Celestial Being. Referring 
to the section in the Critique of Judgment where this sentiment 
is expressly introduced, Schiller speaks of Kant in the highest 
terms as the first to have begun reflections on the love of 
Nature for her own sake, as she stands opposed to Art and puts 
1
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it to shame; “whoever has learnt to admire the author only as
1
a great thinker, will rejoice to find here a trace of his heart". 
Schiller gives some examples. What is it, he asks, that 
pleases us in an unsightly flower, a spring of water, a mossy 
stone, the chirping of birds, the humming of bees? He answers , 
it is an idea presented through them that we love; the still, 
creative life, the quiet, self-produced effects, the self-deter­
mined existence, the inner necessity, the eternal unity with self.
They are what we were, they are what we ought again to be; hence
2
they transport us into a sublime emotion. Kant calls this 
emotion by the strange name of an intellectual interest in Beauty, 
ostensibly because it implies some concept of Nature. Schiller 
more candidly regards it as moral sentiment. Neither of them 
considers it .aesthetical. But Kant did not see "that the ad­
mission of this feeling for Nature alters his whole conception 
of abstract Beauty. If it be discovered that the object of 
our admitation is an artificial flower, we lose our interest* .
It is the thought "that Nature has produced it" that creates the 
immediate interest in our aesthetic reflexion. A mischievous 
boy can make a perfect imitation of the nightingale, and while the 
delusion lasts we are charmed; hut as soon as the deception is 
discovered, the charm is gone; "it must be Nature or be regarded
as Nature, if we are to take an immediate interest in the Beauti- 
4
ful as such". Notice the deliberate use of the term immediate, 
and then consider that this section is entitled, 'Of the intellec­
tual interest in the Beautiful1. Both Kant and Schiller are 
thinking of the same thing and both are wrong. Schiller's 
reason is that the feeling is mediated through an idea, and that
it could only be aesthetical if it were the impression received
§
in immediate observation of the form. As Kant would say, it 
must be blosse Betraohtungc. Here we see Schiller's limitation.
^Ueber Naive und Sentimentalische Dichtungc. Sammthiche
Werke. x.ii. p. 198.
2 3
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ibid. p. 182. Ueber Naive und Sentimentalische
Dichtungc. Werke.xii. p. 198.
Although he developed the conception of Form to great advantage, 
as the aesthetic semblance, he never got away completely from 
Kanb’s mechanical distinction of matter and form; and when he 
comes across psychic phenomena which have a deeper significance 
than the play of free appearance, he can find no place for them 
except as affections of our moral disposition. Kant would defend 
himself by pointing out that we must not confuse this emotional 
interest with a pure aesthetic judgment, for in the contemplation 
of a flower as a free beauty, we abstract altogether from the 
thought that Nature has produced it. But to this we reply that 
such a flower is as unreal as an artificial flower, and Kant has 
practically admitted that it is impossible to think away this 
thought; in the case of a counterfeit, our whole interest is 
based on the supposition that it is natural, Schiller could go 
a step further. He would admit that the form is deceptive, but 
it is an honest deception; as the refutation of existence in 
its naturality, the asthetischer Schein is frankly appearance and 
is a base falsehood when it claims to be actual. Very well; 
but this is not an abstract appearance, a new heaven, it is a 
new heaven and a new earth. It is not an image given off from 
Nature like the i«Ja>Xt*of Democritus, but Nature herself as 
appearance in her body and spirit. It is the false appearance 
that is opposed as from form to matter, while the honest appear­
ance transcends and includes this original opposition, This, 
as will be readily recognised, is practically refuting Schiller 
by his own words. But owing to his moralistic tendency, he 
did not see that the naive feeling for Nature is nothing else 
than the aesthetic consciousness of Nature's Spirit, which 
breathes through the poetiy of Wordsworth.
"To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears", 
is a purely aesthetic emotion of the sublime order. But neither 
Schiller nor Kant was able to assimilate the Sublime to Aesthetic.
1
The Aesthetical Education of Man. Weiss, p. 158.
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Let me give one more illustration from Schiller, and it 
is the last. In a very fine passage he shows, with special 
reference to children, how the unsightly, the inconsiderable 
and in itself despicable has a soul of Beauty which does not 
lie in its form but shines through its formlessness. It is a 
good instance of the Sublime, which includes the infinitely 
small as well as the infinitely great. He says it is a mis­
take to think that the feeling we entertain towards children 
is due to their appearance of helplessness. This may indeed 
be the emotion in those who are used to feel towards the weak 
nothing but a sense of their own superiority. But the feeling 
for Nature for her own sake is "humbling rather than agreeable 
to self-love; and if there be an advantage on either side, it 
is not at least on' ours. Not because we took down upon the 
child from the height of our power and perfection do we come 
into emotion, but because we, out from the limits of our con­
dition, which is inseparable from the disposition of our nature
we have once for all acquired, look uo to the limitless des-
1
tination in the child and to its pure innocence". What is 
this but the sympathetic symbolism of aesthetic intuition, 
which gives wings to the wind, eyes to the stars, and invests 
inanimate Nature with the passions of men? Because the child 
touches the Ideal of our perfection in a single point, we make 
it impersonate the complete destination of our humanity. In a 
similar way, the unsightly flower and mossy stone have what is 
wanting in our character to make it complete. And although 
they do not enjoy our divine freedom to change our condition, 
they suggest the Ideal of our humanity in the simple appearance 
of self-contained existence; they have necessity, the indif­
ference to change, which we have not, the eternal age of un­
remembered years is writ upon them. But if both are combined 
in what can only he an aesthetic intuition, if our uncertain, 
fitful changes are controlled by and educated into their serene
indifference to Time's destroying passage, "there goes the Divine
q




The whole root of their error is a false conception of 
immediacy. The feeling for Nature is the aesthetic conscious­
ness of depth in spiritual content, Is our experience less 
aesthetical "because it must sustain an effort of reflexion, is 
our intuition less serene and contemplative because it is the 
penetrating insight of sympathetic feeling? Is not G-enius the 
greatest amount of excitation with the least expenditure of 
energy, and will it not therefore maintain its calm in the con­
sciousness of spontaneous effort? Is it less aesthetical be­
cause the soul of Beauty in a thing does not lie in the mere 
observation of its form, but exists in our sublimity, and must 
be fetched from the deep by sympathetic symbolism? Kant him­
self has been telling us that there is a kind of causality in 
Aesthetic, by which the Powers maintain themselves and promote 
each other to increased activity. So the question arises if 
unqualified immediacy is an adequate description of what is 
distinctive in Aesthetic. Setting aside for the moment the 
specific type of emotion which Kant has defined as a violent 
inhibition of the nerve-centres, we have only to recognise 
that emotion need not be exclusively volitional. The check 
may be and is normally ideational, and this is not a rude re­
vulsion of moral feeling but the gentle displacement of one 
idea or image by another; it is what happens in the almost 
imperceptible shock of surprise with which we greet recognisable 
features in.a view or work of Art. Now it will be remfeea? re­
membered that Kant stakes everything on this question, and in­
sists that the moment immediacy is surrendered, Aesthetic dis­
appears. But the truth regarding immediacy is the same as 
we found in the claim to disinterestedness; the two terms are
the ,sides of the sane shield. In contrast with Cognition
Aesthetic is undoubtedly immediate, for it does not think the 
object discursively but views it as a whole whose parts are 
transparent. This perception, however, may be full or empty,
"^ Ueber Naive und Sent. Dictung. Werke. xii. p. 199.
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deep or shallow, according to the power of* aesthetic vision.
He may not gain the Beautiful who only glances at her form and 
is satisfied in "the mere act of judging", he may have to 
linger long and suffer the displacement of many ideas. And 
still this mediating process is not the intervention of a con­
cept or a moral reaction, it is neither an intellectual nor a 
moral interest but the mediation peculiar to Aesthetic itself. 
This is what both Kant and Schiller have not recognised. It is 
not a going beyond the appearance into something beneath or 
above, which would be intellective, it is a modification within 
the appearance. There are degrees in aesthetic appearance, 
there are degrees in Subjectivity, When now we recognise the 
qualified sense in which Aesthetic is immediate, we shall not 
speak of a sympathetic insight into Nature as an intellectual 
interest or as moral sentiment, we shall call it rather the 
content in aesthetic judgment.
This completes Kant’s critical theory. It was a three­
fold criticism, directed against the intellectualism of Leibniz, 
the aesthetico-ethical fusion of Shaftesbury and the sensational­
ism of Burke. But we have been continually aware that his 
theory suffers in its several applications. This is partly due 
to Kant's ignorpw$e of Pine Art, but more I think to the incoher­
ent doctrine of Freedom which he adopted from the Aufklarung.
The fact is, he had a most profound insight into the original 
conditions of aesthetic FeeL ing, such as none of his predecessors 
had acquired, and the general principles of his theory will 
never be superseded. As was hinted in an earlier part of this 
chapter, his limitation chiefly consisted in not being able to 
develop his own principles. His path was blocked by three 
obstructions which are all hewn out of the same rock, a negative 
conception of Freedom, an unregenerate Sensibility and a con­
sequent want of Schemata in aesthetic Imagination. I now wish 
to indicate, in conclusion, the positive and constructive phase 
in Kant’s theory. But before doing so, we ought to notice a
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rather unique passage in which he demolishes, at a single 
stroke, the whole edifice of abstract Beauty. He announced 
quite early in his analysis, that the Key to the criticism of 
Taste is to he found, in the principle that the judgment must 
precede the pleasure. If we have fallowed the exposition with 
any intelligence, this statement will occasion some surprise.
As M. Basch says, a state of feeling is changed into a state of
1
knowledge, sans crier gare", Although it appears as early 
as the ninth section I have purposely reserved it until now, 
because it seemed quite inconsistent with the theory which Kant 
has developed. We have understood as a cardinal maxim, that 
Aesthetic must not he assimilated to intellectual activity hut 
explained as being due to an original and independent faculty, 
low, nhowever, we are told In advance that we must make up our 
minds before the feeling of pleasure arises, and this can only 
be understood as a prior Intellectual act. What is more, this 
principle removes a most important land mark by which Aesthetic 
Is distinguished from other types of mental activity; for it 
is equally true of a teleologies! judgment that the recognition 
of an end precedes the pleasure, and also in the moral judgment 
the pleasure must decidedly follow the maxim of Practical Reason. 
Moreover, the statement Is not without support. In the original 
Introduction the same principle is expressed with a more glaring
emphasis; it Is said that Mthe subjective teleology is thought
2
before It is felt? It might be explained in the first place, 
that Kant Is here confusing logical with temporal priority. Un­
doubtedly the conditions which make the pleasure possible as a 
fel$? harmony in the mental states, must be supposed to exist 
prior to the pleasure Itself, but not for our consciousness.
And, in his other statements, Kant makes it quite clear that the
pleasure does not follow but accompanies the judgment; it must
I^Esthetique de Kant, p. 178.




be "bound up with the mere act of judging’". But this critic 
cism is so obvious that if it had been proposed to Kant, he 
would have laughed in scorn. Why then did he say that the 
pleasure must follow? Because he wished to indicate that 
there is such thing as aesthetical Reflexion, quite distinct 
from the intellectual process, and that if the pleasure is to 
be aesthetical and not the consequence of sensation, it must 
first be mediated through this reflexion. And although his 
language would lead us to believe that he is reducing the 
aesthetic state to an intellectual process, nothing is further 
from his mind. Even in the passage quoted from the original 
Introduction, where the harmony of the faculties is said to be 
thought before it is felt, he is careful to point out in the 
next sentence that the ground of this harmony cannot be brought 
under a determinate concept and can only be apprehended in feel­
ing; that is to say, it is not thought at all. Evidently 
Kant is struggling to express ideas which were in advance of 
his philosophical vocabulary. He has to use the word * thought* 
when he should have said 'felt*; and he does so because that 
this is not a mere feeling of pleasure but indeterminate content, 
and for Kant significant content was identical with explicit 
thinking. The unsuspecting candour and the absence of all 
sense of contradiction with which he introduces this principle 
in the ninth section,are themselves a clear indication that he 
had made a discovery of which the mechanical appliances of his 
age were not able to provide a working model. As to whether 
he meant an intellectual act by placing the judgment before the 
pleasure, this is settled at onoe by his express use of the 
term Beurthellung. which does not denote a logical judgment but 
a psychological process; notice how it is stated; ob im 
Q-eschmaoksurthei 1 e das Gtefuhl der Lust vor der B eurtheilung des 
degenstandee, oder dies© vor jener vorhergehe; the specific 
judgment of the object which Is said to precede the pleasure,
1
Bernard, p, 164,
is distinguished from the judgment of Taste itself as falling 
1
within it. He does not say that the pleasure follows an 
intellectual act, hut that it must he hound up with and he 
dependent upon the condition of all intellectual acts and prin­
ciples, the Power of Judging at all. This principle, then, 
which at first appears so disingenuous, is simply the denial of 
unqualified immediacy. What must be fundamental, he says, as
the basis of the pleasure, is "the universal capability of
2
communication"in the mental state, and this is just another 
expression for a significant content, a state of feeling that 
is worth communicating and therefore capable of being under­
stood. The whole point it that the aesthetic Powers have it 
in their own hands, and do not move at the bidding of Sense 
without or Reason within. Immediate the aesthetic act may 
be; hut this does not mean that we must be precipitated on 
to the presentation and be glued to it in a blind panic, and 
that if it does not happen instantaneously there is a mis­
carriage. Like Pal staff the Powers refuse to entertain upon 
eompusion compulsion, and whether we shall have any pleasure 
in the Beautiful is for them to consider. They have instruc­
ted the Pleasure not to be tickled by sensation, nor to be 
cajoiled by any intellectual interest or moral sentiment, but 
to take its cue immediately from them; when they move, it 
goes with them, when they begin to play, it announces the fact 
in cheers. But the Powers may refuse to budge, their motion 
fflay be fast or slow, light or heavy, and may vary in intensity. 
There is therefore such a thing as aesthetical Reflexion, 
quite peculiar and sibin distinct from thought. There are 
degrees in immediacy, and each of them as it imperceptibly 
glides into another is an immediate moment, the augenblick der 
Sssi&stt. How when this reflective modification is observed 
from the outside, it looks 1 ike a mediated process, and it 
1
Hartenstein v. p. 221.
2
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this false external view that led botdrKant and Schiller to 
think that naive interest in Nature,because it is not immedi­
ately imprinted on the form of presentation, must be an inter­
vention, intellectual, moral or bath. It is not an inter­
vention, it is the mediation peculiar to Aesthetic itself,
Thus Nature, not indeed as the object of Understanding 
but of Reflexion, is become the content in Aesthetic. This 
poetic idea of Nature, as containing the raw substance to 
which Aesthetic gives form, is composed of two abstract elements, 
the systematic knowledge of sense-perception and moral Reason, 
or Nature as she is interpreted by Mind and Will. These elements 
do not enter into Aesthetic by mechanical subsumption as a 
material which, is contingent to and unaffected by the form, 
and here at least Kant is above criticism. For although he 
uses this mechanical metaphor, he is very careful to insist 
that it Is not the concrete representations of Mind and Will 
that are subordinated to each other in the free relation which 
constitutes aesthetic form, but the faculties themselves, in­
tellectual and moral. And this can only mean that, as in­
determinate potencies, Knowledge and Morality enter into 
Aesthetic by inner transformation; foregoing their specific 
form and subsiding into characterless substance, they are 
"changed into the same image". Kant unfortunately restricts 
the faculties to Imagination, or the highest faculty of Sense 
and Understanding, or the faculty of systematic Thought, and 
these are only specifications of one direction of mind-, the 
intellective; but, as will immediately appear, he merits a 
higher interpretation. He is deserving of all praise for the 
dogged persistence with which he excludes Knowledge and Morality, 
as such, from Aesthetic,and his mistaken theory of purity is 
in great part due to this motive. The artist is capable of 
perceiving Truth but he does not think it discursively, and he 
has also a moral disposition but its promptings are not
commands to be obeyed. Therefore he need not blush to 
acknowledge the sensuous form nor fear to own its authority, 
for it is instinct with intelligence, theoretical and practi­
cal. how the original problem of the Critique of Judgment, 
as it is generally received, was the union of these two 
elements which are the abstract factors in the poetic idea of 
Nature; it is the union of Sense and Reason, or of Nature as 
Mechanism and Nature as Freedom. But it is evident that this 
union can never be consummated in the artificial type of 
Beauty which Kant has developed, for, as the very abstraction 
of Nature and the negation of true Freedom, it is incapable 
of containing either. Kant is well aware of this and turns 
to the Ideal, which is not aesthetical but moral, not the 
Ideal of Beauty but the Ideal of Character. But again this 
is not the solution of which we are in search. This moral 
Ideal is the ethical noumenon, the abstract Man of Freedom,
which, as Cohen says, separates Nature and the ethical Per-
1
sonality (sittlichkeit) ; it is an Ideal which is never com­
pletely realised and can only be maintained by ceaseless 
strife. It is therefore not properly the Ideal at all but 
the Idea of Humanity. It is in Aesthetic alone that the 
Ideal can be presented as the complete realisation of the 
Idea in individual form. There is only one way in which 
Man could contain his own Ideal, and that is by being himself 
perfectly good.
Kant, however, seems to have found his solution in
another and somewhat accidental way, I mean his theory of
G-enius. It has the appearance of a foreign , element which
has no systematic connection with the rest of his work. But
this is not a true impression. On the contrary, it may be
urged with some degree of confidence that it is the primary
and original factor in his Aesthetic. For over thirty years,
he had discussed the nature of Genius in his lectures on
Logic and Anthropology, chiefly under the influence of 
1Kant,s Begrflndung der Aesthetik. p. 216.
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Baumgarten and Gerard. The'Essay on Genius' by Gerard, a 
professor at Aberdeen, was known to him as early as the
• 1
sixties, and he mentions the work as the best of its kind.
Meanwhile, in his comparison between Logic and Aesthetic, he
was effecting a rapprochement between feeling and logical
form, which later emerged in the conception of subjective
teleology or Play. (Spiel der Krafte) But it is not likely
that he arrived at this conception apart from the theory of
Genius. We must remember that subjective teleology as
aesthetic play does not come into vogue in Kant's writings
until so late as 1787. In that year he intimated to Reinhold
that Teleology would be the title of his work on Taste, It
is surely, then, a correct inference that the conception of
Play arises out of the theory of Genius and not the latter
2
from the former, as Anna Tumarkin supposes. But Kant did 
not seem to be aware of any connection between them, and 
developed an independent theory of Aesthetic which has no­
thing in common with the nature of Genius. He did not see 
that in Genius the distinction between the formal Beauty of 
Nature and the characteristic Beauty of Art is completely 
swept away. For the work of Genius is at once Nature and 
Art: the rule by which he is guided is not consciously
*
applied, it is Nature that gives the rule to Art through him:
"it can only be that in the subject which is Nature and aannot
be brought under rules or concepts, i.e. the supersensible
3
substrate of all his faculties".
"Nature is made better by no mean,
But Nature makes that mean; so o'er the Art,
Which you say adds to Nature, is an Art 
That Nature makes".
It is in this artistic consciousness that we shall find the 
reconciliation of Nature and Freedom. For the supersensible
^Schlapp. Kant's L.ehre vom Genie, u.s.w. p. 244.




substrate that utters itself in Genius is not the ethical 
noumenon but the catholic nature of the individual, not the 
ethical but the human Personality, not the Man of Freedom but 
the Man of Humanity. It is therefore the harmony of all the 
mental Powers, and not simply those which are intellectual, 
Imagination and Understanding; it is the unison in their ori­
ginal simplicity of Intellection, Emotion and Conation, it is 
the Gemuthslcrafte rather than the Erkenntni ssvermogen. Kant 
denotes the consciousness of this state by the feeling of 
pleasure and pain. Perhaps there is an. advantage after all in 
the choice of this term. In the original Introduction he de­
fined it as the only form of sensation which can never indicate
1
a quality in objects. In another passage he goes further,
and says that it contributes nothing even to a knowledge of our
■ 2
subjective state, Pleasure-pain is not a psychosis but the 
resonance of a psychosis; it does not illumine explicit ele­
ments in consciousness, it only indicates the practical attitude 
of consciousness to presentations. And, as the barest form 
of awareness, it has a close resemblance to that elemental state 
whose content is indeterminate. But there is a great difference 
between them. Pleasure-pain is only the qualitative index of 
consciousness as a succession, while the other feeling-state is 
the va&ue sense of duration and only means that we have con­
sciousness. It has a nearer affinity, therefore, to sensation 
than to that form of sensation ifiose significance is exhausted 
in the bare feeling of pleasure or pain. But it is not sensa­
tion. It Is the state which exists before the distinction has 
emerged between consciousness as affective and as affecting. 
Fichte held a feast on the day his child first said *1*, because 
It was the birth of self-consciousness. The child-life is 
prevailingly objective and. impersonal, and even when the first 
1
Ueber Phil . nberhaupt. Bosehkranz 1. p. 598.
2 .........
Reehtslefane. Hart. vii. pp. 8-9.
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personal pronoun is used, it is more in imitation of the 
linguistic expression than with a definite sense of the dis­
tinction between pure and empirical consciousness. The ego is 
vaguely identified with the whole mass of sensation, as may be 
seen from the use of the simply exclamation, ’Hungry instead 
of the more subjective expression, *1 am hungry'. Unfortunate­
ly, we have no word to express this primordial state of con­
sciousness except the common term Peeling, which is already used 
in to denote pleasure-pain. Perhaps we might use the word 
'empathy1, which Dr. Stout has coined to cover Emnfindung in its 
widest sense. It is not a feeling of, but a feeling in. an 
empathy; it is the limit at which consciousness is still possi­
ble without a determinate object, the thin, taut rope on which 
consciousness balances itself without support and looks down in­
to the awful abyss of the thoughts.
This elemental feeling of our identity, in the quiet of our 
spirit, is a fleeting revelation of a past estate, and is deep 
enough to justify the thought of pre—existence. In the earliest 
dawn of human life, mind existed in its concreteness without 
speeifiiu specific directions of activity; there was apprehen­
sion but it was not intellectual, being entirely pragmatical in 
subservience to Will; there was Will but it was not ethical, 
being subservient to the feeling of well-being as it is promoted 
or hindered; there was Emotion but it was not ideational, being 
inseparable from its physical expression. This is not an 
estate we should wish to recover, and if we speak of a return 
to Nature, we mean an ideal regress which is really a progress. 
But it was a harmony of mental life which we must regain if 
Nature and Freedom are to be reconciled. Meanwhile we are 
suffered to cultivate the tendencies of consciousness in isola­
tion, in order that the original unity may be enlarged and en­
riched; but we are to come back again. As the foetus evolves 
through the several stages of the animal world, the elemental 
harmony of human life is broken up into co-ordinate directions
37.
of activity and waits in hope of its redemption, when that 
which is in part shall be done away. Our Intellect is culti­
vated to excess, and as it becomes more and more conceptual, 
it loses the intuitive power to realise its ideas in practice.
Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.
There is the correlative defect in our culture that our Will is 
not intellectual; it is exercised apart in enforced obedience 
to a Law which our mind cannot approve, a helpless monitor which 
bids us at• act or refrain from acting but does not inspire us to 
obey. Pragmatism is telling us that this is an antiquated 
theory, and that we must mince the absolute Rule into interesting 
morsels. But Pragmatism cannot change human nature. Humanism 
is periodic in the Race, but the permanent features of human 
nature remain unchanged. The youthful exuberance and healthy- 
minded vigour of the present generation, is closely akin to the 
effete and dangerous schwarmerei of the eighteenth century, and 
is the passing of the human spirit through a destructive moment. 
Mankind will ever seek to strive with the Highest and will not 
tolerate its behests to be squandered in the suffrages of human 
passion; it will rather battle with uncompromising Righteousness, 
a hateful Law which intimidates by coercion, than see its mandates 
weakened. But therein it is not blest. Its morality is warped, 
a grasping Freedom reft from dishonoured Nature uSiose-dear at 
whose dear price it wins a doubtful victory. To be an offering 
worthy of God and man, morality must pass through Nature, forego 
its rigid form and sink to plastic substance, thence to emerge, 
empowered by Nature's ministries of love and noble feeling, to 
s^rve the Highest. It is not by Law but by “the faith which 
passes into action through love", that man is made righteous.
Pending this regeneration of the Race, Aesthetic is the 
"symbol of Morality". The phrase is Kant's and thus we take it 
in its highest meaning. The moral Ideal was for him nothing 
less than the consummation of History. ‘ Now, the elemental 
harmony in man, which we may suppose to have preceded the 
development of distinctive tendencies in consciousness, is already
38.
preserved in the aesthetic state as a higher immediacy. But
Aesthetic is not Life. As the deliberate refutation of the
actual, it is only an incident in Life. Life on the other
hand, is a process of realisation which is never complete.
But if man, in the fulfilment of his destiny, attains a, to
perfect goodness, he will then become the Ideal of his humanity
which Aesthetic now contains as symbol. His nature will be
but
aesthetical, not in despite of the actual/for its sake. He 
will carry the ideal world into the actual, instead of sublima­
ting it into an ideal world which ignores its existence. He 
will not be able to take pleasure in a work of Art which ig­
nores or conflicts with moral instinct, as the artistic con­
sciousness can do and is justified in doing. I do not wish 
to raise the controversy here whether there ever did exist a 
sinless man. But, to illustrate what has been said, we may 
at least observe, that the nature .of Jesus was an aesthetical 
harmony just because it was perfectly good. It would be a 
poor description of the life in God, as he conceived it, to 
say that it was moral, and in fact that is not the way in 
which He presented the Ideal of Character. It was as the 
life without a motive that he commended it, the life of the 
lily, the end of whose existence is completely immanent in it­
self. He did not tell men to be perfect because their Father 
in Heaven is perfect, but even as He is perfect, or as child­
ren say, just because. Morality in itself is not spontaneous 
but artificial, calculating, careful of its reputation; it is 
occupied with many little things instead of the one thing need­
ful; it is the restless effort to acquire depth of character 
through breadth of enterprise, to gain intensity of feeling 
through extensive activity. Jesus told these weary souls to 
cease from their labour and enter into rest, the Peace of 
G-enius. He showed them that the present moment is rich enough 
to make a perfect life, if it is lived well, and that they 
need take no thought for the morrow. If we have the strength
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and the patience of mind to dwell in the actual until it is 
shorn of its contingency, it will he found to harbour the 
unlimited content which our minds are informed to receive, 
and we shall possess that intensive insight at home which the 
moral consciousness, in its impatient prodigality, seeks to 
find in a far country. The perfectly good is an aesthetical 
harmony.
In conclusion, Kant was never able to carry out the 
consequences of his theory of G-enius, It is more of an in­
tellectual harmony than a harmony of all the Powers. Even 
Cohen, the most liberal and sympathetic of Kant's expositors 
to day, does not think that the moral consciousness is assimi­
lated to the aesthetic in Kant's theory. Although it is 
the supersensible substrate that speaks through Genius, the 
faculties of Genius,are the Imagination and Understanding; 
they do not include the Will. Kant was afraid of the mental 
chemistry which could transform the moral consciousness by 
making it pass through Nature, and this appears in large 
letters in his doctrine of the Sublime.
1
die Aufhebung des sittlichen Inhalts in die Form des 
Gefuhls der Anlage des Problems nach zwar vorgesehen, 
aber den Ausfuhrungen nicht als Disposition zu Grunde 
gelegt worden ist. Kant's Begrundung der Aesthetik. 
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harmony. Terrible Nature menaces and thwarts the habitual 
course of our ideas, and creates a feeling of disquieting fear, 
In the presence of mountain masses piled in arrogant confusion, 
forbidding crags with jagged edges impending our path: before
the fury of the tempest and the raging of the swollen sea: be­
neath reverberating thunder-clouds emitting bolts of destruc­
tion, we suffer a sense a shock; the even tenor of our life is 
arrested by invading force. But if our emotion will be sub­
lime, we must win past this first moment of surprise and regain 
our calm, we must rise above the threatening presentation and 
our feeling of dismay. It is the difference between sublimity 
and superstition, and Kant has been careful to remark this dis­
tinction: "he who fears can form no judgment about the Sublime
in nature; just as he who is seduced by inclination and appe-
1
tit.e can form no judgment about the Beautiful".
The satisfaction in the Sublime may therefore be called
negative; it is the peculiar pleasure which arises from pain
and fear. Kant calls it admiration or respect, Burke calls
it delight. The initial shock is followed by an overflow of
vital force, the tension of inhibition relaxes in a feeling of
expansion, and we are caught up beyond the present danger to
an elevation from which we can look down in serene security.
The explanation of this change in us is that the greatness and
vastness of Nature, baffling the effort of Imagination to
grasp it, challenges our Reason, the divine power of our mind,
to think of something greater still, the infinite power and
majesty of G-od. The greatness of Nature suffers in comparison
with the Omnipotent. This feeling is subtly expressed in a
up
well-known Psalm. In the words, "I will lift/mine eyes unto
the hills, from whence cometh my help", the dependent clause 




structure of the Psalm is antiphonal, set to he sung in the 
form of responses hy reciprocating choirs, thus; "I will 
lift up mine eyes unto the hills. Whence cometh my help?"- 
(antiphone) "My help cometh from God, maker of heaven and 
earth".
But Burke's explanation is much inferior. It is simply 
the psychological fact that we do find pleasure in what is 
painful. He does not only mean dramatic sympathy, the 
pleasure we take in an imitation of painful facts, hut pleasure 
in the painful facts themselves. He asks us to choose the 
most affecting tragedy, and to appoint the most favourite 
actors to act it on a certain day; and just at the moment 
■when the audience is at the pitch of expectation, let it he 
announced that a criminal of high rank is to he executed in 
the adjoining square; "in a moment the emptiness of the 
theatre would demonstrate the comparative weakness of the
1
imitative arts, and proclaim the triumph of the real sympathy". 
He thinks that terror is the ruling principle in all cases 
of suhlime emotion; what makes the suhlime a"delightful horror"
and one of the most affecting ideas, is its power of appeal to
2
our self-preserving instinct. By defining the Suhlime in 
terms of its phenomena, without discovering any principle 
which should make them suhlime, Burke has practically identi­
fied this emotion with the wretched sentiment which draws 
people against their will to the shambles, or the morgue or any 
horrifying spectacle.
Kant's explanation is very different. It is metaphysical 
and concerns the destination of our humanity . In agreement 
with his principle that the Suhlime is incompatible with charms,
the sensational character of the presentation ceases to affect 
us at the moment when suhlime emotion arises. It is not to
1
Suhlime and Beautiful. Part 1. Q 15.
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the stimulus of the presentation we respond, hut to the soli­
citude of our Reason which it provokes to activity, and there­
fore horror or charm of any kind is not admitted into the Sub­
lime. The raging sea is not sublime, it is horrible. Kant 
goes so far as to say that no form of sense can contain the
Sublime; we can only say that it is capable of suggesting a
1
sublimity which is found in our minds. These are statements 
which we cannot accept, but meanwhile they help us to see the 
inwardness of his position. Before we advance further, we 
should say that Kant makes a distinction between the mathemati­
cal and dynamical Sublime, which we do not intend to consider. 
There are the two classes of sublime phenomena, those of quanti­
ty and those of force. But mathematical extension is unable 
to affect us unless we conceive it somehow as intensive power.
So Burke thought: "I know of nothing sublime which is not
2
some modification of power". Whenever we speak, then, of 
greatness in Sublimity, it should always be dynamic and not 
simply quantitative.
Kant has given a very confused account of his ideas, and 
it may not be possible to obtain a net result. Probably his 
analysis is consummated in the discovery of a higher kind of 
intuition. In the magnitudes of Understanding there is no 
occasion for sublimity because there is no conflict between 
perception and thought. The mathematical estimation of great­
ness proceeds by numerical schemata, and it is by this mathemati­
cal procedure that our bread-and-butter faculty of knowledge, 
the Understanding, appreciates greatness. We do not attempt 
to realise the greatness, we are satisfied if we can measure 
it or count it; and since the schema of a mile is as easy for 
the Imagination as a foot, an exceeding great mountain occasions 
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us, we must begin with a sensible measure in this logical 
estimate; the numerical schema presupposes a definite in­
tuition in space, and therefore "all estimation of the magni-
• 1
tude of the objects of nature is in the end aesthetical".
The term aesthetical, as it is here used, has its original
meaning of sense-perception and has nothing to do with artistic
intuition. But in logical estimation the Imagination does
not keep by the original, sensible measure, for its purpose
is not to realise greatness but to give it a figure. It
shuts its eyes to the solicitude of the presentation and listens
to the Understanding. And since the numerical schemata of the
Understanding are capable of infinite multiples, the Imagination
can have "no maximum" and therefore no impression of greatness.
The whole which the Imagination seeks to envisage is not real,
it is not the intuition of the parts in their completeness but
the multiple of an arbitrary ■unit of measurement; and however
far the Understanding may lead, the Imagination is always able
to follow by changing its gear. If the Understanding puts up
the figure very high, Imagination takes its seven-leagued boots
and gallops after. But Reason will have none of this short
work. It requires the Imagination to realise what it is doing
at every step. As the faculty of Totality, our sense of the
divine and ultimate, it demands a whole of real parts and not
an ideal sum; and it asks the Imagination if it is able to keep
up intuiting the real parts until the whole is envisaged. Here
the unit is no longer relative but a fixed perception, or the
aesthetical unit of magnitude as Kant calls it; "it must be the
aesthetical estimation of magnitude in which the effort towards
2
comprehension surpasses the power of the Imagination". To 
this effort Imagination is unequal. It can apprehend part after 
part to any length, but it cannot comprehend them in a single 
intuition. Looking up a mountain-side, we run over its 
features from the base to the top, but we cannot take it in.
The total effect in the Powers of Nature is more than we are able
1 / pBernard, p.iii.^ 26. Bernard, p. 116.
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to envisage in perception. This is the negative moment of 
disquiet while we are still under the influence of the presenta­
tion, hut it is just in this contrast between Imagination and 
Reason that sublimity arises. The transcendent solicitude of
Reason is for the Imagination "like an abyss in which it fears
1
to lose itself".
The painful sense of shock occasioned by the presentation 
reaches its limit in the completely unthinkable object of 
Reason, which makes its first appearance in our consciousness 
as an indefinite extension of the presentation. Were the 
object nothing more than a piece of finite Nature, we should 
not be alarmed nor distress ourselves about it. Its sublimity 
would be simply a want of conformity to our thoughts about 
Nature and would fall outside the range of our reflections. It 
is because the presentation is suggestive of so much more than 
its immediate unform, a Nature-in-itself for which we have no 
imaginative faculty, a Nature which would with its slightest 
motion derange our poor subjective principle of adaptation, that 
we are seriously perturbed. The presentation expands into in­
finity as the peal of thunder rolls into its interminable echo.
In the words of Cohen, it is only as we view Nature aesthetically 
that there is anything hateful in her; malformations are not
yet objects of dislike but of teleological judgment, and only
2
affect us as furchtbar and Zweckwidrig. It is because we 
interpret Nature into the aesthetic symbol of a Nature-in—itself 
which to us is all unform, unlike the supersensible harmony of 
which Beauty is the aesthetical appearance, that it can give us 
so much pain. There is thus already an aesthetical moment in 
the Sublime for which Kant has made no provision. In the
passage already quoted, he tells us that all estimation of 
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unit. But if he thinks that this proves the Sublime to be
aesthetical, he is surreptitiously confusing the two senses
of the term. It is quite evident that in this passage
aesthetical only means sense-perception as contrasted with
logical calculation. But an aesthetical moment, in our
sense, is implied in his statement that the feeling of pain
arises from a want of accordance between Imagination and 
1
,Reason. In no other way could we realise the contrast be­
tween Imagination and Reason than by the expansion of a 
presentation into Reason's object by aesthetic symbolism. It 
is at this moment Imagination calls off. The feeling of 
discomfort reaches its limit and passes into satisfaction.
We are relieved of the irritating effort to assimilate the 
intractable forms of Nature which now are overshadowed by 
the Absolute. There is victory in this defeat, for althougi 
it is hopeless to contend with the Absolute we have a right 
to do so and are ennobled in the consciousness of effort.
It is a law for us, says Kant, to strive after the Ideas of 
Reason, and it belongs to our destination to estimate as small
in comparison with these Ideas everything which Mature, re-
2
garded as an object of sense, contains. Thus in the moment 
of self-abasement we are exalted and feel with Faust in pre­
sence of the erhabener Geist:
Ich fuhlte mich so klein, so gross.
It is this self-negating effort of Imagination, the greatest 
faculty of Sense, which falls so far short of Reason, the 
highest faculty of Thought, the more it strives, that gives 
rise to sublimity. It is the peculiar pleasure we take in 
a unity which is realised by emphasising the differences 
rather than by making them transparent as in the Beautiful; 
it is the subjective play of Imagination and Reason"as 
harmonious through their very contrast". The thwarting




feeling that we cannot see is itself a certain intimation 
that there is light round about us, for this privation assails 
us with a challenge: like the dumb conviction which remains
with us of the truth we have failed to vindicate in argument. 
The darkness of Reason is brighter than the whitest light of 
Sense:
"in such strength
Of usurpation, when the light of sense
Goes out, but with a flash that has revealed
The invisible world, doth greatness make abode,
1
There harbours."
The feeling of the Sublime is thus for Kant.a higher
power of intuition. The pull which Reason makes on our
Imagination to procure a real one Idea, a whole in perception
and not simply in thought, "excites in us the feeling of a
2
supersensible faculty" . Here at last Reason has found an 
answer to its pathetic cry, and is freed from the reproach of 
barrenness in the gift of a divine perception.which sees the 
things unseen. There is also a covert rebuke to the arro­
gance of Understanding, which professed to have the only kind 
of certain knowledge. Kant is here recovering part of the 
ground he had so readily conceded in his battle with the 
Rationalists. He freely exposed the emptiness of Reason, and 
gave his whole strength to rescue Philosophy from the contempt 
into which it had fallen by vindicating its existence as a 
genuine, scientific knowledge of Nature. But meanwhile the 
Understanding has gained undue ascendancyin Kant's system, and 
the time has come to define its limits. The scientific con­
ception of Nature is exhausted in a single adaptation to our 
minds, the world as matter in motion determined by causality, 
and makes no provision for further favours of Nature. But 
already we found an adaptation of Nature which goes beyond the 
1
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Understanding in the phenomena of the Beautiful, and now the 
phenomena of the Sublime, though they do not promote our 
thoughts about Nature, are conducive to our knowledge of a 
Nature-in-itself, the Supersensible. We say knowledge of the 
Supersensible and not simply thoughts about it, for the super­
sensible faculty is a power of intuition which transcends the 
opposition of perception and thought. The Understanding, the 
controlling faculty of Sense in which Imagination is a sub­
ordinate piece like the lens in the telescope, is the knowledge 
of separation and diversity; it only knows the parts of exist­
ence with a suspicion of their complete unity and therefore 
not as they exist concretely in the whole. Reason can never 
obtain a real total from these abstract, particulars and must 
be satisfied with an Idea, an attentuated thought about them. 
For the demand of Reason, that it shall realise existence as 
a completed whole, can only be satisfied if the parts of exist­
ence themselves are known in -their completeness as originally 
connected with the whole and with eachother. As we shall see 
later, Nature favours us yet once more with an illustration of 
this more intimate relation of whole to part, in the phenomena 
of organic life. There is thus a conflict of faculties. 
Understanding and Reason, the governing faculty of Sense and 
the governing faculty of thought, are not able to supplement 
eachother and supply a real intuition. For the parts of ex­
istence as they are known to Understanding are perceived, if 
imperfectly and even falsely, while the real kinds are not 
imaged by Reason but imagined or conceived. The particulars 
and their specific characters exist in our minds in divergent 
ways. This is the result at which the Critique of Pure Reason
arrives: there is a pull between Imagination and Reason, as
i't is expressed in the Critique of Judgment. In the Sublime & 
"this silent opposition breaks out for the first time in an open 
declaration of war. Our power of perception is taken at a
»• xo
disadwantage. What can the understanding make of arid mates of 
solitude* "mountain-masses grandly dumb" or the tragedy of 
human life ? To know their soientifio history is not to explain 
the reason of their existence* Certainly the beautiful is
also outwith the Jurisdiction of the understanding* tout of 
these phenomena it does not need to ask the reason because 
they confirm, its interpretation of Nature as adapted to our 
intelligence. But these intransigent phenomena of the 
Bublime help us in no way, they ms rather bring disoredit 
on the effort of our intellect to keep its hold on Nature, tex?  
Far onoe the Imagination* whioh is an unbounded faculty of 
presentation* is put to confusion. Reason had already been de­
graded as an empty power* now it is the turn of Imagination 
with its controlling genius Understanding to fall into disgrace , 
and in their common wi ruin the supersensible faculty takes 
its rises
,# in such strength
of usurpation ~~~ doth greatness make abode.*
The superiority of this supersensible power Consists
in its trwnsoendenoe of the streit der Faoult&ten. Its object
1.
is a "real idea", the absolute totality whioh reason
sought but failed to find. It is real because the parts
exist in the same way as the whole* there being no outside
faculty of Imagination now to raise a conflict. it is the
type of real existence.
But however -valuable this interpretation of the
Btiblime may be as a moral or religious acquisition* it has
little in common with Aesthetic and Kant deliberately calls
8.
it a mere appendix to the beautiful. imagination haring 
onoe lost its footing is newer allowed to regain it* and 
"the light of sense goes out". It is true he says that 
Nature is sublime "in those of its phenomena* whose intuition
brings With it the idea of its infinity." 25. < r^ j
’(Bernard p.iof) *(ibid.p.X04.) *’ (ibid p o m ) .
■*11 —■
But It Is by a negative suggestion and not by aesthetic
expansion of the presentation that the thought of the Infinite
is conveyed to us. The presentation itself suffers in
comparison with the Infinite of whose expression is it is
deemed incapable and even unworthy. "Who would call sublime"
he asks," shapeless mountain masses piled in wild disorder upon 
each other with their pyramids of ice, or the gloomy raging
M 1.
sea?* Certainly we should, But to Kant these are
simply horrible, and although he is superior to Burke in 
discriminating between the Horrible and the Sublime, Burke 
was nearer to the truth when he discovered Sublimity in %y 
the frigeoc of sensation. *6— ^
What is it that comes to our help when we are
confronted with some imminent peril and regains for us our
self-control, or what enables us to contemplate the most 
harrowing suffering at once with sympathy and admiration ? It 
is sublime emotion. It may not happen often. As Kant truly 
says, sublimity requires moral oulture. But if we are not 
moved to disgust nor turn away in loathing, we stand our 
ground in presence of the presentation and are sufficiently 
reoonoiled to contemplate it with a curious but ennobling 
satisfaction. The awful loses its erstwhile hostile form, 
becomes familiar and even friendly while yet it maintains 
its distant majesty.
There is a lingering trace,however, of aesthetio 
symbolism in Kant9s view. Instead of confirming our 
interpretation of Nature as an intelligible order 
enlarging our thoughts about it, sublime phenomena call in 
1.
(ibid. pp 117-8.)
(Der BnglAAder Burg (i.e.Burke) sagt das erhabene 
sei sohreCkhaffc,das 1st falsoh. Anthropologie 1791-98. 
Sohlapp # Kants Lehre vom ftenie. p ,893)
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question the whole principle, of natural teleology as unim­
portant, and shift our attention to the supersensible world 
of which visible Nature is only a more or less contingent re­
presentation; "we are reminded that we only have to-do with
nature as phenomenon, and that it must be regarded as the
' 1
mere presentation of a nature in itself". It will thus be
employed "gleichsam zum Schema des Uebersinnlichen". But
this is only the analogon of a schema and not an expressive
symbol. Perhaps a more decisive suggestion may be found in
his idea of subreption; "the feeling of the Sublime in
nature is respect for our own destination, which by a certain
subreption we attribute to an object of nature". In its
highest sense this language would mean, the artistic passion
which lives itself into the object and makes it personate our
feeling. And he uses moderate language when he says that we
judge sublime, not so much the object as our own state of 
3
mind. I have mentioned these passages that we may not think 
unfairly of Kant's view. But these modifying statements do 
not affect his characteristic position. Sublimity is with­
drawn from Nature altogether and exists entirely in our minds.
This theory has influenced later thinkers and may be said 
to have held the field until we come to Schopenhauer."Your 
object is the sublimest, of course, in space", said Schiller
to the astronomer, "but friend, in space the Sublime dwells
' 4
not". Hegel, too, has lent the weight of his great name to
the same view. for him there is only one object of sublimity
and that is God. But his appeal to Old Testament poetry is a
little unfortunate, for it is not true that the transcendence
of God exhausts Hebrew poetry. On the contrary, it was not
till after the exile, when the fortunes of the nation were
1 2 3
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broken, that the Hebrew people learnt in their unfulfilled 
hopes to'measure the distance between God and the creature. 
The theophanies of the earlier records testify to a fellow­
ship with God as intimate, if naive, as New Testament faith. 
And God is not only present to His people, He is immanent in 
His works. The forces of Nature are not analogous symbols 
but the expression of His presence and power:
"yea, He did fly upon the wings of the wind.
He made darkness his secret place; his pavilion 
round about Him were dark waters and thick clouds 
of the skies.
The Lord also thundered in the heavens, and the
Highest gave His voice; hail stones and coals of 
1
fire".
If the God of the Hebrews is sublime, it is as He is
clothed in Nature's majesty and power. And if Nature suffers
in any part of her before the glance of the Creator, it is in
man. But the vanity and nothingness of human life, so
characteristic of Ecclesiastes and many of the Psalms, is a
product of scepticism which first appears in the prophet
Habakkuk and is not the genius but a historical development of
Old Testament faith. The destruction of Nature herself is
abhorrent to the Hebrew mind, and is the subject of Apocalypse
which belongs to the New Testament rather than to the Old.
Apart from this reference, however, it should be remembered
in explanation of Hegel, that the rejection of Nature in his
theory of the Sublime rests on the general principle of his
Aesthetic. For him as for Aristotle, Art is Nature purified
and set free from her contingencies and has therefore more
2
reality than Nature as Poetry is higher than History. He 
scarcely recognises natural. Beauty. And since the forms of 






embodiments of the true forms which are born of spirit alone, 
it should follow that all Art is in its origin sublime. It is 
in his impatience with natural Beauty, that is, with ordinary 
perception, that the artist begets a desire to create an in­
dividual form which will perfectly express the specific 
character of a rock or tree or any other object of Nature. He 
wants to see the thing in its history and in the variety of its 
existence; he wants to see a distinct, individual rock or tree 
and not as they exist for ordinary perception, a generic com­
position of quartz and felspar or a generic collocation.of leaves. 
Now the state of mind in which he approaches his study is sub­
lime, because it involves some mental strain and a moment of 
disappointment, followed by the feeling of uplifting, in the 
effort of imagination to penetrate to the Ideal of Nature in the 
particular form.
But if we are to acquiesce in the rejection of Nature in 
her sublime appearances, we shall have to face the question 
whether Aesthetic has any part in sublimity at all. We must not
be mislead by the peace of exalted emotion into thinking that it
must therefore be aesthetical. The sublime peace of a Words­
worth is aesthetical, but not many are able to have the same 
feeling of peace. Moral determination is self-appraising and 
yields a harmony of feeling, oxjgt peace of soul is the grace of 
religious faith. But neither of these need be aesthetical for 
they may be very abstract. Morality and Religion can exist on 
two terms, God and I, and it is even essential to their existence 
that they should maintain a negative if not hostile attitude to 
the world. The difference is that Aesthetic must be reconciled 
to Nature now, while Morality and Religion can afford to wait.
It is the genius of Faith that it lives on a promise arid does
not walk by sight. For this reason we should consider Faith as 
of a higher order than aesthetic intuition, for the latter is 
a premature realisation of what Faith will be one day when the
15.
old things are passed away. The common interpretation of 
Faith as a faculty which will pass into sight whenever the 
eternal things are revealed is completely false. Faith is 
not hope, it is a power which will continue to be exercised 
even by him who is seeing the eternal things. It is in this 
sense Kant is justified when he calls the Beautiful the symbol 
of Morality. Yet Faith may be aesthetical, but it is only 
in rare, exalted natures that it is able to forget the opposi­
tion, suppress the strife and be reconciled to the world. 
"Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do", is a 
true instance of aesthetical sublimity.
It was, of course, impossible that Hegel should not have 
also recognised an immanent phase in the Sublime, and I only 
allude to what he holds in common with Kant. If the Sublime 
were confined to those extreme phenomena which provoke anti­
pathy rather than engage our sympathy, we should not be great­
ly concerned to win a place for it in Aesthetic. It could 
be defined as the exalted emotion of moral and religious ex­
perience. But this would be unjust to many phenomena which 
can only be admitted into Aesthetic by the recognition of 
their sublime character. Now in his analysis, Kant offers no 
principle which is able to include those phenomena. They 
will thus be regarded as neither sublime nor beautiful. We 
have to ask, then, whether this terrible shock of which we 
have heard so much is essential to sublimity, and is a re­
presentative characteristic in all its forms. Certainly not 
in the sense of violent reaction to a hostile, menacing power, 
for the presentation may be at once arresting and sympathetic. 
It is said of Dickens that when he visited the falls of Niag­
ara he experienced a feeling of great peace. But there is a 
moment of suspense while our aesthetic sympathy is put on its 
trial, due to an absence of familiarity which may occasion a 
feeling of disappointment or it may be a sense of self­
depreciation. We are taken at a disadvantage for the moment
16.
by the daring expression of the Ideal in the presentation, and 
we may call this a slight shock if we please. But it must be 
understood that a hostile attitude in Nature is not essential, 
though she does reserve her dignity. The negative moment 
may vary between the sympathetic reaction we feel in seeing 
a sunrise and the violent sense of power to triumph in our own 
annihilation. Perhaps one of the finest instances of the 
Sublime as arising out of a purely sympathetic admiration, is 
the lunar rainbow in Browning's Christmas Eve. The imagina­
tion of the poet, exhausted in the effort to realise the beauty 
of the rainbow as it sprang like a spectral creature, dauntless 
and deathless, across the sky, subsided in the white light of 
pure, spiritual energy, and the vision of the outward sense 
passed into a vision of the mind;
"Thus at the show above me, gazing 
With upturned eyes, I felt my brain 
Glutted with the glory, blazing 
Throughout its whole mass, over and under 
Until at length it burst asunder 
And out of it bodily there streamed 
The too-much glory”.
An example of the lower limit is the dignified reserve in 
language which makes up sublimity in style, its power to dis­
pense with fulness of diction and perfection of form. The 
following passage is characteristic of Hebrew prose; "Now 
Naaman, captain of the host of the King of Syria, was a great 
man with his master, and honourable, because by him the Lord 
had given deliverance unto Syria; he was also a mighty man 
in valour, a leper”. (2 Kings v. 1.). There is no adversa­
tive particle in the Hebrew to indicate the transition in 
thought. The narrative intimates the infirmity of Naaman in 
a quiet, unobtrusive manner that is all the more impressive.
It emphasises the difference of contrasted features by taking 
their unity for granted. This indifference to form reaches
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its highest point in the silence of Ajax to Ulysses, which
• 1
as Longinus remarks is more sublime than any speech. When 
now we extend the range of the negative moment so as to in­
clude the minimum of inhibition, we see how large a class of 
phenomena come under the Sublime. We have already noticed 
some of these instances in the preceding chapter. If the 
Beautiful is that whose specific character is adequately ex­
pressed in sensuous form, the Sublime is found where the Ideal 
visibly goes beyond the expression; and sublimity arises not 
in comtempt of the form but in the exercise of our aesthetic 
sympathy, which is able to trust the wisdom of the Ideal when 
it consents to dwell in this unlikely appearance. Never is
it more sublime, says Schiller, than when the Ideal seems 
2
awanting. And the more sublime our own nature is, the more 
immediately sympathetic will the presentation be, for we are 
already uplifted by culture and self-discipline to the exalted 
level of this difficult expression. To one who is already 
sublime, like Faust, sublimity is beautiful;
"To me are mountain-masses grandly dumb ;
' 3
I ask not, Whence? and ask not, Why? they come".
This is the merit in Schopenhauer's exposition. He 
makes the Sublime the same in principle with the Beautiful, and 
traces the degrees in which sublimity is accentuated and in­
tensified. The influence of Kant here as elsewhere in his 
system is very marked, but, unlike Kant, he mediates moral Will 
through Nature in the Sublime, and shows how it is able to be 
a factor in Aesthetic. And, generally, he has done for this 
part of Kant's theory what Schiller did for the Beautiful.
But it is in his own peculiar method, and also his aesthetic 
theory follows so naturally from his metaphysics that it can­
not be explained to advantage apart from his system. What
1
The Sublime ix., Odyssey xi. 543
o
The Aesthetical Education of Man. Weiss, p. 49.
3
• Taylor's translation, p. 310.
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Kant called the Supersensible is designated Will by Schopen­
hauer. In itself* it is a Will that neither affirms nor 
denies, existing without ground of principle, the mystical 
One of the Vedas. To become directed and purposive it must 
be represented as Appearance, and this means that it becomes 
object of knowledge. So Schopenhauer calls the world of
for whom the world exists as objective Will is himself part 
of this world. Although in itself indivisible, groundless 
Being, the supersensible Will exhibits an intelligible, 
reasoned order in the graded scale of existence when it takes 
form in an object-world, being related to these typic forms 
of existence as harmony to the single voice. And in this
ascending order brain and nervous system stand among the very 
highest expressions of Will. But since the individual is in 
his bodily being part of the world as objectified Will, his 
knowledge will be conditioned throughout by all the lower forms 
of existence which harbour in his individual nature. Human 
knowledge is therefore characteristically impure, being always 
subservient to the lower grades of Will as they come to us in 
sensation. It perceives things as artificial unities of parts 
which co-exist with necessity or succeed eachother in a cer­
tain order, never real unities of being. Consequently we 
have to make this distinction, that the world as objective 
Will, or the world as it is represented in knowledge is not a 
direct and perfect organisation of the Supersensible but in­
direct and inadequate. But there are also direct objectivi- 
cations of Will, complete organisations of the blind Super­
sensible, and these are the real kinds or types of existence 
which Schopenhauer identifies with the Platonic Ideas; "As 
soon as knowledge, the world as idea (Vorstellung). is abolished, 
there remains nothing but mere will, blind effort. That it
Appearance the objectwication of Will. Now the individual
1
The World as Will and Idea. Haldane and Kemp 1. p. 206.
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should receive objectivity, become idea, supposes at once 
both subject and object; but that this should be pure, com­
plete, and adequate objectivity of the will, supposes the ob­
ject as Platonic Idea (Idee), free from the forms of the
• 1
principle of sufficient reason". Are these specific forms 
accessible to knowledge?
Before we proceed further we should notice that the Ger­
man has two words for idea. The translators have preserved 
the difference in meaning by writing the Platonic Idea with a 
capital. The technical rendering of Vorstellung is represen­
tation, but idea in English Philosophy has been always associ­
ated with a concrete perception or image while IdeefIdea) 
denotes the universal; for example, Burke says: "if they
may be properly called ideas which present no distinct image 
2
to the mind". To answer the above question, we must ob­
serve a distinction in our faculty of knowledge corresponding 
to that which we have just remarked in the world of objective 
Will. Knowledge fed and governed by sensation is always 
the perception of things related in a necessary way, fof 
sensations do not come to us haphazard but under rule and 
measure. But besides this body-principle of knowledge to
which Schopenhauer gives the name Sufficient Reason, there is
simple
a much more primary and ultimate relation and that, is the/re­
lation of subject to object, the mere fact of a representation 
in consciousness (Vorstellung uberhaupt) . All that is need­
ful for the exercise of this pure knowledge is to abstract 
from its subservience to Will as it is indirectly and badly 
expressed in our individual being. Pure knowledge is the 
state of freedom from our personal being with its pragmatic
tendencies, when we are pure, will-less subjects (willenloses 
4
Subjekt) .
It is easy to see the close identity in this form of 
expression with Kant's explanation of the aesthetic state as
~^The World as Will and. Idea 1. p.. 234.
^Sublime and Beautiful. Pt. v.<§ 7.
20.
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^German. p. 201. Bk. iii 34.
a kind of knowledge in general, and it is this disinterested 
state which in Schopenhauer takes the place of aesthetic per­
ception. It is hardly necessary to observe that its corres­
ponding objects are those Platonic forms, which are complete 
organisations of the Supersensible. Outside the world of 
Appearance, the Supersensible is nothing because it is any­
thing; it is groundless Being. But Appearance does not 
give coherent meaning to the Supersensible, it rather breaks 
up its unprincipled unity into a multiplicity of blind, im­
pulsive tendencies, which war with oneanother without ceas­
ing and without any final purpose to justify them —  the 
mechanical attraction of physical bodies, the elan vital in 
plants and animals and the impulse to action in man. Hence 
the misery of human life, which makes it that the first and 
only crime is to be bom. Only in the Ideas (Ideen) , the 
specific characters which are independent of the particular 
forms, is the Supersensible perfectly reduced to harmony 
and brought into peace. Here he criticises Kant for having 
made the Supersensible completely unknowable. He insists
that it can be known when it is the object of aesthetic in-
■ 1
tuition or will-less knowledge. Thus a double change has 
taken place: "Since now, as individuals, we have no other
knowledge than that which is subject to the principle of 
sufficient reason, and this form of knowledge excludes the 
Ideas, it is certain that if it is possible for us to raise 
ourselves from the knowledge of particular things to that of 
the Ideas, this can only happen by an alteration taking place
in the subject which is analogous and corresponds to the 
great change of the'whole nature of the object, and by virtue 
1
The World as Will and Idea, l.,p. 226.
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of which the subject, so far as it knows an Idea, is no
more individual". The contemplation of the eternal forms
is a sympathetic intuition based on identity of natures, for
outside the world of Appearance the supersensible Will is the
• 2
same in the subject as in the object.
In this contemplation the subject loses himself and 
comes into peace. It is the satisfaction in the Beautiful 
which is won without effort. This happens in those forms 
of Nature or Art whose content is in harmony with its sensu­
ous expression. There are few or no contingencies to 
obstruct the passage of our sympathy, for that object is 
beautiful in which the stress of Nature's elemental Will is 
laid to rest. But there are also forms which do not yield 
so readily to such facile contemplation. Because they are 
themselves beset and hedged about with Nature's blind effort 
which guards their secret, their accidental form, unsympath­
etic to the pure Idea in themselves or us, provokes to activi­
ty the elemental Will of Nature as it is organised in our 
body. And being thus drawn into conflict with the hostile 
presentation, our will-less knowledge is in danger of being 
engulfed in the pragmatic interests of our personal being.
Prom this thraldom it can only be delivered when by a violent 
effort we exert our will against our will, and refuse to be 
drawn into this strife with Nature. Then sublimity arises. 
Refusing to take up the challenge, we steadily penetrate the 
forbidding appearance until it yields the secret of its in­
ward being to our disinterested knowledge and we have pleasure 
in its contemplation. We come into sublime emotion because 
we are lifted up above our personal being and its inevitable 
strife with Nature,




The World as Will and Idea.I. p. 233.
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have been noticed how the Sublime and the Beautiful are in­
terpreted by a single principle. In both it is the inner 
teleology that is the object of aesthetic pleasure, and we 
are able to enjoy the contemplation of the sensuous form be­
cause we ourselves exist in our supersensible character. The 
difference is in method. While in the Beautiful we come in­
to this state without a struggle, we attain to the Sublime by 
"a conscious and forcible breaking away" from the hostile re­
lation of the object to our will. But this does not affect 
the community of principle in both, which at least ensures 
that the Sublime is a genuine part of Aesthetic. There are
degrees in the Sublime according to the strength or weakness
*
of the effort by which it is distinguished from the Beautiful. 
As an instance of the weakest degree, the following example 
may be given: "If, in the dead of winter, when all nature
is frozen and stiff, we see the rays of the setting sun re­
flected by’masses of stone, illuminating without warming, and 
thus favourable only to the purest kind of knowledge, not to 
the will; the contemplation of the beautiful effect of the 
light upon these masses lifts us, as does all beauty, into a 
state of pure knowing. But, in this case, a certain trans­
cending of the interests of the will is needed to enable us 
to rise into the state of pure knowing, because there is a 
faint recollection of the lack of warmth from these rays, 
that is, an absence of the principle of life; there is a 
slight challenge to persist in pure knowing, and to refrain
from all willing, and therefore it is an example of a transi-
• 1
tion from the sense of the beautiful to that of the Sublime". 
He gives other instances of rare beauty. I shall only men­
tion what he says of solitude in Nature: it is a test of our
intellectual worth to endure the state of pure contemplation 
in a region where there is nothing to engage our will, which 
is always in a state of want either of striving or attaining,
^The World as Will and Idea. I. p. 263.
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and. where we are tempted, in our incapacity, to abandon our­
selves to the vacuity of unoccupied will and the misery of 
ennui.
It is only by recognising such a principle of graduated . 
indifference to harmonious expression that we can effect a 
real synthesis between the Beautiful and the Sublime and 
bring them under a common name. It may be, however, that we 
should be prepared to find two forms of sublimity, one of 
which is not aesthetical, and separated in their less extreme 
forms.by inappreciable lines of transition. We should not 
be anxious to show that every form of the Sublime is aestheti­
cal, for there are many which are not aesthetical and yet are 
sublime. King Lear is sublime when he defies the elements.
He rises above the thunder-storm", he accepts the challenge 
as a very little thing, but there is nothing aesthetical in 
his emotion. It is only as a dramatic representation that 
Lear can be aesthetical, when he together with the raging 
elements becomes an object for the spectator; and we can 
judge him as sublime because we are able to free ourselves 
from practical interest which he could not do. To be 
aesthetically sublime in and for himself, he must become the 
storm as it passes over the trembling forest in its fury or 
lashes the deep into temp^estuous foam. I have a distinct 
recollection of sublime emotion when witnessing a thunder­
storm on the Brocken. But it was not aesthetical, for the 
elements of Nature suffered in comparison and dwindled into 
ostentatious display of mechanical forces. This is nothing 
more than the triumph of our moral nature over the natural 
forces which make the cattle tremble, and is very different 
from the aesthetical peace a Wordsworth would have felt in 
his sacramental fellowship with Nature. But Kant has made 
it impossible to unite the Sublime and the Beautiful under a 
common principle, because he has defined the Sublime in terms 
of those extreme forms which lend themselves most readily to
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a purely moral interpretation. We have already noticed 
how he approaches towards a synthesis in the conception of 
Nature as a symbol of the Supersensible, and also in the 
recognition of a process of subreption; but these are found 
to be little more than a fa^on de narler. There is a re­
maining principle, however, tending in the same direction on 
which he lays some emphasis and which ought to be examined.
It is the idea of Security. Terrible Nature is attractive, 
he says, provided we are in security. There is no actual 
fear but only "an attempt to feel fear by the aid of the 
imagination". The quality of our emotion is not affected 
by this apparent want of seriousness, because it is not our
actual experience of life that matters but the consciousness
1
of our supersensible destination. This seems to be his 
meaning and it is plausible enough, reminding us of Schopen­
hauer's ‘volition in general1 (Wollen uberhaunt). Schopen­
hauer also insists that there must be no actual danger; "if 
a single real act of will were to come into consciousness, 
through actual personal pressure and danger from the object, 
then the individual will thus actually influenced would at 
once gain the upper hand, the peace of contemplation would 
become impossible, the impression of the sublime would be lost
because it yields to the anxiety, in which the effort of the
2
individual to right itself has sunk every other thought".
He means that our exaltation is consciously maintained by a 
constant recollection of effort, which is not a particular 
act of our will but the elemental sense of opposition between 
us and Nature. It is the aesthetical consciousness of will 
as it is completely dissociated from our personal striving, 
and idealised in being identified with the universal will of 
1
Bernard, pp. 125-6 and 136.
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humanity. In this way the moral consciousness is passed 
through Nature and becomes aesthetical. But whoever has 
read Kant’s discussion from end to end,is fully persuaded 
that this interpretation has nothing in common with his 
true position and is only a happy accident. Indeed, when 
we examine into it closely, we find that it is a return to 
the formalism which we discovered in his theory of the Beauti­
ful. The principle by which he has been guided in both in­
stances is, that whenever Aesthetic is free it ceases to be 
earnest, and that when it is earnest it has lost its purity 
and becomes dependent. He shows this formalism in another 
passage where he says that we must not think of the stars as 
inhabited worlds or as physical bodies moving in elliptic 
orbits, but as a spangled canopy: nor of the ocean as peopled
with the denizens of the deep or as the source of clouds or as
the means of transit between the continents of the globe, but
1
just as it strikes the eye. This would be a very empty 
feeling and quite unworthy of his serious, wistfftl experience 
of the morally Sublime. The writer of the eighth Psalm who 
looked up to the heavens had much deeper thoughts than those; 
the moon and stars were at least framed by the fingers of 
God.
It is the beauty of morality, then, that Kant mistakes 
for the aesthetical Sublime, as Baumgarten would speak of the 
beauty of knowledge; it is what we might call the aesthetical 
resonance of moral feeling, not the aesthetical expression of 
a moral disposition. In a stray passage he seems to make a 
considerable advance. He says that moral feeling is so far
cognate to aesthetical that it can represent moral action as
• 2
sublime or even as beautiful, without losing in purity. But 
we must be guided in our interpretation by the total impression 




intentions we cannot help thinking that this statement is 
quite different from the position, that in the Sublime or 
Beautiful the moral consciousness is reduced to aesthetic 
form. Kant's definition of the aesthetic consciousness as a 
disinterested, which for him means impersonal, feeling of 
satisfaction, does not include and therefore does not affect 
the personal consciousness of character. The moral feeling 
of which he speaks as being closely akin to Aesthetic, is on­
ly a generic form which is indifferent to its content like 
Socrates' sail in the Parmenides: it is the after-glow of
self-conscious virtue. If the moral consciousness is to
m
enter into Aesthetic at all, it must exist in us in some such 
instinctive way as Wordsworth believed it to exist in Nature. 
"Through primrose tufts, in that green bower,
The periwinkle trailed its wreathes;
And 'tis my faith that every flower 
Enjoys the air it breathes.
The budding twigs spread out their fan
To catch the breezy air;
And I must think, do all I can,
• 1
That there was pleasure there".
For Kant the moral consciousness must always be wide awake.
He reaches his highest point in establishing a close connec­
tion between aesthetic feeling and moral culture. He had
already attained to this level in his early Observations. and
2
he never gets beyond it. It is the lower limit in Schiller's 
Aesthetical Education of Man.
The Sublime might be called the test in aesthetic theory. 
Its importance is seen in its decisive bearing on the relation 
between Beauty and Expression. If we hold with Lessing that 
expression must always be subordinate to Beauty so that Laocoon
^Lines written in Early Spring 
2
Hartenstein ii. p. 239.
must not open his mouth too wide, we confine Aesthetic to a 
very narrow field. There is a beauty of spirit as well as 
of form, for example Maeterlinck's plays, to take a recent 
instance. The beauty of form is the essential condition of 
all expression. But while the beauty of spirit will not 
conflict with this formal symmetry, it demands its own in­
dividual expression which the beauty of form may never have 
dreamt, and is such stuff as dreams are made of. In the 
following passage from George Eliot's Romola. expression is 
made subordinate to beauty of form: "a perfect traitor
should have a face which vice can write no marks on - lips 
that will lie with a dimpled smile - eyes of such agate-like 
brightness and depth that no infamy can dull them - cheeks 
that will rise from a murder and not look haggard". This 
view could be defended on the ground that it is the character 
of a perfect traitor to dissemble his own nature and counter­
feit another. But this is only as it appears to the ordin­
ary eye. Art has no use for such a creature, and will ex­
press in the features not only the perfect dissemblance but 
also some hint of the fact that it is a dissemblance. If 
now we look at such a painting as "The Two Usurers" by Mari­
nas van Romerswael (London National Gallery), we see two men 
whose souls are carved upon their faces, the one secure 
from threats or dint of pity, the other agonising in the 
grasping greed for gold. Both are ugly and repusive, but 
although there is no immediate beauty of form, there is 
beauty of expression; their soul flows from their features, 
and this spontaneous, undisguised portrayal holds our ad­
miration "like the red blood spouting from a vein".
This question was important for Kant had he cared to 
take it in this way. For beautiful objects are the first 
intimation on the part of Invisible Nature that it is in 
sympathy with out limited intelligence. This accomodation 
is what Kant calls the Technic of Nature, on which all
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natural science rests. In view of those natural forms 
whose significance is not exhausted in their mechanism, 
it is essential to our further understanding of Nature that 
we should regard her as working on a definite principle.
We think of her as an artisan who fashions and moulds his 
material with conscious purpose. Otherwise we should be 
in a hopeless predicament, because our Understanding has no 
categories for those contingent forms. The Beautiful it­
self, judged from this point of view, and the essence of 
Life are things which escape a mechanical explanation. In 
the absence of such definite knowledge we must have some 
assurance that Nature knows what she is doing, and indeed 
we could not carry our mechanical explanation nearly so far 
as we do if we were not buoyed by this subjective principle. 
Certaitoly this persuasion does not make our knowledge of 
objects more intensive, for knowledge ends with mechanism 
and beyond that limit we are in the night where all cows are 
black. We may say, for instance, that the blood is carried 
into the lungs that it may be oxidised and diffused again 
throughout the feedily body for the purpose of nutrition; 
but this teleological explanation throws no light on the 
efficient cause of its circulation. Yet if our knowledge 
is not intensified it is extended, and if we cannot say 
precisely what things really are, we can classify them, which 
is a great matter. Now the Beautiful is a visible evidence 
and no longer a scientific hypothesis of Nature's sympathy 
with our intelligence; it is that quality in objects which 
facilitates the knowledge of their specific character. It 
will therefore be in the interest of our subjective principle 
if the range of these objects can be expended as far as possi­
ble, and this can only happen if we are willing to define 
Beauty in terras of expression. This will enable us to secure 
the testimony of those phenomena which in themselves are a 
positive denial of the purposive disposition of Nature, the
29.
phenomena of the Sublime, the ugly, the unsightly and unform­
ed and all the darker features of experience. But this is 
not the course Kant has followed. He acknowledges that the 
Sublime is contingence to the second power, not lending it­
self to interpretation by the scientific Understanding nor 
the teleological function of Reason. And so he thinks that
"the concept of the Sublime is not nearly so important or
• 1
rich in consequences as the concept of the Beautiful". But 
in neglecting this advantage, Kant believes that we are in­
troduced into a more fruitful field of discovery. For in 
the untowardness of those forms which seem to call in ques­
tion the adaptation of Nature to our minds, we are thrown 
hack upon ourselves and strike upon a higher harmony, the 
sympathy of our minds with the Supersensible. If the Imagina­
tion sacrifices its freedom, it acquires "an extension and a 
might greater than it.sacrifices"; for instead of being the
instrument of Understanding as in the Beautiful, it becomes
2
"the instrument of Reason". And if the Sublime does not 
recognise the subjective specification of Nature as a work­
ing principle which only makes Nature explainable so far, 
it is because it assumes the de .jure conformity of all Nature 
to the highest and most ultimate purpose, the moral destina­
tion of man. Thus the Sublime is indirectly a further in­
fluence of the supersensible Thing; for if Nature in her 
beauty is influenced in favour of our Understanding, in her 
sublimity "Reason exerts a dominion over sensibility" in 
order to extend its outlook into the Infinite.
It is necessary that we should have a clear idea of 
Kant's position before we offer a final appreciation, and 
with this in view we have been obliged to develop his theory 
in slow stages with apparent repetitions. But I think it 
will have been evident that in each successive stage there
1 2 




is a slight advance. Like aeronauts we feel that we are 
rising, though there are no landmarks to register our as­
cent. Kant considered that in Beauty and Sublimity there 
are two kinds of teleology which are at last complementary.
The harmony of our mental processes is a subjective indica­
tion that Nature is positively or negatively, in sympathy with 
our minds. But in the Beautiful it is the play of Imagina­
tion and Understanding, and this means that Nature is only 
adapted to our knowledge. Now in pure knowledge there is no­
thing truly infinite; it is only the unending. Infinity 
dawns upon the scientist who is engaged with incalculable 
quantities only when his moral consciousness is awake. For 
his imagination, under the rule of scientific Understanding, 
makes no effort to realise infinity, being able to give it4 a 
figure by means of numerical schemata. Such is the limited 
nature of the mental powers which are active in the Beautiful. 
The Understanding does not indeed appear as this bad infinite 
in its aesthetic form, because it is the genius of the Beauti­
ful tp present the unending as immediate completeness, and it 
has satisfaction because the Understanding has ceased from its 
wandering. But this does not affect the nature of the faculty 
itself, and what we have presented in the Beautiful is not 
Infinity but the crystallising of a false infinity. The 
superiority of the Sublime, in Kant's view, is that in it for 
the first time the Infinite dawns upon us, for it is the Ima­
gination and the moral Reason that are in play. It is essen­
tial to his theory of the Sublime as a negative experience 
which is not aesthetical that the Understanding should be 
omitted, for we are not reconciled to Nature as known to the 
Understanding but Imagination fabricates a new world under the 
controlling influence of Reason. It is the presence of this 
latter power that distinguishes the Sublime. But it calls 
for some words of explanation, for throughout the discussion 
Kant is confusing Reason as the unconditioned Understanding
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and Reason as the moral faculty. Primarily, of course, it means
the Practical Reason, and it is quite clear that in the Sublime
' 1
this is the dominating and final sense in which it is used. But 
he also appears to take it as the faculty of the unconditioned, 
the Theoretic Reason of the Dialectic, as is evident from the 
prominence he gives to the idea of infinity. This confusion is 
easily due to the subtle way in which the G-emuthskrafte and the 
Erkenntnissvermogen. which are ostensibly a single specification 
of the former, run parallel and into one another. As Judgment, 
which is only a subordinate element in the higher faculty of 
knowledge, came to be identified with the higher faculty of Peel­
ing, so the Theoretic Reason, itself a subordinate part of know­
ledge , becomes germane to the Moral Reason. And after all, in 
spite of their apparent difference, there is a very close connec­
tion between them. Por Theoretical Reason is the faculty which 
seeks to realise extensively in knowledge the same completeness 
(res completae) which moral Reason apprehends intensively in' 
practice. The latter, firing at close range, either misses fire 
or strikes with deadly aim; the former, firing at long range, is 
dispersed like small shot over a wide area and never pots a rabbit. 
Jt is only an over-refined subtlety that would distinguish too 
nicely the G-emuthskrafte from the Erkenntnissvermogen, and it is 
an equivocal merit in Cohen's book that he seems to assume their 
identity, at once making Kant's meaning more intelligible and 
his method harder to appreciate. There is no doubt that Kant's 
methodological intention restricts the Reason in the Sublime to 
its theoretic use, as a specification of the cognitive faculties.
In the Beautiful, then, the content is limited. It is 
the perception not of infinity but an infinite finite, an 
inexhaustible Nature but still unmediated Nature, an in­
determinate concept of Nature but still a concept, the 
immediate consciousness of Nature only as it is adapted to 
knowledge. It is in the Sublime that the Infinite first
1
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appears in its true nature as spirit. For the harmony of 
Imagination with Reason is a subjective indication that Nature 
is purposive to our highest destiny, not indeed directly and 
positively for then this final end of Nature would be evident 
to our knowledge, and in our immediate consciousness of this 
end as known the Sublime would also be beautiful. Now we see 
clearly and for the last time the double error in Kant's 
Aesthetic. The Beautiful is formal, without specific meaning, 
because it is exclusively intellectual and is not affected by 
the spirit of our mind. It is an idealised Understanding. 
There is no final end in Nature for knowledge, and however far 
we carry out the process, we never get any nearer to the heart 
of things. The immediate consciousness of this unending 
teleology is much the same as the ideal sum in arithmetical 
progression. The secret of our pleasure in this formal Beauty 
is its premature completeness, its anticipation of discursive 
processes, but it is not therefore a deeper insight into 
Nature. The immediate consciousness of infinite extension 
does not make our perception more intensive. It is only the 
unending processes of Nature crystallised in certain of h%r 
forms, very pretty like a glass marble, but it has nothing 
spiritual, the breath of Art has not breathed upon it. Again, 
in the Sublime it is our spirit and not our Understanding that 
is affected by Nature whose final end, inconceivable for 
knowledge, is consummated in the consciousness of our immortal 
destiny. But it is not aesthetical, it is spirit without form 
as the Beautiful is form without spirit. The sublime faculty 
has no aesthetic Understanding to perceive this final end in 
Nature, and must therefore think it outside of Nature in the 
formless void of an Imagination whose light is extinguished.
In this exalted feeling, Nature has no community with man's 
spiritual being.
The cause of this double error is Kant's radical separa­
tion of the mental Powers. It was right to prevent all
confusion of Volition with Cognition, and it was the dawn of a 
new day for ethical theory; it was right also to maintain a 
distinction between Feeling and the other faculties, and in 
doing so he laid the foundation-stone of aesthetic theory for 
all time. But Kant has carried this separation into the root 
and destroyed the primordial unity of human nature. He forgets 
that while these faculties are separate as explicit elements 
in consciousness, they lose their distinctness in the elemen­
tal unity of mental life.The intellective consciousness so 
conceived will have a moral nature, instinct with spirit, and
Beauty will possess the Infinite; the moral consciousness
instinct
likewise will have a nature that is intellective, with form, 
and our sublime Reason will shape itself in Nature. But 
although Kant does not succeed in transforming the moral con­
sciousness into an aesthetic factor and hardly suspects that 
it is possible, he really does succeed with knowledge. And 
faults in theory must not affect the merit of his intention.
If he denied a soul to Beauty, it was in order that Goodness 
might live: a needless sacrifice, for the moral consciousness
pre-existed in a form much more akin to aesthetic feeling than 
to its own specific function. Kant himself was aware that 
the Ideal which he found in the moral consciousness is the 
soul of Beauty and what alone could make it precious. But 
in his theory of Genius he goes much further. It is what is 
Nature in the subject, the supersensible substrate of all his 
faculties, that utters itself in Genius; and evidently this 
cannot mean the ethical personality but the Man of Humanity, 
not his character but the totality of his nature. It is the 
supersensible substrate of his Humanity which, as Cohen says,
holds itself responsible for the harmony of all the directions
1
in consciousness.
There is the further consequence that Aesthetic cannot be 
subjective in the sense that it is a less immediate interpretatim
^Kants Begrtindung der Aesthetik. p. 263.
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of Reality. For Aesthetic is the most concrete expression
of this elemental disposition. We do not commit ourselves
to the statement that it is more original^, in the sense
that it precedes and conditions the emergence of Knowledge
and Morality. We must not he mislead hy Schiller's poetic
fancy when he says that virtue was loved and vice rejected
' 1
before Solon's laws were made. It is quite a plausible 
theory that before our moral nature became self-conscious, 
it already contained the end of its development instinctive­
ly; if its content was meagre, less precious than the ex­
posed and naked sense of self-conscious virtue in its un­
gainly growth, its eyes not yet being opened and innocent 
of good or evil, it had at least the form of its consummated 
perfection in the fruit, the innocence of its own goodness. 
But this innocuous state is as little aesthetic as it is 
moral. It is simply the condition of a "living soul".
We must distinguish the physical theory of the Play-impulse 
from the imaginative theory. The former is among the very 
earliest factors in the development of child-life as also in 
the race, but in this function it is only another name for 
the consciousness of motion. Aristotle observed that the 
most rudimentary form of sensation in animals, namely, Touch, 
is a discriminative activity by which the objects of nutri­
tion are accepted or rejected, and this primary attitude of 
consciousness is inevitably bound up with the consciousness 
of motion. The play-impulse as we find it in the child is a 
purely physical motive, the discharge of surplus energy, like 
the roaring of the lion in the forest when he has nothing else 
to do. But this is surely not the same as the play with
images of things or the delight in seeing for seeing's sake. 
The world of the child is altogether a world of play in the ' 
sense that the distinction between Appearance and Reality has 
not yet emerged, while Aesthetic is based on the conscious
^Die Kunstler. iv.
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implication of this distinction. But, on the other hand, 
Aesthetic is at once more original and concrete than either 
Knowledge or Morality; for while these are particular direc­
tions of consciousness, it is the original disposition itself 
in its totality raised to a higher immediacy. It is the 
same elementary state hut informed and enriched by the con­
tributions of Knowledge and Morality, as the trunk of the 
tree grows with its branches and draws its nutriment partly 
from them and partly from its own root. The ever-recurring 
questions whether Aesthetic should be moral or intellective, 
are the same as if we should ask whether the tree can contain 
its own branches. If Aesthetic is affected by Knowledge and 
Morality, it is not in the form of raw impressions but as 
light and atmosphere are transmuted into the sap of the tree.
Now Kant's view, strictly understood, means that the
i
farther we remove from outer presentations, our conscious­
ness becomes less and less intensive. Aesthetic is subjec­
tive the more it loses contact with Reality. It is an echo 
of his doctrine of Inner Sense as a form of consciousness 
which is not schematic. Subjectivity first appears in the 
Beautiful. The pleasure is not the consequence of sensation 
but the concomitant of aesthetic reflexion, and then it seems 
to lose the thrill of sensation and sensuous charm. We are 
still, however, in the realm of Appearance. But in the 
Sublime, subjectivity becomes outrageous. We soar upwards 
into the void where there are no objects of Appearance but 
incoherent figurations of a blind Imagination. Yet there is 
no candid reader who will seriously believe that this is an 
adequate statement of Kant's meaning. In Reflexion, of 
which Aesthetic is the typical expression, he finds something 
more than the neutral attitude of Science; it is the Personal 
in man. It could not therefore be other than subjective, 
but for Kant it is the richest plane of experience and objec­
tive in its own right, though it cannot be measured by the
standard of Science. It is in the Sublime, regarded as a 
further development of the moral Ideal, that we receive this 
deeper impression of Kant's meaning; and while we acknowledge 
that in his exposition the gulf between Nature and Freedom is 
widened, we are bound to admit that in principle he effects a 
reconciliation between them. This principle is expressed 
mainly in the profound conception of subjective teleology as 
the felt harmony of oyr mental Powers, and may be studied in 
the two Introductions, especially the first, and also in his 
theory of G-enius.
An attempt may be made in closing this first part of the 
Critique of Judgment to indicate a solution of the final pro­
blem, how, in spite of their subjective character, the judg­
ments of Reflexion may be considered as even more objective 
than those of Science. According to Weber's law, the inten­
sity of sensation varies in a constant ratio with the in­
crease or diminution in the presentation-stimulus. For our 
purpo.se. it does not matter whether we reject this quantitative 
theory and hold with M. Bergson that there is no minimum in­
crement of sensation. The fact remains that the intensity of 
sensation diminishes in the degree that presentations are 
withdrawn. But this is only true up to a certain point. In­
crease the presentation-stimulus to its maximum and sensation 
disappears. Thus we have two very different orders of zero, 
that which registers the total absence of presentation and 
that which registers the maximum of stimulation. We can have 
no hesitation in deciding which of these applies to Aesthetic. 
Notwithstanding the ideal character of the world of Art as re­
moved from the first rude contact with Reality in sensation, 
there is no diminution but an access of vitality. Well, then, 
it can only be that our zero is the maximum. Aesthetic feel­
ing is not the negation of sensibility but the transmutation
of sense-affection into a new order of sensation. What 
gives the appearance of objectivity to sense-perception 
is just the partial and limited range of the presentation- 
stimuli* Their number is so modest that we are incapable of 
rejecting their addresses and readily give ourselves up to 
their entertainment. A few guests are always engaging and 
compel our devoted attention. But what do you do when the 
whole world calls at your house? You begin to think of your 
own soul. This is seen to best advantage in the Sublime, 
but the same principle also applies to the Beautiful accord­
ing to its degree. It is not the absence but the prodigality 
of presentations that exhausts our sensibility and overfcteps 
the maximum. Now think of the whole world knocking at your 
senses, and you will readily conceive how you may be con­
scious of no sense-affections, just as we do not hear the 
motions of the heavenly bodies after the fancy of the Pytha­
goreans, and still have an intensive consciousness. Kant's 
degrees in Subjectivity are our degrees in Reality. Aesthetic 
is for him an original faculty of intuition which is indepen­
dent of the distinction between subjective and objective, 
Thought and Sense, because its object is the supersensible
substrate of Nature "which lies at its basis and also at the
• 1
basis of our faculty of thought".
1 . . .  
Bernard, p. 117.
0? l i t  S O L O  Gr Y  O F  N A T  U  R E ,  
C h a p t e r  7 .
TELEOLOGY -OF NATURE.
We now turn to what seems to he a very different subject of 
study. But if we keep in mind Kant's original intention, the 
transition to the Teleology of Nature is quite easy. It is 
sufficient that we should have pleasure in discovering purpos­
ive connections, to bring this discriminative activity under a 
common principle with Aesthetic. For although the pleasure in 
either is of a different kind, it is characteristic of a mental 
procedure common to both, in which the mind more, interested 
in its own processes than in arriving at any definite conclus­
ion. Each is a form of judgment which does not define an ob­
ject but illustratesthe way in which the conscious subject is 
affected. This is what Kant means by Reflexion. If we are 
pleased to call it a judgment, we must remember that it is not 
logical but psychological, for in place of a predicate whose 
meaning is fixed and explicit there is only an inarticulate 
feeling or affective description. A thing is beautiful only 
so long as it contains something which cannot be defined; and 
living forms, in like manner, lose all their sacredness and 
charm,when a mechanical interpretation is sufficiently con­
vincing to influence our judgment and to destroy the sense 
of wonder in which Philosophy takes its rise. No doubt, 
connected with the difference in the kind of pleasure, there 
is a very marked distinction between the objects of Art and 
Teleology. In common language we speak of beautiful objects, 
although they are not beautiful in themselves but as represen­
tations in consciousness. Aesthetic pleasure is not the 
perception of a quality in the object but of a harmony in our 
mental processes. Or if we still prefer to use the language 
of common sense and say that the object is itself a harmony 
of elements, it is nevertheless true that its purposive form 
only comes to self-consciousness in us. The beautiful object 
indeed exists outside of us, but conceived as a common object
2.
it has no aesthetic interest. If now we turn to living 
forms, we are confronted with things which continue to hold 
our interest while they also exist independently, and indeed 
because they do so. There is the difference between Aesthetic 
and Teleology. Even the objects of Science are the creatures 
of our Understanding, their extension, rigidity and motion 
are subjective constructions; and whatever their independent 
basis may be, they do not exist as objects in themselves, for 
object means synthesis and synthesis is the work of mind. For 
the sake of brevity we might adopt J.. S. Mill's convenient 
evasion and say that they are 'permanent possibilities of sen­
sation*. How much more will the objects of Aesthetic, which 
is a still more independent activity than Understanding, be 
the peculiar creation of our mind? Our processes of imagina­
tion, feeling and thought are the objects themselves, and con­
sequently the pleasure is quite distinctive. We have aesthetic 
satisfaction only when objects yield up their natural existence 
and impersonate our inner life. But in appraising living 
forms, our admiration is sustained by the thought that the 
object has an independent being, and we enjoy the excitement 
of our own processes, not because they are a finished sym­
phony as in aesthetic pleasure but just because they are in- 
domplete; it is pleasure in a harmony that is realised pro­
gressively. Our own processes are interesting only because 
they are the transcript of a purposive form which is intensely 
interested in its own activity. We may now trust ourselves 
to express the distinction in Kant's high-sounding words: "we
can regard natural beauty as the presentation of the concept 
of the formal (merely subjective) purposiveness, and natural 
purposes as the presentation of the concept of a real (object­
ive) purposiveness"
But even this difference of province between Aesthetic 
and Teleology need not put us off the track. For although 
1
Bernard. Introd., p. 35.
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Teleology is the experience of our affective states in 
essential connection with real objects, in the long run it 
is not less subjective than Aesthetic. It does not profess 
to determine anything conclusive about these objects. It is 
true that all Science is built up by teleological observa­
tion, and Kant himself devotes more attention to Teleology 
as a system of heuristic principles than is consistent with' 
his original purpose. But he is quite positive in his 
©pinion that the experimental sciences never give a final 
result which is different in kind from our mathematical 
knowledge of Mature. However far the biological sciences 
may carry their investigations, they do not come any nearer 
to the secret of a living form. Undoubtedly, the sciences 
greatly extend our knowledge of Nature, but they are still 
working from the outside with quantities and measurements; 
and if, as Kant says, the end of Nature must be sought out­
side Nature, the door is fore-closed against them. He 
means that there can be no science of ultimate ends corres­
ponding to our knowledge of relative existence. And since 
the object of Metaphysic is the ultimate, it can never he a 
positive science but only the science of the limits of human 
reason. In teleological reflexion, we do not define the 
exhaustive unity of existence in a living form, but, to use 
a phrase of Mr. Bradley, give "illustrations of its latent 
qualities". For although a thing exhibits purposive activi­
ty and may therefore be regarded as an End of Nature (Natur—
zweck) , we are not at liberty to say that its existence at
• 1
all is an End of Nature. The end which it embodies is 
limited to the organism and is not by any means self—explain­
ing. All that we have said is that there is present a re­
lative End of Nature. We are using little more than a 
figure of speech when we say that an organism is a natural 
purpose, for this it could only be if it were also a natural
■^ Bernard. A 67. , p. 283.
product. But if we try to answer this question we fall into
confusion, for it is meaningless to speak of a product unless
we know something about the mode of production. We say it is 
a product of Nature and do not even know what Nature is. It 
is true that we do see Nature organising herself in her pro­
ducts , and Kant himself thinks that we are nearest to the
■ 1
truth when we describe Nature as "an analogon of life". But 
this is not encouraging; for it either means Hylozoism, the 
conception of Nature as living substance, which contradicts 
the very being of matter, spontaneous generation being an
idle fancy for Kant; or it means the conception of Nature as
informed by a soul, which is equally improper, for Nature 
is made into the instrument of a soul which governs it but 
does not bring it into being; or, finally, this latter theory 
may take the deistic form that the soul, existing from with­
out, fashions the world out of an independent substance which 
it does not make. As he says in a further passage, to think 
of Nature as an intelligent being would be preposterous, and
to place another intelligent being above it as its architect
2
would be presumptuous. For the a w  reason that we cannot
also
prove the existence of God, we are/unable to speak of a 
natural product with any degree of intelligence. .It is 
only a natural product, not simply when we think of it as 
manifesting a purpose of Nature in its inner structure, for 
this is limited to the life of the organism and gives no hint 
of Nature's complete design, but when we are able to exploit 
the full reason for its existence as a reciprocal part of a 
world organism. This would be to determine with precision 
the final end of Nature, and this we cannot do without a 
scientific knowledge of the God who made it, which is im­
possible. Kant gives the example of a blade of grass.3
It is an organic form of Nature and therefore something
1 2 
Bernard, p. 279. Bernard, p. 290.
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Bernard. £ 67.
which no mechanical interpretation can ever explain. It is 
no mere concursus of* fortuitous atoms. Even to make it 
thinkable at all, we must introduce the idea of design. So 
far, then, as its internal structure is concerned, it may be 
regarded as a natural purpose. But our fatal mistake is to 
jump from this purely subjective idea of design', which is a 
necessity of our Reason, to its actual existence, as if what 
we think ought to be must be in fact. It is the same criti­
cism as Kant makes on the ontological argument for the being 
of God. How do we know that there is any final end in Nature 
at all? Indeed our certitude diminishes as .the evidences of 
design increase, for each fact of teleological observation 
leads to another by which it is cancelled, and we are carried 
forward in an unending progression from which the idea of a 
final purpose fades away. Thus, while the blade of grass 
bears the evidence of design in its structure and cannot have 
sprung up by accident, it offers no indication of the reason 
for its existence and we must seek the final cause outside 
of it. Let us say, then, that it is needful for the ox.
But the ox is not in itself an dne end of Nature and again we 
must be satisfied with the a relative explanation. We can 
say that it is needful for man as a means of subsistence. But 
no amount of scientific knowledge can offer the reason for 
man's existence^though he is the most highly developed of all 
organic products. The end of existence only becomes more 
ironical as the adaptations appear more wonderful. To take 
another example from Kant, the Laplander finds many conveni­
ences marvellously suited to the maintenance of life in these
which
inhospitable regions; the reindeer xto can subsist on a dry m 
moss which they scratch from under the snow, enable him to 
have intercourse with other races of men; sea-animals provide 
him with food and clothing, and with their fat and the wood 
floated in by the sea his huts are warmed. This is very 
instructive but gives no conclusive proof of a divine purpose
in Nature. For neither do these conveniences exist ex­
clusively for the Laplander, although he happens to make 
use of them, nor does he contain a reason in his own being why 
he should be thus provided. If men are to live there must be 
the means of livelihood, but it is not at all clear why they 
should exist at all. As Kant rather wittily remarks, the 
case of the Laplander is not by any means an evidence of pur­
pose and harmony but rather the absence of these in the con­
stitution of the world, for it is only disagreement and strife 
that could have dispersed mankind into such inhospitable re-
Tel eology therefore in Kant's view makes no pretension 
to Science. Though it deals with objects which have an in­
dependent reality, it is subjective like Aesthetic. Its use 
as a scientific principle in building up our experimental 
knowledge of Nature is only a secondary result and not its 
proper function, which is not to determine the mechanical re­
lations of objects but the total unity of their existence, 
their purpose or end. Now Science is so far exhaustive in 
its achievement, and Teleology would likewise be Science if 
it could discover with the same precision the final causes 
of things. But we have seen that it can never do this. In
Science our judgments are objective because our thoughts about 
objects obtain necessity in sense-perception. But in Teleology 
our thoughts are only possibilities which cannot be verified 
in actual presentation. We can have no sensation of an end.
So while the judgments of Teleology may indeed be necessary 
truths of Reason, they are not necessary truths of Science.
They are economic devices of Reason to help our memory and to
save us from being confused in the multitude of scientific 
principles, by giving than the lead in a single direction 





discovery of common elements, the multiplicity of scientific 
kinds is reduced to a comparatively small number of higher 
genera. (entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiblicanda). 
These genera are capable of being further differentiated by 
features which are only found in a certain number of the 
species included under the genus, and thus the number of 
genera is increased on a new basis of distribution (entium 
varietates non ternere esse minuendas). But Reason will not 
rest until it has reduced all these genera with their sub­
genera to a single, comprehensive unity, and this is effected 
by carrying the principle of differentiation to an unlimited 
extent until the plurality of genera melts away and gives 
place to a single genus. For by increasing the diversity 
it is found that the sub-genera or species hitherto obtained, 
are not fixed but continuous with oneanother. And although 
this approach of Reason to a final unity is always asymptotic, 
it believes in the interest of systematic knowledge that no 
species is absolutely separated from another; it will always 
be possible to discover a third between any two whose differ­
ence from either is less than their difference from eachother,
' -1
and so prove their affinity. (non datur vacuum formarum(
In consequence of these three maxims of Reason, namely, 
Homogeneity, Specification and Continuity, the general prin­
ciple follows that there are no first and original differences 
separated from each other by an empty interval, but that all 
the manifold genera are divisions in a single, supreme genus. 
It is natural genera that we should think of this final point 
in which the various principles meet, as a stable fact of 
Science; and if man were to be taken as the apex of the mani­
fold genera, he would not only be able to give a reason for 
the hope that is in himself but also to substantiate the 
existence of all the lower forms as ends of Nature in their 




and man's immortality might rest on other than moral grounds. 
Modern thought favours this point of view and has reversed the 
order in Kant's statement. As Dr. Ward would put it, Science 
is not objective and ultimate but reflective, while it is 
Teleology that interpretes the real constitution of Nature. 
Science is only a conceptual description of facts, and for 
its boasted necessity there is not a trace of evidence except 
what we project into Nature out of our own heads, causation 
being nothing more than what Mill said it was, uniform ante­
cedence. It seems that Hume was not so far wrong after all. 
But the modern attitude to Teleology is different. The ends 
which we read into Nature are valid and objectively true be­
cause they are a creative interpretation of Nature. We 
shall not stay to examine this position further. But it is 
right to say that the difference between Kant and his critics 
is in great part a battle of words. We have reason to think 
that the Subjective in which Teleology finds its place, is for 
Kant more real than Science; but he reserves for Science the 
title to knowledge and denies it to Teleology, because in its 
determinate, mechanical relations Science has the complete­
ness and finality of a limited achievement. However, we 
must at present accept Kant on his own terms. This point to 
which reflective Reason decoys the laws of Understanding is 
no proved fact of Science but an illusion, a focus imaginarius.
like the naive belief that objects reflected in a mirror are
• 1
actually behind it. He is quite emphatic in the Critique
of Pure Reason that these principles are not derived from
the actual nature of objects but from the interest of Reason
2
in the completeness of our knowledge. They are not con­
stitutive but reflective, not interpretative but descriptive. 
They are not properly concerned with objects at all but only 
with the way in which they are illustrated in the consciousness 
1
Appendix to Dialectic. Meiklejohn, p. 395.
2
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of ourselves. Teleology is therefore reflective as Aesthetic.
They are different "because they are on different planes and
are occupied with different aspects of Nature, the former
through reflexion on concepts, the latter through reflexion
on representations.
implicit in
This is the sxmpls intention/Kant1s Teleology. Its
primary significance is not logical "but affective. It is the
play of concepts as Aesthetic is the play of representations.
In neither of these forms of judgment do we look for a predi­
cate which specifies the scientific nature of objects so 
much as an affective Idea, which carries their resonance in 
the consciousness of our own processes and is marked by a 
feeling of pleasure. This is their common attribute and the 
only justification for having brought them together at all as 
modes of Reflexion. But there are so many strands in the 
discussion that we lose sight of this original motive in a 
complicated analysis. Kant himself seems to forget all 
about it and shows a greater amount of interest in the meta­
physics of Biology, so that we who have been hitherto engaged 
in the analysis of Pine Art now find ourselves thinking of 
Darwinism and kindred problems. He had already discussed 
Teleology at sufficient length in the Dialectic. and indeed 
more in criticism of its misuse than in recognition of its 
positive function. What he ought now to have done is to 
develop this positive side so as to show its affinity to 
Aesthetic. But when we read through the Critique of Judgment 
and the two Introductions, it is the same old song we hear 
as in the Dialectic with the exception of a few sporadic 
suggestions. There is, of course, a new element introduced 
into Teleology in the Critique of Judgment. In the Dialectic 
he is only concerned with what may be termed Formal Teleology, 
because it surveys things with a view to their symmetrical 
arrangement in a logical system; and it does this on the 
principle that Nature specifies the laws of Understanding,
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which really mean mechanical causation, into more minute 
applications throughout her whole empire. This procedure 
of Reason carries the belief* that Nature will be found con­
stant to her character as governed by necessary laws, even 
when we press the causal conditions to their farthest limit 
which is manifestly beyond the reach of knowledge. It is 
no other than Mill's Uniformity of Nature with his supple­
mentary doctrine of Probability. This is the logical dis­
position of Nature, though we must not be mislead into 
thinking that it is the empty analysis of an arbitrary pre­
miss. Kant explains in the original Introduction that 
this is a transcendental principle which has its ground of
expectation in Nature herself; it is not the Logic of the
' 1
Syllogism but the Logic of Nature. This does not alter 
the fact, however, that the system of Nature obtained by 
inductive hypothesis is logical, for Nature is never given 
to us as a completed whole anymore than she is given as 
beautiful, and therefore Induction like Art is a teleological 
determination of Nature. Not seeing the end, we endure "as 
seeing Him who is invisible", and are only able to realise 
it in a logical anticipation. Accordingly, we are not 
surprised to find Kant saying that the end or ends, by whose 
help we imagine to ourselves the independent series of caus­
al conditions not only as completed in themselves but also 
as uniting in a final direction , do not exist in the things
of Nature; it is solely in the thinking subject they reside,
2
in behoof of his reflective faculty. It is called formal
Teleology because it is a necessity of our Reason to regard
Nature as governed throughout her extent by a systematic 
because it
Idea, and/does not dogmatically assert that there is a pur­
posive activity in Nature herself. For as Stadler admirably 
expresses it, the laws of Nature are always mechanical and it 
1Ueber Phil, uberhaupt. Rosenkranz I. p. 590. Note. 
2ibid. p. 594.
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is only their relation to eachother that it is not mechanical. 
When wecsay that a particular thing is contingent, we must 
not mean that it cannot be mechanically explained; for how 
could we ever recognise that it fell out with the universal 
order of Nature unless it were a possible object of experi­
ence with causal conditions? Every fragment of appearance 
must have causal relations, even the most complicated fact
must be presented as a sum of effects, otherwise it is no
1
object of experience. What we want to know is how these 
innumerable threads of causal conditions, which no memory can 
hold, are related to eachother and whether they unite in a 
common direction. The hypothesis of Reason is absolutely 
necessary for the sustained activity of Understanding, for 
without this systematic Idea of determination according to 
end, Nature would be a torso even as mechanism and the suppos­
ed necessity of the categories would have merely subjective 
validity. As Kant says in the Introduction, without the 
principle of Formal Teleology "the Understanding could not 
find itself in Nature".
What is to be noticed in this entire procedure of Reason 
is that nothing further is determined in the constitution of 
Nature herself. Formal Teleology rather emphasises the 
mechanical order of Nature and gives sureties for its continu­
ous and unquestioned application. The novel feature in the 
Critique of Judgment is that Nature is purposive, not simply 
as a logical system in the interest of our Reason but in the 
organisation of her own products. These organic forms are 
much more than a complex of mechanical processes, and are 
only intelligible if we regard them as the immediate products 
of a Nature which organises herself in theip. We should expecb 
this new field of observation to react in a verymarked way on
the teleological judgment, to the extent of creating a new type
possible
of Reflexion. For there is the greatest/distinction txxih*
"'"August Stadler. Kants Teleologie pp. 63-64.
2Bernard, p. 36.
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wcsxbd between a Nature of mechanism, which is only figured as 
purposive with a view to completing and sustaining its original 
character, and a Nature which is herself purposive in her 
products. The former exists as a system altogether in our 
teleological reflexion, but the latter is in parts of her do­
main quite independent of our interpretation and is herself 
purposive. This at least is how the case seems to stand. And 
Kant makes the rather unexpected statement that this Objective
Teleology "has nothing to do with a feeling of pleasure in 
1
things". Surely this is taking very high ground. It shows 
how clearly Kant meant to distinguish the two fields of teleolo­
gical observation. He freely acknowledges that in Formal 
Teleology the discovery of a higher principle under which sever— 
al heterogeneous laws of Nature may be combined, is the ground
of a very marked pleasure, although hardly anyone except a
• 2
transcendental philosopher is capable of this admiration; and 
if we do not always have this feeling, it was certainly present 
at one time. But in the case of things which are themselves 
real organisations, it would seem that our own interests are 
silenced in the presence of a being which enjoys its own ex­
istence, and we surrender the pleasure we might have in our 
processes of observation to the neutral attitude of the scien­
tist who merely registers the harmonious activity of the organism, 
isatien Thus the difference between these two provinces of 
observation does not affect the nature of Kant's Teleology in 
the slightest degree. Two courses were open to him: either
the subjective factor in the judgment is practically negligible 
as appears from the statement just quoted in which the feeling 
of pleasure is excluded, and then Teleology becomes an objec­
tive judgment of Science and ceases to be a form of Reflexion 
altogether; or its reflective character is retained, not be­
cause of, but in spite of, its objective province. His critical 
1Bernard.- Introd.- p. 34. cp. Ueber Phil. uberhaupt. Rosen- 
kranz. I. pp. 696. 602-3. Hart, vi. p. 392.'
2
Ueber Phil, uberhaupt. Rosenkranz. I. p. 595.
temper will not tolerate the first alternative,for he is hound
to maintain that Metaphysic can never be Science. Just as he
had exposed the false application of Formal Teleology in the
Dialectic, he must now show that no form of judgment which
goes beyond the causal connections in experience can have more
than subjective validity. He therefore explodes the illusive
certainty to which we pretend in our interpretation of organic
life, quite in the manner of the Dialectic. and finally pro- 
what
claims wh±®h he himself calls objective, material, internal 
purposes to be predicates of reflective Reason. But this is 
just Formal Teleology over again, and the judgment has gained 
nothing from the character of this new field of observation. 
Kant's discussion is very valuable for the metaphysics of Bi­
ology, but what is its significance here if it has no light to 
shed on the way in which we are affected by the organisations 
of Nature? We simply pass through the world of organic life 
and, like a diver whose eyes are shut under the water, rise to 
the surface as wise as we were before. I can now appreciate 
Stadler when he says the Reflective Judgment in its entirety
is identical with the regulative Ideas of Reason, and that the
.1
only peculiar and novel feature in Reflexion is Aesthetic.
At first I was naturally inclined to agree with Dr. Frost who
holds on the contrary that they are not the same, for Reflexion
is meant to provide deeper categories corresponding to those
of the Understanding. But Stadler is speaking from the actual
results of Kant's exposition and Frost admits that he is quite 
2
correct, as indeed it is only too easy to prove his position 
from statements in the two Introductions which are quite ex­
plicit in its favour. But if this is all we have to learn,
1
wo immer Kant von einer eigentumlichen Urteilskraft 
snricht, er damit die asthetische meint, und dass er 
ksineswegs gedacht hat in der teleologischen Urteils­
kraft ein neues, von der Kritik der reinen Vernunft noch 
ungekanntes Vermogen aufzustellen. Kants Teleologie, p. 
29., cp. p. 36*
o
Per Begriff der Urteilskraft bei Kant, p. 115.
we have spent our labour in vain. The teeming forms of life 
emit no response to our efforts to understand them but shrink 
into their crevices before the fatal sneer of Criticism, and 
all that we have for our part is a purely intellectual and, in 
the modern sense, scientific judgment which is neither more 
nre nor less than Inductive Hypothesis. For Criticism is 
perfectly justified in reducing organic life to the same 
level as the field of observation in Formal Teleology. Organi­
sms must be perfect mechanicisms above all else, and any flaw 
in the mechanical functions is fatal to the life. The heart 
beats, the blood circulates, with the same purposeless, insen­
sate motion as the stamping engines on a gold-mine. As Kant
says, without mechanism organised beings "would not be natural 
1
products". They are a system of mechanical processes which 
we can follow and understand. What we cannot understand is 
the system itself which gives a meaning and a purposive direc­
tion to those processes which no mechanism could initiate. It 
is as true to its mechanical character as an engine which is 
controlled by an external agent, although the controlling power 
is not without but in the organic processes themselves. Now, 
in such a natural form, our teleological observation is essen­
tially the same as when we round off the purely mechanical world 
of Nature into a completed system by the help of final Ideas. 
Organisms, therefore, from our point of view, are not generi- 
cally distinct from the totality of mechanical Nature as em­
pirically contingent for our Reason; they are particular 
illustrations of what is essentially the same problem, and 
though outstanding are not peculiar..
But there is still an enormous difference between the 
two orders of Teleology. In the one case mechanical Nature 
does nothing t^urther its own interests, it lodges no claim to 
systematic uniformity; it is we who have to bring its case to 
chancery and plead its cause. But in the other, Nature is
1
Bernard, p. 342.
assertive and needs no counsel to speak for her. For though 
we see no more than a complicated mechanism at work in a liv­
ing being, and can have no determinate perception of an end or 
purpose as we do have of necessary changes in causal sequence, 
it enacts a purposed plan in every phase of its activity; we 
are quite sure that there is more than mechanism there, al­
though we cannot give it a name that has WKiny any intelligible 
sound in the language of mechanism, just as the conception of 
end has no meaning for a Haeckel. Yet there is nothing in 
the teleological judgment to register this change. Our 
pulses do not quicken nor is imagination kindled, there is no 
intimation that we are in the presence of the living; nay, 
we are even told that this ki&d of observation has nothing to 
do with a feeling of pleasure. It is a purely scientific 
judgment with the miserable qualification that Science as we 
understand the term is hypothetical and not apodictic. Certain­
ly a strong case may be made in Kant's favour to show that he 
did appreciate the distinction between Formal and Objective 
Teleology. Dr. Walter Frost, for instance, rates Reflexion 
higher than Formal Teleology because it brings an intensive 
insight into objects, while Formal Teleology only makes a de­
mand for larger objects and a larger outlook. We are far 
from denying the truth of this opinion and hope to use it 
with advantage in the proper place. Thus the highest reach 
in the Objective Teleology, to take it in its net result, is 
the interpretation of organisms as the spontaneous products 
of a Creative Understanding, whose conception is based on the 
analogy of our own practical causality. This is a thought 
which is infinitely higher, more illuminating, and more 
precious as it is more human, than the greatest pretension of 
Formal Teleology which is the interpretation of Nature, not as 
the immediate product of an Author, but of an indeterminate 
cause in which it is 'eminently' contained. As Kant says,
16.
"the "transcendental and only determinate conception of God,
which is presented to us by speculative reason, is in the
• 1
strictest sense deistic". Therefore the Objective Teleology 
is a deeper insight into Nature than Formal, as the immanence 
of Theism excels the artificial transcendence of Deism. This 
is readily conceded. But the more intensive the predicate 
the farther is Kant drawn away from his proper study, which is 
not to interpret organisms as effects but as themselves causes. 
The Objective Teleology becomes more and more dissociated from 
Reflexion as it becomes identified with Biology. We do not 
evade the point by the gratuitous criticism that Kant never 
allows teleological predicates to have mathematical certainty, 
and always remai reminds us that they are only reflective. Re­
flexion is much more than inductive hypothesis if Kant's ori­
ginal intention counts for anything, and if he was in anywise 
concerned to justify the union of Aesthetic and Teleology under 
a common principle. It is only in his theory of Aesthetic 
that Reflexion maintains its distinctive character, and there 
is absolutely nothing in the Teleology of Nature to save it
from confusion with t£re ordinary, systematic or Formal Teleology
thwhich is just the specification of Causality to the n— : power.
An intensive predicate does not constitute Teleology into Re­
flexion unless this intensity is reflected in the conscious­
ness of ourselves. Judging by results, then, Stadler is 
justified when he says that Reflexion is nothing different 
from the regulative function of Reason in the Dialectic, ex­
cepting Aesthetic which alone introduces a new principle. The 
process of Induction is described in the Critique, of. Pure 
Reason as Reflexion is later defined in the Critique jof Judg­
ment . the qualification of a particular which is given and
p
certain by a ©erely problematic idea} and the maxims of Reason, 
Homogeneity, Specification and Continuity, are called the 
1
Transcend. Dialectic. Meiklejohn, p. 413.
2
Appendix to Dialectic. Meiklejohn, p. 396.
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1
maxims of the Urteilskraft. The Teleology of Nature, in
Kant *s treatment, bears the same relation to Aesthetic as 
Inductive Science to Art, and so the Critique of Judgment 
closes with the same impression of disappointment as the 
Book of Job, in its present melodramatic and spurious con­
clusion.
Perhaps we may seem to be forcing an interpretation of 
Kant which his expositors will not recognise. But in no 
other way is it possible to give a plausible explanation of the 
connection between Aesthetic and Teleology, and I believe they 
were originally united in Kant's mind in a very real way.
As it is, his main achievement in the Teleology of Nature is 
not by any means to destroy, but to sift in order to place 
on a more secure basis, the argument from design. The 
critical review of Kant's Teleology such as we find in a book 
like Dr. Kennedy's Natural Theology and Moderm Thought, shows 
a curious want of insight. What Kant really did was to dis­
credit the argument because it depended degraded God to the 
level of an architect. Otherwise he holds it as deserving of 
respect, being "the oldest, the clearest, and that most in 
conformity with the common reason of humanity", He thinks 
that it would be utterly hopeless to destroy the irrestibile
conviction to which it rises: "the mind, unceasingly elevated
so
by these considerations, which, although empirical, are/re­
markably powerful, and continually adding to their force, will 
not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by 
subtle speculation; it tears itself out of this state of un­
certainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms 
of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height 
to height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated 
itself to the supreme and unconditioned author of all .^
It was held that the form of things, the arrangement of means
1
Bernard. Introd. pp. 20 and 24.
2
Transcend. Dialectic. Meiklejohn, p. 383.
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and ends, is contingent, being foreign to the matter which 
was regarded as eternally necessary. Kant replied that G-od 
is then limited by the matter whose necessary being lies out­
side of His creative power. In order that He may be a creat­
or and not an artificer on the analogy of technical Art, 
matter must be equally contingent. For to say that matter 
with its purposive forms is contingent for our knowledge, 
is to admit the probability that it is the spontaneous product 
of a creator whose ways of working we cannot conceive. All 
apodictic certitude must be confined to the mathematical form 
of things and is not to be entertained of matter and its pur­
posive modifications, which can only appear as inexplicable 
accidents to our intelligence. The only certainty we can 
have in regard to these is hypothetical. But this criticism 
rather strengthens the argument from design, for he has ex­
tended the borders of certitude beyond the mathematical and 
introduced it in a qualified foim into the realm of contingence. 
He has shown that Metaphysic can be Science if only its necess­
ity is hypothetical. Anyone who accuses Kant of scepticism 
does not realise that it amounts to nothing more than the 
hypothetical element in all modern Science: "he is unbelieving,
who denies all validity to rational Ideas, because there is
' 1
wanting a theoretical ground of their reality". We need 
not allude to his Natural History and Theory of the Heavens n 
which breathes a spirit of religious adoration his critics may 
seldom enjoy, as it falls within his pre-critical period. We 
have only to cite another short stffifttise treatise which appear­
ed three years after the Critique of Pure Reason was first 
published, where he evinces the saipie devout belief in a bene­
ficent Creator.2 But although Kant has displayed his criti­
cal acumen to great advantage, he has made no contribution in 
of Nature
his Teleology/to the study of Immediate Experience which is
2
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher




the proper and only domain of Reflexion. He has only exten­
ded the boundaries of Science, though he must retain a distinc­
tion in name between the mathematical and hypothetical. But 
according to his own finding, there is a very decided limit 
to this extended Science and we are constrained to ask if we 
have not been on the wrong road. Its hypothetical results are 
not different in kind from mathematical certainties, the inter­
pretation of organic life by the Idea of end being just the 
specification of mechanical processes as forming a systematic 
unity. Moreover,Kant admits that the whole teleological pro­
cedure is due to a defect in our intelligence. It is because 
we cannot perceive an organic unity without discursively appre­
hending its elements in their discreteness, that we must pre­
figure our perception of the whole in the conception of its end 
or the idea of what it would be like if we could immediately
perceive it. So far are we from acquiring a deeper insight 
that
by this method, we disrupt the original unity of organic life 
into end and means, idea and existence, and consequently fail 
to receive a direct impression of its nature. It is only to 
manufactured things which we ourselves can make that the con­
ception of end may be applied with advantage. But in the in­
stance of a living thing which never is completely but always 
is to be, the conception of a final end is a false anticipation 
which destroys the perception of its immediate unity. This 
latter, I maintain, is the only kind of Teleology which Kant 
was justified in bringing under a common principle with Aesthe­
tic , and not the purely logical judgments of experimental 
science. The remainder of this chapter will be given to a 
more minute study of the Teleology of Nature, to ascertain 
whether and how far it is able to bear this interpretation.
A complete scheme of Kant’s Teleology is not helpful but 
rather discourages the reader from entering into the matter at 
all. However, a spectre is most easily laid by walking through 
it, and perhaps we shall come off with greater credit if we
20.
addr©ss ourselves "bo the whole truth, For our purpose, it; 
is convenient; to "take the main division as into subjective 
and objective, But under the subjective are included two 
very different kinds of Teleology, Formal and Aesthetical.
They are both alike in defining the state of the subject 
alone, the one being a play of notions, the other of representa­
tions. Otherwise they are not subjective in the same sense. 
Kant characteristically identifies formal and subjective, and 
we have already seen how this is exemplified in his theory of 
Aesthetic. But we also showed how Subjectivity, even on 
Kant’s principles, has a content of its own which is anything 
but formal. In so far as Art expresses an Ideal, its pro­
blem is the individual, for the Ideal is an Idea embodied in 
individual form, and this puts Aesthetic on a level with
Objective rather than with Formal Teleology. Stadler correct-
1
ly keeps them apart as distinct types . Then follows what is 
most important for us at present, the Objective Teleology. But 
this is again subdivided into formal and material, the same 
distinction as we have just made and which Kant should have 
made, under the heading ’subjective'. What he calls objec­
tive-formal are geometrical figures; they are formal because 
they are capable of many relations and constructions which 
are not essential to their existence as a determination in 
space, , for instance, a circle. Finally, the other sub­
division, objective-material, admits of a further distinction, 
inner and relative. We do not seem to have gained much by 
this exhaustive dichotomy. It is sufficient to say that 
Kant's main concern is to establish a difference in kind between 
organic teleology which is self-contained, and all other 
types whose purpose is only relative to other things. What 
he calls relative-objective-material is not really different 
from the formal type of Teleology. The superficial distinc­
tion between them is that what is formal only applies to the
^Kant's Teleologie. p. 112,
purely mechanical aspect of existence which is without any 
purposive intention in the things themselves, while relative 
teleology is called material because the things to which it 
applies do exhibit adaptations which contribute to their own 
existence and not merely to the unity of our knowledge. Kant 
gives the instance that the sand deposited by the sea is ex­
cellent for growing pines. But these adaptations can be 
adequately explained by mechanical causes without supposing 
any design. Indeed it would be ridiculous to think that the 
deep sea had nothing else to do than to look after #he grow­
ing of pine-trees; it is quite contingent to the action of 
the sea, for sand can be left in large quantities without 
growing pines. Why should we credit the sea with a self- 
conscious purpose, when we know that it is itself an effect 
in a larger cause, the history of the earth? Relative 
teleology, then, is really formal, because the purpose it 
appears to carry as contributive to the existence of things 
can be demonstrated as effects of mechanical causes, and it is 
only we who suppose designed adaptation. It can only be
material and therefore something more than formal, if that to
■ 1
which it is contributive is itself a purpose of Nature, for
then it would be means to a real end of Nature and not to a
figment of our fancy. But we know of no such real end in
Nature even among organic beings, for "to Judge of a thing as
a natural purpose on account of its internal form is something
very different from taking the existence of that thing to be
2
apurpose of Nature". If we look away from the self-con-
/
tained teleology in organises and consider their relation to 
the environment, we find that they are pieces of Nature like 
everything else'. They are of a day and perish in a day.
Their purpose is cut before it is fulfilled by the abhorred 
shears which "slits the thin-spun life". Even man, the 
highest of the creatures, is not excepted from the ravages of
Bernard, pp. 271,346. ^Bernard, p. 283.
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Nature nor is he treated with more respect. Kant recognises 
only one genuine type of Teleology, and the saving feature 
which marks it off from those which are relative, conttibu- 
tive, conditional, is its inner adaptation. If we abstract 
from the relation to environment altogether in which there is 
no hope of final purpose, we find in the organism an adapta­
tion of means to end which is self-sufficing within the limits 
of its life. The result,then, of the entire scheme is to 
establish a broad distinction between external and internal 
Teleology. The former can only have the relative validity 
it claims if that for which it is useful is itself a final 
purpose of Nature, and this can never be demonstrated; but 
the internally purposive "is bound up with the possibility of
1
an object irrespective of its actuality being itself a purpose". 
This internal Teleology is quite distinctive and cannot be con­
fused with what is only relative. The first broad specifica­
tion of natural laws is into organic and inorganic. Although 
in Kant's opinion our judgment is equally formal in both, the 
objects themselves are radically distinct. And we should 
notice here that the expression, Objective Teleology, is con­
fusing. He only uses the term 'objective' to characterise 
the province of judgment and not the judgment itself'. What 
is distinctive in an organism is not a greater complexity of 
relations but a new kind of relation. .The structureless 
plasma is a single organ without differentiation while the 
crystal is a complicated formation, but the plasma has what 
the crystal has not, reaction and assimilation. In an or­
ganism the parts are reciprocally cause and effect; it is a
new kind of causality.
This important finding, however, does not seem to enrich 
Philosophy. It has only brought us an enigma. Organisms 
are unthinkable, he says, unless we regard them as purposes 
of Nature; but there is no question here of final cause, for 
it is only as "considered in themselves and apart from any
■^Bernard, p. 346.
23.
relation to other things" that we must think of them as 
natural purposes. How they can also he natural products 
will remain for us a mystery, until we are able to show that 
there is a necessary relation between the environment and 
their purposive organisation. Darwin's brilliant hypothesis 
of natural selection is very far from demonstrating necessity 
in this relation. The variations which present themselves 
arise contingently, and we have no means of knowing if these 
and no others should be forthcoming. The structure of a 
bird is perfectly adapted for flight, but there is no ulti­
mate necessity in this particular adaptation: "Nature, view­
ed as mere mechanism, might have shaped and connected the
parts in a thousand other ways, without stumbling upon the
■ 2
unity which such a principle demands". But accepting it as
an enigma, it is the only genuine instance of a real purpose
that we know; and although we do not understand this new
principle on which Nature organises herself in her products,
we are justified in seeking to extend it to the whole of
3
Nature in the belief that nothing is in vain.
We are now confronted with one of the unsolved problems
in the Critical Philosophy, which has puzzled its expositors
not a little. If the conception of natural purpose be
applied beyond organic forms to every object of experience,
it remains undecided whether this should mean the discovery
of a thorough-going mechanism or a complete teleological
system in the whole of Nature. Kant can be interpreted in
favour of both positions. Dr. W. Ernst thinks that the
relative priority of Mechanism and Teleology in the Critigue
4
of Judgment is a non liquet. I think we are able to enter­
tain a more positive opinion. In like manner, Pfannkuche can
2
■’'Bernard, p. 280. Caird's' translation. Kant
Vol. ii, p . 478., Bernard,
3 ' ' p. 260.
Bernard, p. 284.
4
Per Zweckbegriff bei Kant und sein VerhaLtnis zu den 
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find no clear solution in view of the criticisms offered
• 1
and the misunderstandings which have arisen. He admits 
that the discovery of an ultimate mechanical interpretation 
lies in the trend of Kant's thought, hut that all his ex­
planations are in favour of an External Teleology which can 
hardly he different from the old rationalistic procedure ex­
cept in its conditional charaoter. The first actual result 
in Kant’s Teleology was to destroy this easy optimism. We 
are at liberty to organise our knowledge into a unity as 
far as possible hut not to introduce any specific end into 
Nature. Now if Kant intends that we should apply this 
specific principle which is exemplified in organic life to 
all objects of experience, he is certainly going beyond the 
Formal Teleology of inductive science. But I do not think 
that he would acknowledge this interpretation. Pfannkuche 
appeals to the discussion on the antinomies in support of 
his view. There Kant says that we must explain Nature on 
mechanical principles, but that when these fail, as they do 
in the case of organisms, we have instructions to interpret 
these forms by the principle of final cause, and eventually 
the whole of Nature. This Pfannkuche considers to be 
something more than the indefinite extension of mechanical 
principles which Formal Teleology is meant to provide, be­
cause inorganic Nature is already adequately explained on 
mechanical grounds, and therefore the application of final 
cause can only mean some kind of special Teleology. But 
this is just what is not true. From the moment we enter 
the Dialectic. it becomes evident that Mechanism is quite 
insufficient to give a complete explanation even of in*- 
organic Nature without the help of Teleology as a heuristic 
principle, and that the objects of experience are only necess­
ary within the limits of a wider contingence. Besides, Kant
1 . . .
Per Zweckbegriff bei Kant. Kantstudien. Bd. v.’
distinctly says in the passage to which Pfannkuche refers, 
that though this principle obtained from organisms is cer­
tainly useful, it is not indispensable in our Judgment of in­
organic objects "for Nature as a whole is not given as or­
ganised". I therefore think that Kant did not seriously 
intend organic purpose to be taken as a principle of Ex­
ternal Teleology, but as an additional maxim of Reflexion to 
help us in our researches into Nature. The truth is that, 
at an earlier period, Kant had entertained something like 
this view to which his language in the Critique of Judgment 
certainly lends countenance, and its traces still remain.
At that time his interests were mainly scientific,and he was 
content to assume certain connections of ideas which his 
critical reflection afterwards rejected. In'The only possi- 
ble proof for the being of God' (1763), he is evidently criti­
cising two well-known theories whose names he afterwards ex­
plicitly mentions in the Critique of Judgment. These theor­
ies, which prevailed in the eighteenth century, were Occasion­
alism, whichj goes back to Cartesian principles and Preforma­
tion, which was formulated by Leibniz. In the first view, 
the appearance of every new species or variety in a species 
was the occasion of a divine act; in the second, there was 
no such thing as a new formation, but simply an unfolding of 
parts which were preformed from all eternity and already exi­
sted in all the complexity of their later development, though
• 2
very small like diminutive models. This theory of Preforma­
tion went by the name of Evolution (Auswickelung). In the 
Critique of Judgment Kant exposes its false pretensions and
shows how a better name would be Involution or emboxing
3
(Einsohachtelung). It is not a real evolution but an un­
folding of what is already completely involved, and does not
1 2
Bernard, p. 310. See Schultze. Kant und DarwinT-pp.p>Fi-.7
3 ^
Bernard. £81. Hart. v. p. 436.
advance beyond Occasionalism. For it is all the same 
whether a divine act is invoked for these new formations at 
the time of creation or in the course of development. Indeed, 
Kant thinks Occasionalism has the preference, for it restricts 
the interference of the supernatural to the forms which actu­
ally come into existence, while Preformation must provide
supernatural agency for every possible variety whether they
■ 1
come to maturity or not. Preformation does call in the aid
of natural science for the growth and traa transmission of the
preformed characters, but it is not any less supernatural, for
the whole distinction between the two theories is not in the
degree of immediate divine activity employed but solely in the
2
time of interference. The real issue, then, is between
Occasionalism and genuine Evolution or what is a still more 
apposite term, Epigenesis. Kant was not the author of this 
theory,which still remains as the essential basis in the mo­
dern doctrine. According to Schultze, it was first announced 
by Caspar Friedrich Wolff in 1759. Epigenesis means that an 
organism is not simply the growth of a tiny preformation as a 
literal evolution of already perfect parts, but an accretion 
of successive new formations which previously liad no existence 
at all in the embryo; or, as Kant would express it, it is not 
an educt but a product. Yet Kant does not mean to exclude 
the supernatural. The advantage which he commends in Epigene­
sis is that it involves the least expenditure of the super­
natural. In Preformation, which is a maximum Occasionalism, 
each individual animal and plant is immediately created by 
God,,, and the only natural feature in this supernatural produc­
tion is the simple transmission and growth of the original 
characters. But in Epigenesis, the production of the varia­
tions in a species is natural just as much as the transmission
^Bernard. p . 344.
2 • . . . .
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of the original tendencies, and it regards Nature not merely
as envolving hut as self-producing. Darwin later essayed to
show how this is possible by 'natural selection'. Kant's
sympathies, however, were quite averse from materialism.
Though he conceives of the production of species as natural,
he does not so regard their origin. He indeed said in his
'Natual History of the Heavens', "G-ebet mir Materie, ich
will eine Welt daraus bauen!" But this is only with reference
to the inorganic world, for in the same context he challenges
anyone to show how from given matter even a worm can be pro- 
1
duced. The question for Kant was whether every individual 
in a species is immediately created by God, or whether only 
the original individuals are indeed divinely created yet en­
dowed with a power, inconceivable for us, of producing their j
kind in accordance with natural law, and not merely evolving 
2
them as educts. The first alternative he rejects under the
name of Occasionalism, the second is the theory of Epigenesis
which he favours. He thinks that there must have been a first
divine disposition of plant and animal life (ersten gottlichen
Anordnung) in which the seeds of later tendencies are formed
* 3
found, not as individual but as generic preformations. And 1
further, in order to restrict the range of supernatural agency, j
these original individuals must be reduced to the smallest i'
I,
possible number. On this principle of seminal tendencies or j;
generic preformations, he explains the races of men as a 
teleological organisation of Nature. He rejects the idea of 
local creations of races and maintains that, in spite of their (
f!
differences, whites and negroes are sprung from a single stem. j
While he anticipates what is important in the modern theories |!
i !
of adaptation and natural selection, he will not hear of con- '!
r
tingent variations which are the distinctive feature in the
1 2 Hart. I. pp. 219-220. Per- einzig mogliche Beweisgrund i!
u.s.w. Har.t.. ii. p.. 157..
Per einzigmogliche Beweisgrund.u.s.w.T Hart. ii. p. 158. :
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Darwinian hypothesis. He defines a Race as constituted by
constant, hereditary characteristics which are unfailingly
transmitted, and he will not allow us to speak of it even as
a particular species; otherwise genus and species would sole-
• 1
ly denote what is incompatible with a common stem. He
means that these hereditary characteristics are not specific
for that would involve Preformation or Occasionalism, but
generic differences which are originally united in mere
2
tendencies, (in blossen Anlagen) and only gradually developed
' 2
and separated out in the course of propagation. A Race is 
a variation of the type,but it must not be regarded as pro­
duced by a contingent act of Nature. He therefore proposes 
to translate the word Race by a technical term which will in­
dicate this meaning of variation; it is Abartung. which de­
notes the hereditary variations generically contained in the 
common stem, as distinguished from Ausartung which denotes 
complete deviation from type. For this latter he can find 
no place. As he says in his 'Races of Men': "an animal 
species, having a common stock, contains no different kinds 
(for these Just mean differences of derivation); but their 
deviations from oneanother are called Abartungen, if these
are hereditary. The hereditary marks of derivation, if they
4
tally with their parentage, are called resemblances: but if
the hereditary variation no longer exhibits the original stem-
• 5
formation, it would be called Ausartung." Kant's own way of 
dealing with what we should call contingent variations is as 
follows: if the variant characteristics which are compatible
with a common stem are necessarily hereditary, a Race is con­
stituted; if they are not necessarily hereditary, it is a 
6
Variation. He thus throws the burden of explanation on to 
1
Ueber den Uebrauch teleologischer Principien in der 
Philosophie. Kirchmann., p. 153. . 
p 3
ibid.p. 152. ibid.pp.150-1. He is thinking of
half-breeds like the Moors. . . . .
^Ueber die verschiedenen Racen der Menschen. Hart, ii.p.436.
P i IUeber den Q-ebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie |
Kirchmann, p. 153.
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Teleology, for it is the original tendencies that must explain 
when and where the variations shall he hereditary or not; just 
as he believes that the varieties among men of the same race 
k are, in all probability, designedly (zweokmassig) reposed in 
the original stem. His theory of evolution may be summar­
ised in the following passage from the 'Races of Men'; "This 
providence of Nature in equipping her creatures by means of 
hidden, inner provisions against all manner of future condi­
tions, that they may maintain themselves and adapt themselves 
to differences of climate or soil, is wonderful; and by the 
wandering and transplantation of animals and plants,produces 
kinds which are to all appearance new, but which are nothing 
else than constant variations (Abartungen) and races of the 
same genus, whose seeds and natural tendencies have been
developed only occasionally throughout long periods of time
• 2
in diverse ways". Kant anticipates the impasse which a 
mechanical theory like Darwinism is bound to encounter, by 
making the mechanism of evolution finally subordinate to a 
teleological principle. What is developed by external causes, 
such as climatic conditions, are seeds (Keime) or natural
Ptendencies which were given in the act of creation. This is 
is undoubtedly a teleological view of Nature, organic and in­
organic. Although, as Schultze says, Kant's Anthropology is 
completely in favour of our derivation from the ourang-outang, 
it is only the external causes of production that are natural. 
The generic preformation or seed placed in the original dis­
position of the species, is metaphysical and comes like the 
soul in Aristotle's psychology from without. We must not for­
get that Kant has unmistakably expressed his opinion more than 
once that matter is utterly dead, and the disposition of ori­
ginal seeds in a lifeless matter is unquestionably an External 
Teleology. As a maxim of Reflexion, Teleology would only
1 2 ■ 
ibid. Hart. ii. pp. 440-1.
mean that we may or must interpret Nature as pyrposive, but
.^ e should not be authorised to determine any specific purpose
in Nature such as we do find in the present instance. Organic
life comes into being on occasion of an original creative act,
and so we may call his position a minimum Occasionalism.
But although Kant does not make any essential change in
his theory of organic evolution, he can hardly be said to hold
the same metaphysical implications in his later writings. In
'The only possible proof for the being of God’, he rejects the
three proofs and advances a new one, which, from the idea of
other ttoaaa beings and their logical possibility, infers the
• 1
necessity of an existing something as their ground. This, 
of course, is nothing new and is thrown over in the Critique 
of Pure Reason as it well might be, for it is simply a restate­
ment of the ontological argument. It shows that Kant was con­
tent to reinforce the existence of God as an a priori certainty 
arising out of the mere conception of possible existence, by 
an aposteriori regress from the purposive relations in exist -
I
ence, which are consequently regarded as external predicates
2
of inorganic Nature. In the Critique of Judgment all this is 
changed and therewith a subtle change jfrreto enters into Kant's 
view of the origin of species. He is no longer prepared to 
maintain what is exactly the position of an intelligent theist 
to-day who is anxious to reconcile Theology with Darwinism, but 
advances towards the view that matter is brought into existence 
in the same creative act that endows it with life; or, to 
take, it from the other side, matter is a divine creation and 
may therefore contain in its original constitution the purpos­
ive combinations of organic life. It is true that up to the
■ 3
last he thinks that living matter is an impossible conception, 
and he shows no favour to hylozoism. But that is only because
^Brste Abtheilung: see p. 126. Hart. ii.
2
ibid. see. p., 135,. last paragraph in Erste Abtheilung
3See Bernard, p. 304.
we cannot see into its hidden ground, and for this reason w 
we are for ever precluded from pretending to a theory of 
matter. We are free, however, to use the indications 
which Nature has given us in speculating on her supersensible 
substrate, and to cherish without proof the conviction we are 
empowered to entertain. As in the instance of Practical 
Reason, we are at least safe-guarded by a negative certainty. 
Just because we cannot perceive the inner constitution of 
matter, it is impossible to demonstrate that the origin of 
life may not lie in the mere mechanism of Nature: "it is left
undecided whether or not in the unknown inner ground of nature, 
physico-mechanical and purposive combination may be united in 
the same things in one principle". This does not mean that 
the distinction between Mechanism and Teleology is removed, 
nor does it affect the sincerity of Kant's warnings that we 
must not mix the two modes of explanation. Although an In­
tuitive Understanding would see no difference between them, 
the difference as it appears to us will still exist even for 
this Understanding. There is occasion for much confusion in 
this intricate connection of ideas, and it can only be avoided 
if we distinguish Causality from Mechanism. I agree with 
Frost as against Stadler that in the antinomy, where this ques­
tion arises, the distinction is not between Reflexion and
Causality but between the maxim of Finality and the maxim of
■ 2
Mechanism, both of which are forms of Reflexion. Causality 
means that the perception of necessary change, and this remains 
fundamental throughout as an a •priori certainty. But beyond 
the field of immediate perception, it only obtains as an 
'analogy of experience', and its application to unperceived 
Nature is therefore always problematical. This hypothetical 
Causality is the maxim of Mechanism, which is as much a 
heuristic principle in empirical research as the maxim of
■ B^ernard, p. 296. ep. p. 313. 2Per Begriff der Urteils- 
kraft bei Kant, p. 108.
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Finality. The difference is,that while Causality is quite 
assured of its necessity within the narrow limits of immedi­
ate perception and has no misgivings, the maxim of Mechanism 
advances trembling in the dark, not knowing what may turn up, 
and is quite prepared to find maggots springing into life 
spontaneously from a dead body. In Mechanism as a maxim of 
Reflexion, the ultimate nature of Causality is treated as an 
open question and remains quite undetermined. Yet I feel that 
we are taking our results too easily in what is a very com­
plicated analysis. It is hard to elaborate a consistent 
opinion out of Kant's own writings, nor are his expositors in 
agreement. It does seem contradictory to prohibit confusing 
or mixing Mechanism and Teleology as methods of explanation and 
at the same time to suggest their ultimate identity. If they 
only be aspects for us men of what is really a single intui­
tion, it should not greatly matter if we are careless in our 
use of them. Their common element will surely draw them to­
gether in spite of our efforts to keep them apart. But a com­
plaint of this kind will not arise when we have grasped Kant's 
proper meaning. In two of his smaller writings he makes a 
clear distinction between two uses of Teleology, one of which 
alone is entitled to our serious consideration; and it is the 
other and false Teleology, I think, that he has in mind when 
he warns us against a confusion of principles. It must be 
remembered that Teleology in the first instance is a purely 
empirical procedure. The ends of Nature are found solely 
through experience. We cannot see a priori why there should 
be ends in Nature as we can quite well see a -priori how there
should be a connection of cause and effect. This at least is 
• 1
Kant's opinion. What saves the judgment from being a
worthless hazard is the connection of Reason with these
1  ' . . .
See Ueber Phil, uberhaunt. Rosenkranz I. p. 609.,
Ueber den debrauoh teleologischer Principien in der
Philoso-phie. Kirchmann, p. 172.
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empirical concepts. Now it is quite plain that this kind 
of judgment may easily lapse into the crazy teleology.which 
says, in the jesting spirit of a Voltaire, that we have noses 
in order that we may wear spectacles, unless the intelligent 
sanction of Reason is present, And since Teleology, in so 
far as it is limited to empirical conditions, can never ade­
quately define the first cause of purposive connections, we 
must “expect this complete explanation from a Pure 
Teleology which can he no other than that of Freedom, whose
principle contains a priori the relation of a Reason in general
' 1
to the totality of all ends and can only he practical". We
are safe guarded in our teleological reflexion hy a sense of
obligation which delivers our thoughts from heing contingent
speculations. In the structure of the eye, for instance, as
adapted for sight, we must imagine a certain necessity which
its particular, physiological formation. In the instance 
is anterior to and independent of/a stone we feel no such / of
necessity, for it may he used for breaking on or for building
or many other purposes, none of which is final. But of the
eye we judge that it ought to he adapted for sight, although
its structure is quite contingent for our judgment and might
he adapted for sight in a thousand other ways unknown to us,
amdthis sense of obligation "can he determined just as little
through merely physical, empirical laws, as the necessity of
' 2
the aesthetical judgment through psychological laws". It 
is therefore only the empirical use of Teleology, unsanctioned, 
hy Reason, that Kant will keep distinct from Mechanism, for 
no Teleology of this kind can supply the want of physical 
theory. Without mechanical explanation we are always uncer­
tain about the actual causes, no matter how clear our supposi- 
3 a
tion may he. But when it is/genuine teleological judgment,
the relation to Mechanism is very different. Then Teleology 
1
Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Princioien in der 
Philosophic. Kirchmann, p. 173.
2Ueber Phil, uherhaunt.. Rosenkranz I. p. 610. 
gUeber den Gebrauch tel. Princ. in der Phil. Kirchmann, 
pp. 145-6.
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is not only in place but must always be present even in our 
observation of inorganic Nature, and must have the precedence.
It is no longer a question of co-ordination, but Mechanism
• 1
must always be subordinate to teleological reflexion. He 
means that induction and deduction, syhthesis and analysis, 
are both essential in every explanation, and Teleology takes 
the lead because the regress from effect to cause is condition­
ed and instructed by an ideal progress.
It is so far settled, then, that there is nothing in the 
distinctness of Mechanism and Teleology as principles of ex­
planation to preclude their fundamental identity. What lies 
behind both and unites them is the supersensible substrate of 
Nature, which takes the place of a theistic God in his theory
of organic evolution. For although he still conceives of the
now
ultimate Ground as an intelligent Being, he does not/think of 
this Being sawt as designedly disposing the orders of Nature 
and endowing them with life. On the contrary, we do not de­
mand “that there should be actually given a particular cause 
which has the representation of a purpose as its determining 
ground", and it may be that organic products should find their
ground in Nature's mechanism, "a causal combination for which
■ 2
an Understanding is not explicitly assumed as cause". This 
is put very clearly in the essay 'On the use of teleological 
principles in philosophy', only published two years earlier 
(1788). We can only understand how an organism is made on 
the analogy of our own technical activity, which is a mixture 
of Understanding and Will. It is nothing more than an analogy, 
however, because we cannot make an organism as we can make ob­
jects of technical art. The real cause of an organism, there­
fore.,, must lie outside experience as a causality of which we 
have no example; and the nearest approach we can make to such 
a conception is that of a Being whose activity is purposive 
but without having the ground of its determination in an Idea.
Bernard. £78. pp. 331-3. 2Bernard. ^77. p. 320.
35.
But since the conception of* a Being, in itself purposive 
and acting without specific end or aim in view (aus sich 
selhst zweckmassig. aber ohne Zweck und Absicht zu wirken), is 
quite fictitious for us, we must either give up all attempt at 
explanation or think to ourselves an intelligent Being; not 
as if we considered that such a ground-principle is impossible, 
but because the conception of an intelligent Being is the only 
support we can find in our thought for the otherwise unthink­
able conception of a ground-principle, which is in itself pur­
posive but excludes final causes in its activity (Ursache mit
1
Auss,chliessung der Endursachen). The notion of intelligence 
which is inseparable from the conception of acting according to 
purposed ends, is not introduced for its own sake but only for 
the sake of a conception which contradicts the notion of in­
telligence; the supersensible substrate is a Being which has 
no ideas as motives for its creative acts, and is presupposed 
as indeterminate Ground (Grundkraft) rather than as cause.
It may therefore be that there is no real basis for what we 
observe as teleology in Nature, and that nothing more is need­
ful in explanation "beyond the mechanism of causes working 
2
blindly”. . This, however, does not mean that Kant has finally 
displaced Teleology in favour of a rigid mechanism. If we 
read<§77, we shall find that the Mechanism which Kant approves 
as an ultimate mode of explanation, is something much more 
than just mechanism itself. It means that the parts are ex­
plained by automatic analysis as the parts of a real whole 
which is given in perception with them, as would happen to a 
divine mind, a very different thing from the conception of 
discrete parts out of whose mechanical aggregate a whole is 
constructed. We have to notice in Kant's Teleology a similar 
result to what we already found in his aesthetic theory. While 
according to the view we have taken, he does not reduce 
Aesthetic to intellectual processes in terms of which it is 
explained, but conceives of it as a higher plane of mental
1 Kirchma-nn.pp. 171-2. , Hart.iv.pp. 493-4.
^Bernard. p. 287.
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activity in which knowledge is a limited and specialised 
direction; he now interprets Mechanism in terms of a 
Grundkraft which transcends the distinction of Mechanism 
and Teleology, instead of explaining organic Nature on strict­
ly mechanical principles. It is Nature conceived as pur­
posive without a purpose, a process which to all appearance
is mechanical hut which unfolds itself in marvellous wise and 
indeed
moves/to an event we can surmise ard applaud, yet without fore­
casting or express intention. This theory, which will sound 
somewhat novel to students of the first Critique. can only 
he named an idealistic naturalism or 'creative evolution'.
TP
Perhaps it may seem a little hazardous to urge this point of 
resemblance between Kant and M. Bergson, in view of the sharp 
contrast which he has made between Kant and himself. But so 
far as I know, M. Bergson makes no serious reference to the 
Critiwue of Judgment and confines himself exclusively to the 
Critique of Pure Reason. Is it too much to contend, as our 
short study has essayed incidentally to show, that the third 
Critique effects a real modification in Kant’s theory of 
knowledge? Let us just think what Kant's position means at 
the point we have now reached. It is true that his accredited 
view moves between a timeless supersensible and phenomena 
juxtaposed in abstract time. . But a mechanism working blind­
ly and yet fruitful of reasonable consequences is certainly 
not the abstract relation of cause and effect, and much less 
is it the timeless identity of mechanism and teleology in the 
divine mind. It is clearly an existence which is more than 
quantitative: on the one hand, it is not a mere mechanism
whose parts are simply repetitions of an identical relation, 
for it springs spontaneously from a Ground which is purposive 
and must therefore be itself individual in each moment of its 
existence; and, on the other hand, it is not an empty teleo­
logy which, as the realisation of a predetermined end, eli­
minates real change, but an accretion of real parts in which
37.
the end, unknown even to the Ground, is progressively re­
vealed. Now, as M. Bergson has observed, Causality for Kant
has "the same meaning and the same function in the inner as
1
in the outer world". He means that inner experience keeps 
time with the outer process, and that while our experience is 
really a continuum of interpenetrating elements which are 
never external to each other, Kant has made our experience 
conform to what is only a single and ultimately false tendency 
in experience, the externalising function of the intellect in 
space-relations. But this simple statement does not cover 
the whole ground. Just as we have observed in Kant's final 
theory of Teleology a conception of existence which is more 
than that of quantity, whose parts, over and above their 
formal character as repetitions of abstract causation, have an 
individual character as purposed elements which can never be 
repeated, we have now to recollect a corresponding change in 
the subject. Kant conceived of the inner life as divided in­
to two orders, both of them, strange to say, in the same medium 
of Time, Imagination. Of these the schematic order is subject 
to the law of determined succession, the other is vaguely de­
fined as an Inner Sense, and if we are able to have that deter­
mined succession in consciousness which is necessary to the 
maintenance of our own identity, it certainly does not con­
stitute a coherent perception and is only a fleeting awareness. 
So much is this the case that, as we saw in Chapter iv.,the 
contents of Inner Sense are more of a conceptual play than a 
sensuous succession in Time, although they are affections of 
the very and only faculty of Time and are expressly described 
as sensuous. But in the Productive Imagination, to all 
appearance a timeless faculty, a new causality is sprung upon 
us without warning, to take the place of the reproductive 
function which Kant had denied to it. By means of this 
causality the volatile contents of the Inner Sense are 
1
Time and Free-Will, p. 232.
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transported into coherent forms, which we can recognise as 
enduring unities with all the perfect finish of immediate 
creation. He speaks of the aesthetic state as maintaining 
and strengthening itself by an inner causality, in virtue of 
which we are able to linger over the Beautiful as something 
more than an inconsequent conceptual play. Now the peculiar 
feature in this theory is the way in which Kant has combined 
in a single process, the timeless nature of indeterminate in­
tellective functions with the quality of schematic coherence 
and yet without the characters of abstract Time as they are 
found in our perception of the external world. I am not 
forgetting that Kant’s prevailing expressions are for a nega­
tive, formal consistency without any real content; but it is 
equally clear that concrete coherence lies in the line of his 
thinking. It is just because he has no terminology for a 
real duration which is other than that of external perception, 
that he is forced to deny coherence to the Inner Sense. The 
puzzle in his theory of Aesthetic is created by the search for 
an order of Productive Imagination which will be in Time and 
yet not in that determined order of necessity which controls 
our sense-perception. For Kant there is no such thing as a 
perception of Time itself, and therefore the schema of Causality 
is not a mode of Time, for this would mean a determinate con­
sciousness of Time, but a mode in Time. But in Aesthetic there 
must be no permanence in Time for then the Beautiful would be 
indistinguishable from objects of Science. There is only 
left to Aesthetic, if it will be anything at all, the alter­
native that its symbolic schemata are modes of Time and there-
' 1
fore a more or less durable consciousness of Time.
But it is all the more disappointing to find that for 
1
See- the discussion in the First Analogy; Meiklejohn, p. 
137. Notice how Kant says that succession and coexistence 
'are modes of Time, and then corrects himself a few lines 
further on but only with reference to coexistence. He 
should have made the same correction in the case of suc­
cession as is evident from the glaring contradiction in 
this sentence, where he says that Time is not affected by 
change and that its parts are all successive.
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Kant the ultimate identity of Mechanism and Teleology in real 
existence is a hidden Ground, completely unknown to the subject, 
notwithstanding the fact that on his own admission the nature 
of this Ground and of the subject is the same,namely, purposive 
reality without a purpose. Our main contention throughout 
this study may be put in the form of a question: why should
the Critique of Judgment have been written if Teleology is to 
gain nothing from the theory of Aesthetic? The classic reason 
Kant offers for this failure is the discursive nature of our 
Understanding. This remains to be examined.
The proof is contained in the difficult and important ^ 76- 
77, which really contain the crux of the argument in the Teleo­
logy of Nature. It turns on the difference between the human 
mind and what we are able to conceive as divine. Our defect 
is shown in the presence of two heterogeneous factors, sensuous 
intuition and thought. We know when we are in touch with fact, 
our thought runs against something hard and becomes perception. 
And we also know when we are not in touch with fact but are 
moving in airy circles of possibility. According to Kant, 
actual fact (Thatsache) means sensation with the solitary ex­
ception of the Idea of Freedom, which is a fact although it has
' 1
no adequate intuition corresponding in sense-perception. This 
apart, for it does not interest us now, we may say that without 
sensuous perception we have nothing left but the bare sense of 
possession, and our supposed objects pale into the M mere "re­
presentations of a problem". It is our misfortune that we 
have more thoughts than we can make into objects and are neither 
god nor beast. For a god the possible is itself actual, and 
we can suppose that for an animal all perceptions are necessary, 
at least if it is the same as Mr. Bradley’s dog for whom there 
is but a single possibility: what is, smells; what does not
smell is not. But the simple consciousness of possession is 
no slight acquisition. In the Dialectic. Kant recognised 
principles of Reason which never have immediate relation to a
Bernard ^  91. pp. 405-6.
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sense-object and yet are synthetic with a suggestion of ob­
jectivity. Their function is to organise the concepts of
Understanding as it in turn organises into unities the manifold 
■ 1
in sensation.  ^ In our Reason we recognise a power to think 
our thoughts about objects as if these thoughts were real Ob­
jects themselves, and although we never expect to find a corres­
pondent in sensation to this high thinking, we cannot over- 
estimate its importance. There is no such thing in fact as 
pure earth, pure air or pure water, butthsse are real objects 
for Reason as sensibility is real for the Understanding, and
are necessary abstractions for determining the share which
• 2
each of these natural elements has in any given objects.
Now there were four chief Ideas of Reason recognised in the 
dogmatic metaphysics, God, the Soul, the World and End. To 
the first three there is nothing adequately corresponding in 
perception: that our conception of the world be actual, we
should have to see the whole world at a glance, and of course 
that is asking too much; again, you cannot run against your 
soul and ricocher with a 'Hullo, old fellow, awfully glad to 
see you*, you are only going round it; and perlmps the less 
said about the first the better.. But in the instance of End, 
Kant changes countenance, for it is peculiar to this Idea 
that a corresponding intuition is actually given in organisms.
At this point we might be pardoned if we raised a cheer because 
there is one Idea of Reason which is immediately related to 
experience, and so becomes a necessary perception. But we are 
at once pulled up by the fatal docetic formula, 'as it were'.
For an Idea of Reason is only synthetic for the thoughts, and 
not for the objects, of Understanding. Both Understanding and 
Reason are syhthetic functions on different planes of experience, 
which at their nearest point of contact are divided by a film 
of sense. And although an intuition corresponding to the 
Idea of End is given in organisms, it is only the Understanding
^"Meiklejohn, pp. 213-14 and pp. 394-5.
2 . . .
Meiklejohn. p. 396.
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who can see it. This is what Kant means "by the somewhat
doubtful assertion that we cannot perceive teleology in Nature
• 1
as we do mechanical causation. There is at least this to be
there
said, that while experience would be impossible if hteecy were 
no mechanical necessity in Nature, we are not able to say how 
far the absence of natural purposes would affect the possi­
bility of experience. In an organism as object of sense and 
therefore as judged by the Understanding, nothing is perceiv­
ed beyond a complex of mechanical processes; and when Reason 
asks the questions, 'what is it doing and where is it going”, 
we have ceased to think of it as mechanism. The perception 
of Reason comes too late. It is as if we were looking at an 
object through two; different pairs of eyes, which are as un­
related as the perception of a mechanic and an artist. Reason, 
who is wearing glasses heavily smoked, is peering over the 
shoulder of Understanding, and enquiring with the suspicious 
alertness of Maeterlinck's Sightless, 'What is that, what is 
that? Why don't you tell me? I am sure I saw something'.
To which the Understanding laconically replies, 'Compose 
yourself, my dear fellow, it is nothing for you; it is only 
one of my little men'. The moment we try to use a principle 
of Reason as a prindiple of Understanding, its synthetic quali­
ty resolves in-to the vague function of an Understanding in
2
general (eines Yerstandes fiberhaupt). Now we go a step 
further. Not only are principles of Reason inapplicable to 
objects of sense, the principles of Understanding are in a 
similar case. When we read in the Critique of Pure Reason 
that there are synthetic principles of Understanding, we must 
1
Dass es in der Natur Zwecke geben mfisse. kann k^eip 
Mensch a -priori einsehen; dagegen er a-priori ganz wohl 
einsehen kann, dass es darin eine Verknupfung der Ursac- 
hen und Wirkungen geben miisse. Ueber den Cebrauch 
teleologischer Principien in~ der Philosophie. Kirchmann, 
p. 172. Hart. iv. p. 494. Cp. Bernard, pp. 311-2 and p.327.
2
Hart. v. p. 418. Bernard, pp. 319-20.
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remember that they only become synthetic, formative, creative, 
because vision has been lent to them from without in sense- 
affection. As we saw in Chapter iv.,Kant favours the sugges­
tion that the pure conceptions of Understanding are true of 
things as they really are, while schemata, the applied con­
ceptions of Understanding, present things only as they appear. 
In their unconditioned form, the principles of Understanding 
are indistinguishable from those of Reason, and like them are 
analytical, without immediate relation to experience. As 
applied in experience they are forms of synthesis, but they 
are not synthetic in their own right, as may be seen from the 
unsatisfactory character of experience. The unity which 
Understanding gives,to objects is not the perfect universal 
it is capable of thinking, but a unity which it is obliged to 
construct by reproducing the parts of existence in a deter­
mined order. The consequence is that we only see aggregate 
unities and discrete successions, never the soul of things.
Had the Understanding a gift of vision all its own, we should 
be able to see with the. children in Blue-bird. the soul of 
flinty rock blue as sapphire, the souls of the Hours tripping 
out of the clock or Bread tumbling out of his pan. A princi­
ple which is synthetic in its own nature can only be found in 
the Ideas of Reason, for they are not limited by sensation and 
are therefore free to produce their objects in the simple per­
ception of their unity. But then they have no application to 
experience, and so far as objects of sense are concerned they 
are really analytical; for while the whole is real enough, 
the parts are ideal. For an opposite reason, there is no 
principle of Understanding which is synthetic in its own right; 
for while the parts are real enough, their totality is supplied
by the Ideas of Reason and is merely ideal. A genuine synthe-
nature
tic principle means such a crpative insight into the whole/of 
a thing as that Being has who, in the simple perception of 
its unity, is able to produce the complexity of its structure.
43.
In Kant's words, "we see into a thing completely only so far
• 1
as we can make it". To the same effect Lord.Kelvin is re­
ported to have said, that he could not he satisfied that he 
had explained any natural process until he gsskst constructed a 
working model.
It is a consequence of this analytical nature of thought 
that our Understanding is discursive. When we speak of thought 
as an analytic unity, we mean that it is incapable of analysis, 
its parts being so completely transparent as to be non-existent. 
A real whole is reciprocally conditioned by its parts, but this 
analytic whole is unconditioned and has no immediate relation 
to particular instances in experience. The particular is 
therefore contingent for the universal of Understanding, it has 
a multiplicity of possible relations which are quite undeter­
mined for this universal. In the simple fact of knowledge, 
on the other hand, the universal and particular are both 
immediately given in the individual perception and the contin­
gency is not apparent. But that is because only those rela­
tions of the particular presentation are allowed to enter con­
sciousness as are necessary for the consciousness of our own 
identity. Here we return to Kant's original doctrine of 
sensation. What is determined is not the particular itself 
in its exhaustive relations, but the partisular as it must 
appear to us if we are to have a necessary perception of it.
Sxcfc If we now proceed beyond the simple needs of immediate 
perception, we find that we have no universal to cover the 
multiple relations of the particular which do not enter into 
the consciousness of ourselves. This is just how we feel in 
thinking of an organism. A knowledge of its mechanism is 
given in the simple fact of perception, because without 
causal necessity in perception we could not be conscious of 
our own identity. But although we can surmise the end in 
an organism, we can never be sure that our judgment is final, 
we have no necessary perception of its ultimate unity. If our
"^Bernard, p. 291
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Understanding were intuitive, every nuance in the structure 
of an organism would he immediately perceived as self-explain­
ing. This Intuitive Understanding is the Mrs. Harris of 
philosophy quite as much as the Supersensible Thing. Since 
the universal of our Understanding is not synthetic, we can­
not perceive the whole as cause of the parts but as theiir 
effect, and therefore cannot have an a -priori perception but 
an ex -post facto idea of the whole. In Kant's technical 
language, we must proceed from the universal to the particular. 
Since the particular given in perception is contingent and 
we have no corresponding universal to determine the multi­
plicity of its possible relations, we must first think it in 
the most general terms, then advance from this unspecified 
thought to a more conditioned until we arrive, if we are able,
at an adequate conception which will commend the particular
universal
to our intelligence. We thus proceed from the analytic/ This 
is the discursive nature of Understanding.
It will be noticed in this account that Kant makes a 
sharp contrast between discursive and intuitive. Our Reason, 
in itself intuitive, is only capable cf perceiving bare uni­
ties, not individual things. It consequently becomes discur­
sive when applied to a particular which it does not itself 
create. It has a stock of ready-made suits, all empty, formal, 
pathetic in their simulation of the individual, which it essays 
to fit, one after the other, on the presentation. It usually 
happens that during this discursive process, the presentation 
walks off unsuited. The Understanding, which is the business 
faculty we use in daily life, is wise; it builds the suit on 
the person of the presentation. The universal and the parti­
cular are immediately given in the individual perception. It 
is only when our thoughts are applied in the form of schemata, 
or conceptions specially adapted to presentations, that they 
become intuitive. Kant, then, appears to think that in the 
schematic consciousness the discursive process comes to an 
end. On the contrary, it is in the schematic consciousness
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that the discursive process is initiated, sustained and
completed. It is true that our thoughts, like the waves
of the sea, are more or less contingent modes of mind, whose
meaning is .as elusive and unspecified as the crest and oval
rings on the breakers, and flow discursively over the surface
of the deep until they peradventure break upon the shore. But
they are motived by the tide. We never think to any purpose
without schemata. No matter how abstract it may be, our
thought is always intuitive in nature because it is dynamic,
having an original tendency to imaginative form. Kant said,
our thought is discursive because it is unconditioned; we
say, it is intuitive because ft is conditioned. Schemata are
not by any means confined to the Applied Understanding. Kant
himself recognised that there are schemata of Reason. The
Ideas can only think their Ideal of systematic unity by the
energy of some dynamic form of thought, and this is the idea 
1
of a maximum; or if we will think of something even more
attentuated, the idea of a Supreme Intelligence comes before
2
our minds under the schema of a thing in general. These he 
calls analogous or symbolic schemata, and so far there is some 
ground for this distinction between the schemata of Reason 
and Applied Understanding. For however strong our tendency 
may be to think the being of God or the maximum unity of 
existence, our thinking never arrives at a completely deter­
minate concept; the tendency towards imaginative form is
inevitably arrested, and just when we think we are coming at 
our thoughts
it,/disperse into vacuity. But the ground of difference 
which Kant supposes to underlie these distinct orders of 
schemata is quite fictitious. In his opinion it consists in 
the fact that the schemata of Understanding have a necessary 
reference to Time, whereas the symbolic forms of Reason have 
1




no implication of Time at all. This does not prove anything. 
The reference to Time in schemata is nothing more than the 
feature of change which is essential to the fact of self- 
consciousness, and this implication of Time is quite as real 
in the symbols of Reason. For Kant admits that "we may have
1
a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely perfect". 
But a determinate notion we cannot have unless we are balancing 
and recovering ourselves in the yielding medium of conscious­
ness, and this implies some displacement in Time.
The theory which we are now criticising is deeply embedd­
ed in the history of thought. Aristotle, thinking from an
mechanical
opposite standpoint, held eem the same/opinion as Kant on the 
relation between senseand thought. He indeed speaks of the 
Passive Reason as perishable, but he does not therefore mean 
to identify it with the soul of the lower powers as Zeller 
seems to understand him. It is the discursive processes that 
are perishable, and these are not themselves affections ( *77*^
5 of Reason but of that "which has Reason in it in 30 far 
2
as it has it", that is, images embodying universals. In it­
self, Reason is incapable of being affected and is unmingled 
( ). By being passive he only means
that it is reduced to potentiality. But when Reason becomes 
active, as it may be supposed to exist in the divine mind, the 
discursive processes have fallen away. Both Kant and Aris­
totle hold that discursive is inconsistent with intuitive 
thought. We are prepared to go a certain length in consent­
ing to this opinion. The discursive nature of thinking signi­
fies, that nothing of sense or imagination can have any meaning 
for us unless we are thinking of something else at the same 
time; consciousness is apperceptive. Were our Understanding 
intuitive, we are told that each individual perception would




be immediately self-explaining. But, unfortunately, this 
Intuitive Understanding is like Mrs. Harris unable to answer 
for itself, and it is not by any means decided, in our opinion, 
that even in the divine mind there is not something correspon­
ding to our discursive thought. At all events, we refuse to 
countenance the idea that our thought has only an accidental 
relation to sensuous experience. In Kant's schematic con­
sciousness, Thought and Sense are only united de facto and 
the same is true in Aristotle's theory. But we can also 
point with Kant to a higher plane of our experience where they 
are united de .jure .in the aesthetic consciousness. As I 
remember having read in Hegel's Philosophy of Art, it is not 
that Sense may be tolerated as a medium, it is rather that 
Reason must be degraded into a symbol and cannot appear except 
in sensuous form. In his conception of mental Play, Kant has 
given conclusive proof that thought is inherently perceptive, 
and that therefore schematic consciousness is original to the 
nature of mind and not the accident of a psychological device. 
The discursive nature of our thought does not argue a defect 
in.our intelligence, for the discursive process is instituted 
and maintained by what is truly divine in us, the dynamic 
energy of thought. It may be desirable that our thought 
should be improved in the direction of becoming more intuitive 
and less discursive, but that its discursive nature should be 
eliminated altogether is a doubtful proposition. Even for 
the divine mind immediacy may not exclude mediation. It may 
argue a superficial intelligence in a deity whose mind does 
not admit of more and less. If Kant's Intuitive Understand­
ing can see at a glance, so to speak, it is only because He 
has no d ideas, no discriminating preference in the vast 
universe of His resources. Certainly we do not think of a 
discursive transition in the divine mind as happens with us, 
but we can imagine some qualitative sense of change. In so
48.
far as we have anything divine in us, we need not blush
to own discursive thought. What lies at the back of all
our thinking, except when our apprehension is completely
implicit, is the Schema; it is that transcendental element
1
of thought which is felt before it is noticed, preceding 
and informing all perception.
In conclusion, we have still to explain why the schemata
of Understanding should appear to be so much more effective
than those of Reason. While the schemata of Reason float
with extended wings in the pure ether of $  I 9 the
schemata of Understanding stick their claws into the pulp of
sense and prey on garbage. The latter have the advantage
of a more immediate contact with Reality. While Reflexion
is said to be transcendental and a -priori, it only organises
Nature into an empirical system; but the Understanding has
an apodictic knowledge of its province and its a priori is
absolute. Perhaps the following suggestion , somewhat 
on the lines of the conclusion to
/Chapter vi., may throw 
some light on the problem. It is in the nature of thought 
that it should have a certain amount of geneHB&ifey-be generali­
ty and so be able to embrace may different particulars. Our 
thought can therefore attend to one of these only as it thinks 
it through the others. But in simple perception the apper­
ceptive function, which is not different in kind from the 
discursive nature of reflective thought, is limited. We do 
not need or wish to do more than perceive, and the amount of 
suggestion and memory--processes called into play is no more 
than what is needful for simple perception. In Reflexion 
the apperceptive function is intensified. Presentations 
are not simply to be perceived as they ought but as we should 
like to perceive them, and for this a far greater amount of 
suggestion and recollection is required. But the result is 
not less actual, it is more actual. Every atom of sensation 
1
For this expression I am indebted to a suggestion in
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F.H.' Bradley's acute article on Immediate Experience: 
Mind. Jan. 1909.
is spun into a web of apperceptive gauze until the merely 
actiial disappears and the actual with increased significance 
takes its place, the world of Art and Life. The more the 
beauty of a thing is seen and felt, the more does it stand 
out from the frame--work of s the actual, suspended in splendid 
insolation by its own invisible thread; the more we draw the 
ends together in a living being, the more do its organs lose 
their independence: they have ceased to exist as merely
actual parts in their discreteness and have become elements 
in a system of ideal relations. A living body is no longer 
an aggregate of impressions, but a real whole productive of its 
parts.
C h a p t e r  w.
A E S T H E T I C .  A N D  T E L E O L O G Y .
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N*
AESTHETIC AND TELEOLO GY.
Conclusion. Chapter 8.
The discursive method of our thought does not disable us 
from appraising living Nature. On the contrary, our Under­
standing with its modicum of intuition is peculiarly fitted 
for assimilating this plane of perception. In Aesthetic our 
ideas displace eachother with such a facile motion, and not 
less in the Sublime where the aesthetic process may originate 
in a violent dislocation, that the discursive transition 
melts into a frictionless continuum like the ether. It is 
not on that account a timeless or unreal process, but the 
self-mediation of immediate experience. But in Teleology 
the discursive process must be more explicit, because we 
are subject to a different kind of constraint due to the in­
fluence of living beings, which we do not feel in Aesthetic.
The wisest course, then, for the Understanding is to abase it­
self before the aggressive presentation, and ponder discur­
sively what it has to say in a kind of personal intercourse.
We can adopt George Meredith's expedient of finding out all we 
want to know, by asking questions without expecting a reply.
The least significance Teleology should have for us is that, 
like Art, its problem is the individual and not the generalisa­
tions of abstract induction, which is all the meaning Kant 
put into it. Every true induction is a discursive process 
shot through with momentary flashes of insight, which reveal 
the individual nature of the thing examined. The cumulative 
judgments of a scientist who devotes years to the study of a 
spider, have the emotional quality of artistic divination: 
with this difference, that while in the artistic conscious­
ness, which is unthinking, representations occupy the fore­
ground, they form the background in the active consciousness 
of the scientist to explicit conceptual relations. This is 
the chief distinction between Aesthetic and Teleology. The
judgments of both are forms of what Kant has called sub­
jective teleology, that is, they are purposive as psycholo­
gical processes of ours quite apart from any predicate of 
purpose. But -while the aesthetic consciousness is exhaust­
ed in the subjective feeling of harmony in a play of un­
thinking representations, a harmony which is capable of in­
finite expansion, Teleology is a conceptual play which, in 
its very nature as conceptual, must refer beyond the process 
to an object which has a different kind of independence from 
that which we recognise in objects of Art. The predicate 
in a teleological judgment is at one and the same time a 
purposive feeling and a concept of purpose; and the subjective 
teleology is not exhausted in our feeling of harmony, because 
it is the emotional transcript of purposive activity in a 
being which enjoys its own existence. While we recognise the 
objects of Art as individual with an independent,abiding ex­
istence, our pleasure consists precisely in the fact that the 
product of an independent will so easily yields to our inter­
pretation. But our interest in organisms is stimulated and 
strengthened by the thought that they do not yield up their 
independent existence. Teleology is not simply the reflection 
of our personality, but Nature enacts ©ur freedom in her living 
forms.
It was this independence in the organism that stood as a 
stumbling-block in Kant's way. His final ctiticism was that 
we cannot understand an organism because we cannot make it, 
and that therefore the application of our own practical caus­
ality as a means of explanation must only be analogical. This 
limitation to our knowledge constituted for him the difference
between the mathematical and biological sciences. He thought 
that the only things we can know with certainty are extensive 
magnitudes, because, as Geometry shows, we literally produce 
representations in space a 'priori. His view of intensive 
magnitude or degree in sensation does not really affect his
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position, and is hardly more than a corollary to the pre­
ceding principle. It is fundamental for him that "sensa­
tion is just that element in cognition which cannot he at
1
all anticipated". And the only element in sensation 
which we can anticipate, is that to which we can give a 
mathematical ratio. It is true that he speaks of inten­
sive magnitude as if it were an individual quality, appre­
hended in a single instant of sensation. For example, we 
perceive by the muscular sensation of lifting that a brick 
and a stone, of equal mass, have different intensive magni­
tudes, It would thus appear that we can have a knowledge 
of objects which is not quantitative. But in order to be 
a •priori, it must be a sensation which can be measured in 
terms of space, for example, the number of feet a body with 
specific intensive magnitude will fall in a given time.
When Kant speaks of intensive magnitude, he is thinking of 
the quality of a quantity and not the quantity of a quality.
We have no right to infer from his statement that we per­
ceive intensive magnitude as an individual quality, that we 
can also anticipate different qualities in sensation to which 
we cannot give a mathematical tatio. He denies that we can 
have an aoriori sensation of an end, or the intensive unity 
in an organism. His mathematical ideal of knowledge is the 
necessary correlate to his mathematical view of mental life, 
as a succession of elements in abstract time, represented 
under the image of position in space. He can hardly be 
said to have regarded consciousness as organic; it was either 
an empirical representation of parts external to eachother, 
or else an analytic unity. It is not wonderful if he should 
have thought that we cannot have a necessary perception of 
an intensive unity, which is neither mathematical nor mystical. 
In reply to Kant we should say, that we can understand the 




knew nothing so intimately as ourselves. It is because 
our personality is something we cannot make, as if* it were 
a living thing existing independently of our self-conscious­
ness, and which is therefore able to react on our knowledge
kind of
of itself and check our surmisesabout it. The only real / 
knowledge is obtained in a discursive intercourse punctuated 
by flashes of intuition. In the same way, an organism is a 
thing of which we can have real knowledge because it is some­
thing which we cannot make. If we wish to vindicate the 
validity of the historical and biological sciences against a 
mathematical ideal of knowledge, we must first recognise the 
individual existence of their objects. Of geometrical 
figures we may be said to know nothing real, in so far as we 
are able to produce them. They are only models which we con­
struct of natural forces, such as the elliptical motions of the 
heavenly bodies, which we do not make. It might be objected 
that we do understand a natural law when we are able to pro­
duce an illustration of it in a working model. But all that 
we understand about it is only what we ourselves have put in­
to it. Our so-called mathematical certainty is just what 
precludes us from ever knowing how far our conception is true. 
As Kant himself said in the preface to the second edition of
the Critique of Pure Reason, what we know a -priori in things
1
is only what we ourselves put into them. In so far as we 
may be said to have mathematical certainty in our knowledge 
of anything, there is either nothing in it to be known, that 
is, it is not an individual thing but a centre of endless re­
lations, or we know nothing real about it. If we are able 
to explain a fact of history like the French Revolution, pre­
cisely as the effect of certain causes, we have missed its 
significance as an individual event, an act of cosmic Will, 
and explained it away. We do not forget that natural forces 
are realities which we do not create any more than organisms,
1
Hart. iii. p. 19.
and it is a plausible inference that we should be able to have 
a real knowledge of them too. For all we know, they may be 
what Schopenhauer believed them to be, manifestations of Will, 
and therefore realities which are capable of reciprocating our 
consciousness of them. But it is just because they suffer 
themselves to be measured with mathematical precision and do 
not question or disturb our a priori peace, that we can never 
have a real knowledge of what they are in themselves. As 
matters now stand, we certainly know a great deal more about 
personality, notwithstanding its obscurity, than we know about 
the ultimate nature of mechanical forces. The Individual 
is the only thing that stands up to our scrutiny, and it is 
the only thing of which we can have real knowledge because 
it is the only thing that has a self-subsisting centre of 
reality which is not dissipated by criticism. There is no­
thing else in Nature of which we can have real knowledge be­
cause there is nothing else in Nature with which we can have 
personal intercourse in a reciprocating consciousness. The 
living, or if not the living itself, that which refuses to be 
measured by mathematical standards and subsists as the act of 
creative Will in History or Art, is the only thing that gives 
a sense of security to our self-consciousness because it 
responds. The phenomena of quantity keep us completely in 
the dark, the only answer we receive is the mocking echo of 
our questioning spirit; are what you have made us and no
more'. It is the respons© that gives reality to our knowledge, 
it is the one touch of Nature that makes the whole world kin.
Now Kant admits that a Teleology of Nature is possible 
and that we can have at least some hypothetical knowledge of
organic forms, but it is by $ B&fcgative process of suteeeriptien 
subreption similar to what we already found in the Sublime.
The conception of a natural purpose would be quite unintelli­
gible except to a being who is capable of acting from ends of 
Reason. The conception of ends in Nature is therefore a
6 .
psychological idea imported from our moral consciousness
and attributed to Nature. And we can never be sure if it is
not we rather than Nature who are originally responsible for
the purposive manifestations of organic life. Like the
Indian who wondered, not that the froth should foam out of
the beer-bottle but that it should ever have got in, we are
prone to imagine that what we think to be traits of character
- 1
and will in organisms, exist in Nature as they appear to us.
It is right, then, that we should not rashly choose our 
ground but first apply the thought of living purpose, which 
we find in ourselves, to those organic forms which are able 
to sustain it. Although we may confidently think of persons 
as having a nature like our own, it is a precarious infer­
ence that animals and plants have anything corresponding to 
a moral consciousness; it is possible that their appearance 
of purposive activity may be sufficiently explained as 
mechanical functions. At the meeting of the British Associ­
ation in 1908, Mr. Francis Darwin gave an interesting address
lower
on a kind of memory-knowl edge in plants and/forms of life.
The plant which raises its leaves with the dawn and depresses 
them at dusk, continues to do the same when kept in total 
darkness; flowers that are sweetly fragrant during the night, 
also exude their grateful odour during an eclipse of the sun. 
When we consider that the natural causes of their several 
functions are absent, we are forced to think of these phenom­
ena as due to a kind of association of ideas which implies 
memory. But we are still in the region of conjecture. We 
can never be sure that our proleptic idea of purposive causal­
ity in an organism is a fact of Nature. In Kant's opinion, 
there is only one Idea of Reason which is a fact independent 
of experience, and that is Freedom. Man is in himself an 
unconditioned end of Nature, for he contains the highest
^Bernard, p. 224., Schopenhauer, The World as Will and 
Idea. Haldane iii. p. 78.
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purpose to which Nature can be subordinate. We do not see 
all things already pui? under him, but "the earnest expecta­
tion of the creation waiteth for the revealing of the sons of 
God". Man is the only animal who bids defiance to Nature's
rule and chooses his own destiny. He is what Professor Ray
2
Lankester calls him, Nature's rebel. The animal kingdom
was made subject to vanity, being ruthlessly governed by the
principle of natural selection; Nature bids die all who fail
to reach the required standard of efficiency. Only man has
the courage to answer Nature's challenge with the will to live;
"I shall not die but live, and declare the works of the Lord".
Thus the highest Idea of Reason for Kant is the Idea of
Personality. The only certain end in Nature is the end of
human life, and it is therefore our moral consciousness alone
that gives the sanction to Teleology. As subordinate to man,
all the purposes of Nature, internal and external, may have a
relative meaning and truth. But in themselves they have no
independent substrate of reality, and we can only judge of
them reflectively by an external teleology to which there may
be nothing corresponding in themselves. When Kant says that
the thought of teleology in organisms is due to the discursive
nature of our Understanding, he evidently means that their
whole significance consists in their relation to a self. The
unity is in themselves but not for themselves, as a stone may
be said to have a unity of form, or what Aristotle calls an
external entelechy. They are conscious but not self-conscious.
In Mr. Me Taggart's words, they are not able to withstand the
unity of the Absolute Idea which is an abstract description of
5
the human spirit. Although Kant strongly affirms the re­
lative validity of the categories of abstract science, which 
Mr. Me.Taggart as strenuously denies, he would agree with him 
that the biological categories are not a true description of
1 2 Bernard, pp. 560-1. The Kingdom of Man. pp. 26. 40.
5
Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, p. 145.
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Reality but are due to the zig-zag movement of our thought
as expressed in the law of Contradiction, or in Kant's own
terms, to our discursive Understanding. But as Mr. Bosanquet
has shown in his important article on 'Contradiction and 
1
Reality', contradiction is one thing and negation is another. 
Mr. McTaggart has not sufficiently noticed this distinction. 
Contradiction is a vanishing factor and diminishes in the 
higher reaches of experience, where the elements are opposed 
not so much in earnest as in play. But this does not touch 
the question whether there may not be an original and abiding 
discursive factor in all our thinking, even when it approxi­
mates to the intuitive. Kant's fundamental error consists 
in having assumed as the type of real existence, an ultimate 
unity which is incapable of further analysis and which ex­
cludes not only evanescent oppositions but also original dis­
tinctions. The consciousness of Freedom is such a reality, 
and that is why he is able to call it a fact independent of 
experience. His position is that finite existence is for a 
self but Reality ym for itself, or in Mr. Bradley's phrase, 
Reality is experience. The only difference is that what Kant 
conceives as a higher immediacy in the analytic consciousness 
of Freedom, Mr. Bradley conceives as a lower immediacy in 
Sentience. The former is a subject which is its own object, 
the latter an object which is its own subject. But, on their 
own admission, both these realities have as little to do with 
experience as they are independent of experience. Kant ad­
mits that it is absolutely impossible to procure a single case 
in experience with complete certainty, in -which the maxim of an
act, ostensibly done for duty's sake, has rested solely on
’ 2
moral grounds and on the idea of duty. Mr. Bradley, again, 
cannot find a single piece of experience which is not vitiated 
by relation to a self, and consequently swollen with a merely 
ideal content like a face stung by a bee; just as Kant's
1Mind. Jan. 1906. 2 . - n r  Hart. i v . pp. 254-5.
consciousness of Freedom transcends, Mr. Bradley's object
which is its own subject, falls below, the margin of ex-
• 1
perience and then it becomes a lost quantity. Mr. Bradley 
desiderates a quiet encounter with a fact outside of ex­
perience, where he may shun publicity and the exaggerated 
reports of this upper world:
Follis tantum ne carmina manda,
He turbata volent, rapidis ludibria ventis.
One is reminded of the tramp who remarked on being convicted 
of drunkenness, that he must have had a glorious time of it 
last night Judging from what the policeman told the magistrate. 
This position that Reality is immediate experience, which is 
really the basis of modern Pragmatism however indifferently 
disposed to this school its authors may be, begs the whole 
question. Clearly we can only start from experience, but if 
we also equate Reality with it, we are for ever disabled from 
answering the inevitable question how far experience itself is 
real. And the logical result is solipsism. Ihis is what 
happens with Mr. McTaggart. He would fain find his personal 
monads consenting to a mutual correspondence, but if there is 
no feature of negation in the immediate unity of self-con­
sciousness, how can the monad ever get beyond anything other 
than itself? It is certainly a pious and noble reflection,
jzhat if we could see clearly enough our minds would see a
2
nature like our own in everything. But this does not mean 
for him that everything bears the image of the heavenly, but 
that everything which is not able to bear this image is no­
thing at all. For by everything he does not understand every
chair, every crystal, but that there are personalities behind 
3
them. Whether there is a spirit hiding behind each group of 
chairs, or whtefe- whether it may have a dash of crystals into 
1
Appearance and Reality: see especially Chapter xxvi.
Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, n. 143.g - “ •
ibid; p. 222.
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the bargain, or whether finally there must be no
9  ^  \  V ^
«* AA o y ^ y o 3 , we are not told. But why should we 
be so anxious to force our own nature on everything? If this 
is the kind of heaven to which these thinkers are travelling, 
where every corner is packed with experience, we at least 
are desirous of a better country. We want more room.
It is the same tendency we find in Kant. In so far as 
organic forms have no consciousness of Freedom, they have no 
supersensible substrate but an external entelechy, and their 
purposive appearance is an accident of our thought. Con­
sequently, the sole basis for a Teleology of Nature is our 
moral consciousness, and it has no valid application except 
to persons; in a secondary way, by a kind of subreption, it 
may be applied to animal organisms in order to assist our 
Understanding. There seems to be some doubt, however, as to 
whether this is Kant's real position. We should not wish 
to raise a critical point at this late stage, but it is im­
portant as it focusses the two different methods of inter­
preting the Critique of Judgement. Frost stands for the posi­
tion we have taken, that Teleology requires the help of
• 1
Practical Reason. Stadler, on the other hand, is of opinion
that this is not necessary, the Theoretic Reason being alone
sufficient to account for Teleology. Then it follows that
Mechanism is unbroken throughout as an exhaustive method of
explanation, and Teleology is only called in as an auxilliary
principle to complete this explanation. Wundt and Basch
' 2
apparently endorse this interpretation. But, as Frost 
pointedly observes, if it were really the case that Teleology 
is only a supplementary principle to Mechanism, how could 
Kant speak of an antinomy between them? It is certainly 
true that Stadler has decided support in Kant's writings.
1
Der Begriff der Urteilskraft, bei Kant, pp. 105, 116.
'Esthetique de Kant, p. 143.
Kant's Teleologie. Kantstudien. Bd. xi.
It is very significant that in the original Introduction,
all judgments are divided into theoretical, aesthetical and 
■ 1
practical. In this passage, Teleology has no distinctive 
place at all in the system of philosophy. And near the end 
of the same essay, there is a whole page which is complete­
ly conclusive. There Kant says that what is distinctive in 
Reflexion is the aesthetical judgment alone, while Teleology
follows the lead of Reason and does not need to base itself
• 2
on any special prineiple. In view of these statements, 
which constitute a real difficulty, it will perhaps be suffi­
cient to say that at least they need not be taken as represent 
ing Kant's final view. Stadler was evidently misled by Rosen 
kranz's statement in the introduction to his edition of Kant's
works, that the writing in question first appeared in 1794,
' 13
four years after the Critique of Judgment. It has now been 
ascertained that the Ueber Philosophie uberhaupt was written 
in its original form before the Critique of Judgment appeared. 
The facts seem to be that Kant had prepared an Introduction
which he afterwards laid aside. This manuscript wasthe
/
original Introduction in an extended form. When he saw the 
need for a more succinct statement, he characteristically 
wrote out an independent essay without caring to revise or 
elaborate what he had already written. This is an accredit­
ed feature of Kant's style. In the same way, the Prolegomena 
is a second and independent treatment of portions of the 
Critique: and the Dissertation of 1770 was not revised but
embodied without change in the Transcendental Aesthetic, al­
though it maintains a radical opposition between Sense and 
Thought which was foreign to Kant's critical purpose. Mean­
while, Kant had given the original manuscript to J. S. Beck 
to use at his discretion. Beck made extracts which he pub­
lished in 1794, and these extracts make up what is known to us
1Ueber Phil, uberhaunt. Rosenkranz, p. 600.
2ibid; p. 614.
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as the Ueber Philosophie uberhauot. Now Stadler was under
the impression that the Ueber Philosoohie uberhaunt was a
• 1
recast of the official Introduction. But the fact seems
to be that the official Introduction was a recast of the
Ueber Philo sophie uberhaunt. Kuno,L___ Fischer dates the
2
original manuscript as far back as 1787, while Erdmann puts 
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it down to 1789. It is not, then, the case that this 
work, which contains the principal evidence for Stadler's 
position, gives Kant's last words on the matter. It was in 
the closing years of the eighties that Kant first tried to 
effect a connection between Taste and Teleology. The first 
work in which this connection is systematically developed 
is the Ueber Fhilosoohie foberhaupt. and he is so exclusively 
occupied with this particular problem in that work that he 
loses sight of Organic Teleology. Atany rate, he has little 
more to say about it than he had already said in the Dialectic. 
If now ea? we turn to the essay entitled 'Concerning the use 
of teleological principles in Philosophy"} which was published 
about the time the Ueber Philosophie uberhaunt was originally 
drafted (1788), we find that Organic Teleology is definitely 
based on a new principle, namely, our practical faculty of 
Reason, both pure and applied. The significance of this 
double use of Practical Reason whll be explained immediately4 
But Stadler is not to be put down so easily. He is familiar 
with every passage in which Kant connects Teleology with Practi­
cal Reason. His contention is that this new principle is not 
necessary. In so far as organisms are only considered as 
effects, Stadler is correct. The relation of the organism 
to its cause, however peculiar and enigmatic it may be, com­
pletely. falls within the systematic Teleology of the Dialectic. 
As we saw at the close of Chapter 1, we may introduce a new 
principle in the shape of a psychological idea imported from 
1
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ourselves, and think the Cause of Nature, organic and in­
organic, as artisan. But although this may be mpre pictur­
esque than the idea of Nature as a logical system, it is not 
necessary, and is only of use in helping us to complete that 
system. This is the point in Stadler's contention. With­
out receiving any hint from our moral consciousness, Theoretic 
Reason already instituted a logical Teleology of Nature, which 
is quite indifferent to the circumstance that some of Nature's 
objects are organic; for the classification or specification 
of Nature as a system of ends, according as we start from the 
particular or the universal, is not derived from the con­
stitution of objects but from the speculative interest of
• 1
Reason in the completeness of knowledge. If this were all, 
Stadler's argument would be conclusive. But we must dis­
tinguish between an organism as an effect and an organism as 
itself a cause. It is the latter of these that constitutes 
the problem of Organic Teleology. In the first chapter, we 
argued for a new principle which is distinct from the logical 
principle of systematic Teleology. But now we have to 
supplement what was there said. The only new feature in this 
principle of Technic is that is psychological. Otherwise, 
when it is left to stand by itself, it effects nothing more 
than the logical disposition of Nature. If we shall speak 
of a really new principle, something more must be said. This 
something more, which alone provides a distinctive basis for 
Organic Teleology, is to be found in the essay 'Concerning 
the use of teleological principles in Philosophy', and in the 
Critique of Judgment. I have noticed that Kant distinguishes 
the two ways in which an organism may be regarded by a very 
subtle difference. We have already observed the thorough 
distinction which he draws between technically practical,' and 
morally practical, Reason. When he is thinking of the cause 
of organisms, he appeals to our technical Reason which is a 
mixture of Understanding and Will. (Wir kennen aber der—
1
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gleichen Krafte, ihrem Bestimmungsgrunde nach. durch Erfahrung
nur in uns selbst. namlich an unserem Verstande und Willen,
als eine Ursache der Moglichkeit gewisser ganz nach Zwecken
• 1
eingerichteter Produkte, namlich der Kunstwerke.) What is
important in the application of technical Reason is not the
' 2
organism so much as the architect. But when he is thinking
of the organism as itself a cause, he seems to appeal exclusively
to our Pure Practical Reason as the means of explanation. Two
decisive passages may be noted. He says that the inner
teleology in an organism "is not analogous to any physical i.e.
natural, faculty known to us; nay even, regarding ourselves
as, in the widest sense, belonging to Nature, it is not even
thinkable or explicable by means of any exactly fitting ana-
3logy to human art". The significance of this passage is 
negative. It excludes the use of technical Reason to explain 
organisms as themselves causes. The following passage, of 
which I give a paraphrase, contains a positive statement, and 
insists on the • use of a faculty which is not natural but super-; 
sensible: 'While we can quite well see that there must be a
nexus of causes and effects, it is impossible to say a priori 
that there are ends in Nature. Therefore the use of the 
teleological principle in Nature is always empirically con­
ditioned. It would be the same with the ends of Freedom if 
our motives came to us from Nature, and were formed simply by 
comparing natural needs and inclinations with oneanother.
But this is not the case. Practical Reason has pure a priori 
principles which specify the end of Reason a -priori. This is 
the true finalism. Consequently, if the use of the teleolo­
gical principle can never sufficiently specify the ultimate 
ground of teleological connection in natural purposes, be­
cause it is limited by empirical conditions, we must expect 
1
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this complete explanation from a Pure Teleology which can
he no other than that of Freedom; whose principle contains
a -priori the relation of a Reason in general to the totality 
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of all ends'. It must, be confessed that we seem to be
making the most of a poor case. But I think everyone who
has read Kant with close attention will acknowledge that,
while he has confused these two aspects of Organic Teleology,
he intended to keep them apart. Were it not for our moral
consciousness, there would be no Organic Teleology and no
really new principle. Such ends as Nature presents to us
would remain what they are, empirical observations of which we
can make nothing, if our moral consciousness did not encourage
us to take them seriously. Our moral personality is the
only clear instance of a self-contained end, therefore of a
natural purpose, and it is from this instance in ourselves
and from it only, that we are able to thinX of other purposive
appearances as having inner teleology.
Thus the final outcome of the third Critique is
Ethical Teleology. If our moral consciousness institutes Organic
Teleology, it also determines its limits. Wherever the
Idea of Freedom fails to apply, Organic Teleology ceases to
be a certainty and becomes a subsidiary speculation. Kant's
ostensible reason for this restriction is that we have an
intuitive perception of Freedom as a fact in ourselves, which
we can therefore apply to a society of persons who are able
that
to sustain this Idea. The implication is “feta since we have
no a -priori intuition of biological unity, our judgments on 
organisms must only be analogical. But this is an unreason­
able assumption. Our discursive thought is good enough, 
provided it is a reciprocating, consciousness. As Kant 
himself acknowledges, this trumpery Idea of abstract Freedom 
1
Ueber den G-ebrauch teleologischer Princrpien in der 
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has no existence in fact. The consciousness of Freedom may 
"be an immediate certainty, but it is not therefore an un­
mediated perception. We come into the consciousness of Free­
dom through our discursive intercourse with persons in a 
society of Ends. What George Meredith says of Nature in the 
Egotist. may be said of our moral personality, that it is not 
so much a fact as the effort to master a fact, in a progress­
ive culture. Kant's mistaken assumption is the error in all 
Intellectualism, a one-sided criterion of interpretation as 
reposed in a pre-conceived unity. In every case this dog­
matism makes no serious attempt to explain the diversity.
In Plato it is non-being; in Spinoza, all determination is 
negation; in Leibniz, truths of fact are ideally truths of 
Reason, but they only become intelligible by an arbitrary 
choice of the Best as if the essences of Reason existed prior 
to the divine Mind; for Mr. Bradley it is mere appearance,
so that in its highest manifestation as personality, "he, as
1
such, must vanish"; Mr. McTaggart confesses that we must 
come to a halt somewhere in our system, and that whereas there 
is much which is far from being individual and has a non­
spiritual appearance, we must be content to leave it unex­
plained: a confession which, after so brilliant a display,
2
is almost as remarkable as Hume's. The history of philo­
sophy is a fair indication that we are on the wrong road, when 
we insist on an unconditioned unity as capable of interpreting 
the diverse forms of existence. As I remember Professor 
Stout to have said at the meeting of the Aristotelian Society 
in Birmingham 1909, we are not to seek for a unity which will 
interpret the diversity but a unity which the diversity can 
adequately interpret. That is to say, bur consciousness of 
Reality must be reciprocating, and it is because the organic 
facilitates this kind of consciousness that it is more easily
^Appearance and Reality, p. 419.
2
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within the reach of our understanding than anything else.
One recalls what St. Augustine said about plants making ad­
vances to our knowledge of them, by inviting our admiration 
kxaox. Kant thinks that it is we who project everything into 
the organism. But our thought becomes coherent precisely in 
the measure that the organism reciprocates our consciousness 
of it.
Kant, however, was aware to some extent that if the con­
ception of Nature as organic must have the sanction of our 
moral consciousness, our moral consciousness must be rein­
forced by our consciousness of Nature as organic. Apart from 
his familiar position that the validity of Ethics involves, 
as an essential hypothesis, the subordination of Nature to a 
moral purpose, he expressed himself more particularly with 
reference to the problem of Teleology in the passage we have 
just paraphrased, and which we now continue: 'Granted that
this pure Practical Teleology is destined to realise its ends 
in the world, it ought not to neglect ensuring the possibility 
of these ends as effect, and to do this both with reference 
to the final causes given in the world and also the organisa­
tion of all ends as the effect of a supreme world-cause; in 
short, it must not neglect to substantiate Organic Teleology 
andaLso Transcendental Philosophy, or the possibility of
Nature in general, in order to ensure objective reality to the
■ 1
ends of Practical Reason1. The ends of Freedom can only 
be realised if Nature will glow with some spark of fire in 
her grey ashes and discover a real kinship to our moral per­
sonality. Freedom does not neglect this opportunity. Like 
Mr. Vamp, the editor of the Legitimate Review in Peacock s 
Mel incourt, it does not scorn to raise the scare, The Church 
is in danger, the Church is in danger”, to quash all criticism
1
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of Organic Teleology. It is an open secret that the ends 
of Nature, of which we have only a dim presentiment in em­
pirical observation, hut which Freedom, in its dearest inheres 
devoutly elaborates into a system of Ethical Teleology, are 
not of Freedom's making. They are favours of Nature, and 
without this concession on the part of Nature, secret and 
enigmatic as she is, Freedom would go darkling. Moral culture 
is impossible except inja world which is itself informed with a 
moral intention. The deep without must answer to the call 
of the deep within. Already in her Beauty, Nature becomes 
responsive. But in organic forms there is a nearer approach 
to the nature of man. It is not the picture only but the 
fact of Freedom; organic Nature is the instinctive enactment 
of our ethical personality, or the realisation of moral ends 
in a natural way.
But Kant goes much farther. The moral earnestness in 
virtue of which we are able to take ourselves so seriously in 
appraising Nature as a teleological system, is only an accider.n 
of our practical faculty as the discursive method of thought 
is a defect in our intelligence, In a Being whose Understand­
ing is intuitive, the distinction between 'ought' and ^is' 
does not exist, because the possible is itself actual. From
this ±t should folio?/ that if the manifestations of purpose
organisms
in orgpndma are delusions of discursive Understanding, our
\
Practical Reason is responsible for the fictitious belief in 
moral persons, and the Idea of personality is as much an ex­
ternal entelechy as the Idea of biological unity. Perhaps
Kant hardly realised the far-reaching consequences of this
• 2
admission, which is the root of ethical scepticism. With the 
identification of %eoretic and Practical Reason, as it was 
developed by Fichte, morality ceases to be unconditioned and 
becomes phenomenal like the knowledge of sense-perception.
1 rBernard, o 76, p. 317.
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This ethical nihilism is the worst form in which the concep­
tion of an Intuitive Understanding could be presented, and is 
a very doubtful speculation. It is stated in an extreme form 
by Mr. Bradley, when he says: "most emphatically no self-
assertion nor any self-sacrifice, nor any goodness or morality,
• 1
has, as such, any reality in the Absolute". We do not say 
that it. is altogether fictitious. The motiveless morality 
which Schiller saw typified in the Greek statues, represents 
a real attitude in the life of sainthood. Holiness is more 
than virtue. It is the state of soul which knows all imagin­
able forms of evil but will not image any of them, the state 
of sublimation in which the soul maintains its calm abobe the 
earth-storm of the will. In our unsanctified morality, the 
will is only exercised in self-defence, at random ventures, 
and it is little better than an accident if we come off victori­
ous; it is a negative reaction to an external irritant rather 
than spontaneous expression.' In Holiness the will is watch­
ful and wakeful, the issue is foreclosed, the way of the battle 
determined, before the suggestions of evil arise. He is in­
deed noble who wins a victory over temptation in the fierce 
struggles of the will, but a# the best it is a grudging victory. 
Much nobler is he who, like Perseus on his winged sandals,
rises above temptation's level and engages with the dragon 
from above. How this exalted state is anything but motive­
less. It requires a far greater expenditure of effort to 
maintain this level than to keep our ground in the struggles 
of the will. For the same reason, I do not think that ob­
ligation loses its meaning even for the divine mind. The 
existence of moral evil would be a hopeless enigma unless it 
had its ultimate ground in the nature of God. As Theaetetus 
said to the Stranger, this may seem to be a "terrible ad­
mission". But if we say that obligation is confined to the 
finite mind, we are positing something which God does not 
1
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understand and therefore something by which the absolute 
nature of His being is limited. To be absolute, God must 
be finite or self-limiting as well as infinite, and in such 
a way that his finite nature shall not be regarded as evan­
escent appearance but as a permanent feature in His exist­
ence., This is the truth expressed in the Christian doctrine, 
that the Son retains his humanity in His state of exaltation. 
It would be impossible for men to sin unless the possibility 
were present to the mind of God. When we say with Plato that 
God cannot possibly do evil, we mean th&t it is His nature to 
be good, and we do not express anything different in the 
alternative statement that He is good because He wills to be 
good. But the simple statement that He is good just because 
it is His nature, altogether neglects the element of striving 
in the life of God. The goodness of God would mean nothing 
to us unless it were possible for Him to be otherwise. And 
although the nature of God is such that this contingency shall 
never happen, the necessity to be good is maintained by con­
tinuous assertion of His self-hood. There is no reason, in 
existence or out of it, why God should not let go the rudder 
of the universe, except that He has chosen not to ,do so, and 
the maintenance of His eternal choice is a state of being 
which is unthinkable, apart from the conception of something 
corresponding to moral obligation.
But there is sufficient in the distinction between the 
intuitive and moral Will as we have understood it, to destroy 
Kant's laborious edifice. At last we have forced him into
a consistent scepticism. The moral consciousness is not a
fixture any more than the discursive Understanding. The 
issue is so uncertain, the end of conduct which we confident­
ly set before us as supreme and absolute, becomes so trans­
formed into the commonplace of action, that it is possible 
to doubt our freedom and to regard all persons as complexes 
of animal functions; the moment of free choice which we
2 1 .
enjoyed before action, resolves in retrospect into a series 
of inevitable causes. So much, does the mere consciousness 
of Freedom mean for us. Freedom is not a fact sufficiently 
stable to support the idea of personality in ourselves or 
others, until it has ceased to be self-conscious. THe sanc­
tion for an Ethical Teleology does not lie in the consciousness 
of Freedom but in a habitude of Freedom, which is much more 
akin to the aesthetic than to the moral consciousness itself.
But we do not need to wait upon this habitude, for which a life­
time may not suffice, in order to believe in personality; this 
habitude of Freedom already exists in us instinctively as a 
lower immediacy, in the original disposition of our mental 
functions. Our belief in personality is due to something in 
us which is deeper than the consciousness of moral freedom, it 
is what constitutes the basis of personality itself. There is 
the further important consequence that, since we are conscious 
of this basis as natural rather than moral liberty, this funda­
mental consciousness of ourselves is also favourable to our 
belief in the existence of organic Nature, or the enactment of 
our moral freedom in a natural way. The moral consciousness 
is only an episode in the process from a lower to a higher 
immediacy, the lowest phase of which contains the consciousness 
of personality.
This problem of the relation between Aesthetic and Teleology 
brings our study to a close. There is a curious fascination 
in the way Kant brings together these different attitudes 
of consciousness. Our principal source is the original In­
troduction. In this essay, Kant defines his position in two 
completely contradictory statements. On the one hand, it is 
said that the introduction of the IJrteilskraft into the 
system of philosophy, rests wholly on its peculiar, trans­
cendental principle, that Nature specifies her causality in 
accordance with the idea of a system.1 Teleology of Nature
1Ueber Phil, uberhaupt. Rosehkranz I, pp. 612-13.
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is therefore the sole justification for Reflexion. On the 
other hand, it is argued with equal emphasis, that the 
aesthetical judgment is the only distinct and peculiar ele­
ment in Reflexion. In so far, then, as Teleology has a 
place at all in Reflexion, it is because of the aesthetic 
principle. But it is in this antinomy that the solution 
lies. These two statements are necessarily abstract and un­
true because they are independent expressions of a single 
truth. Aesthetic and Teleology are complementary attitudes 
of consciousness which stand to eachother in the relation of 
content to form. The content in Reflexion is the conscious­
ness of harmony in our mental states, the form is the princi­
ple which makes this harmony possible, pure teleology or the 
principle of adaptation in general. Thus, in a passage which 
Stadler regards as a slip of the pen, Kant is able to say, 
that the aesthetical judgment alone contains the principle of
adaptation without which Understanding could not find itself 
• 2
in Nature. Stadler very naturally considers that this is a 
confusion of aesthetical with systematic Teleology and an 
oversight on Kant's part. But I think he meant it. Cer­
tainly, the connection of the teleological principle with the 
aesthetic process was made easy for Kant by his predecessors, 
and it may quite well be nothing more than a confusion. What 
we should call beautiful Art was confused in Leibniz with 
technical skill, and this explains why a moral end or pur­
posed intention clings to Aesthetic in the subsequent philo- 
• 4
sophers. The principle of Teleology is Technic, the concep­
tion of Nature as artisan in the disposition of her laws, and 
this conception has nothing immediately to do with beautiful 
Art. It is exactly the same in sense as the re^/^Xi/lo^of
^ibid. p. 614. ^Bernard, Introd: p. 36.
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Irenaeus, and indicates the original meaning of the Greek 
word, technical or industrial Art. But the use of the same 
word, Kunst, to denote both beautiful and technical Art, made 
a confusion easy. Kant is by no means free from this am­
biguity and takes advantage of it. There is a deeper justi­
fication, however, for the connection of Aesthetic with 
Teleology, which cannot be explained away as a confusion of 
terms. The essence of the aesthetic disposition of our 
faculties consists in their formal harmony, and this means the 
harmony, not of particular representations, but of the faculties 
themselves as unspecified content in a particular representa­
tion: the harmony, therefore, of Imagination and Understanding.,
Sense and Thought, Nature and Mind. We are taking Kant*s 
aesthetic theory as it is interpreted by his higher tendency, 
the harmony of the Gemiithskrafte rather than the Erkenntni ssver- 
mogen. The ground-work in Aesthetic is an Erkenntniss uber- 
hauot. an Understanding in general, that is to say, the organis­
ed Imagination in general, and this can only mean the first 
and original application of Understanding to Nature; it there­
fore contains the original hypothesis that Nature is adapted 
to our intelligence.
Now, so far, we have heard practically nothing about 
Organic Teleology. It is, of course, included in Formal or 
Systematic Teleology, for this means that Nature specifies 
her causation into new kinds of causality,such as mechanical 
reciprocity and organic teleology, and always in keeping with 
the conception of Nature as a systematic unity. Kant, how­
ever, has taught us to believe hitherto that this disposition 
of Nature is purely logical, and therefore quite indifferent 
to the particular constitution of the objects which come under 
its notice. It arises altogether out of the logical interest 
of Reason in systematic unity, and therefore what matters is not 
what we find in Nature but what we are able to put into Nature, 
so as to satisfy our intelligence. There may be a good deal
i . 24.
j left unexplained in the nature of particular objects, but that
j is of no account so long as our interpretation, which is alto-
j gether subjective, gives a satisfactory result. It #akes no
^difference to Reason that there are organisms, whose existence
is so far individual and whose causality is so far independent,
that they cannot be exhaustively explained as subsidiary to
higher ends of Nature. It would make no difference to Reason
if angels with wings appeared on its ground; Reason would 
accommodate
soon aK&HHsdakg: them to its principle. It is when Teleology 
sets out on its own account to pick up empirical concepts, such 
as those of organic purpose, a purpose which is none of ours, 
that it is disowned by the subjective principle, and is neither 
logical nor scientific but reflective; that is to say,
Organic Teleology predicates a real quality of Nature but an 
empirical quality and therefore it never rises above empirical 
science. The logical teleology, on the other hand, which we 
attribute to Nature, does fulfil a purpose in us, the unifica­
tion of our knowledge in a system: it is a harmony of con­
cepts as Aesthetic is a haimony of unthinking representations. 
But now we wish to address a final question to Kant. Whence
did Reason obtain this logical interest in Nature? Prom u
is
itself? No indeed. It is what/Nature in the subject that 
gives rise to the logical interest of Reason. For the con­
sciousness of our subjective harmony is the felt knowledge 
of that very principle according to which Nature is specified 
in the organisation of her parts, and therefore the conscious­
ness of a harmony in ourselves is based upon the implicit 
consciousness of a real harmony in Nature. The interest of 
Reason cannot, then, be merely logical, it must be transcend­
ental. And the empirical function of Reasom in the domain 
of Organic Teleology, cannot be different in kind from its 
logical function but is a synthesis which is a further analysis. 
There is something deeper in us than the logical function of 
Reason as there is something deeper than the mere conscious­
ness of our subjective/freedom, and that is our personality,
25.
the fundamental consciousness of ourselves as natural 
liberty. We do not need any more certain a priori than this. 
If, as we saw, the aesthetic consciousnessmay be taken as the 
content in Reflexion, of which the principle of pube teleology 
is the form, Organic Teleology, or a genuine inductive syn­
thesis which reveals the true nature of the individual, will 
be a further specification of this indeterminate content, or 
the consciousness of ourselves as Nature, and not a purely 
empirical procedure.
It was surely the light of genius that led Kant, not 
simply to state the community of Aesthetic and Teleology, 
which his predecessors had rendered easy in their confusion 
of beautiful with technical Art, but to reiterate and insist 
on this relation. The real significance in his association 
of Judgment with Peeling, is that notionless experience as 
the indeterminate consciousness of a principle, conditions the 
application of this principle in the use of concepts. Pro­
bably this is the meaning of a baffling passage which it is 
almost impossible to render in coherent English. With the 
omission of certain unnecessary reiterations, what he says is 
as follows: 'Although teleology must be supplied to the judg­
ment empirically on every occasion, still the judgment on 
these particular^ organisations of Nature obtains a claim to
universality and necessity, through the relation of the sub -
principle
jective teleology of the given representation to the a priori / 
of pure teleology: and thus an aesthetical reflective judgment
can be regarded as resting on an a priori principle*. The 
concluding reference to the aesthetical judgment is quite in­
consequent and ought to stand first. What he should have
said is, that for the same reason that Aesthetic has an ori­
ginal claim to universality, Teleology deserves the same 
privilege because of the necessary relation between the con­
sciousness of a harmony in our faculties and the disposition
of the same according to a certain principle. There is 
1
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originally a subjective element in a teleological judgment,
although its predicate is found in empirical observation;
our activity fulfils a purpose in ourselves which inspires
and directs our voyage of discovery. But this subjective
harmony is itself the felt knowledge of a principle which
must be a priori. because it is the principle on which the
faculties of our mind are originally disposed to oneanother,
namely, the harmony of our consciousness of Nature with the
consciousness of ourselves. The teleology of Nature takes
an
its rise in the sense of wonder, which is /indeterminate 
psychological process without specific predicate; or, to 
put it in another way, a judgment of purpose waMas±sxs3*i#y 
is originally a purposive judgment and there­
fore has the same claim to universality as the notionless 
experience of the aesthetic consciousness. We can have 
prop proleptic ideas of Nature which are true predicates, 
because Nature is anticipated by us in the consciousness of 
our own personality. For this fundamental consciousness 
of ourselves, though notionless, is not the arbitrary source 
of spontaneous variations whose novelty surprises Omniscience 
itself, as the late Professor James believed, but the felt 
knowledge of that very principle on which Nature is discovered 
to be constituted. It is intelligence in its elemental self- 
identity, but it is intelligence. In Hegel's words, the 
nature of the universe, hidden and shut up in itself as it is 
at first, has no power which can permanently resist the 
courageous efforts of the intelligence: it must at l^ast open
itself up; it must reveal all its depths and riches to the 
spirit, and surrender them to be enjoyed by it . Teleology 
is the method of philosophy in making this unspecified content 
coherent and intelligible as it is reflected in the diversity 
of Nature, until it stands forth clear as the Absolute Idea. 
But if Teleology sets off to pick up empirical concepts on its
^"Quoted in Caird's Hegel. p. 195.
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own account, without any sanction from immediate experience, 
it need not expect to find anything more than a collocation 
of empirical elements. If we try to interpret Nature in the 
so-called disinterested attitude of the scientist, with an open 
mind, free of all prejudice and supposition, recognising only 
what our senses register, we shall certainly find that matter 
is utterly dead and moreover that life is resolved into mater­
ial processes. If we approach Nature empty-handed, we shall 
undoubtedly go empty away. To him that hath shall be given.
We are empowered, nay, necessity is laid upon us, to proceed 
in our investigation with the conviction that Nature is Spirit.
This may be an unreasoning assumption, but it is not unreason-
irresistible N ^
able; it carries conviction (to Key )
which, after the manner of Zeno, we are prepared to maintain
• 1
with clenched fist against all the world. We have the key 
to the interpretation of Nature instinctively in the con­
sciousness of our own personality; for the greater and deep­
er part of personality is not what is consciously willed
by us but what worketh in us to will and to do, that is, the 
consciousness of ourselves as natural liberty; and therefore 
the supersensible substrate in ourselves is the same as the 
supersensible substrate in Nature. In its empirical method 
of investigation, Teleology has inevitably lost much of its 
original impulse^ received in immediate experience, it has shed 
the features of its early nurture in the bosom of elemental 
mind. And this is not a loss in itself, it is altogether 
gain if it only means;that the intuition of philosophy must be 
supplemented by empirical science. To quote Hegel again, 
"Science, therefore, must work into the hands of philosophy, 
that philosophy in turn may translate the universality of 
reflection which science has produced into the higher univer­
sality of the reason, showing how the intelligible object
ei^voIves itself out of the intelligence as an organic whole,
1
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whose necessity is in itself". For/we do not bring a gift 
to Nature, we shall not receive anything from her. On the 
other hand, we do not see any advantage in decrying the 
discursive nature of our intellect as utterly misleading.
It was originally set with an edge of insight like a razor, 
and if it has become blunted in course of time, we are hard­
ly to blame. Rather this calamity is due to the praise-
substantiate
worthy effort, to what is intuitive in our
thinking by the methods of empirical investigation. If we 
are chinking to any good purpose, not a shred of our think­
ing is merely logical. It is instituted and sustained 
by a transcendental feeling, in this instance the schema of 
Nature's conformity to our intelligence. It is only when 
our thinking is disingenuous that it is merely logical, or 
when the purpose of our thinking is fictitious. To take 
an extreme instance, Hegel did not come by his great dis­
covery of the Absolute Idea by a dialectical process, al­
though he expounded it in a dialectical process, but by a 
kind of divination. Therefore even the conception of final 
causes, however remote it may be from the ultimate truth, 
need not be discarded as a false anticipation. As I re­
member having read in Dean Ramsay's Pul-pit Talk, final 
causes, like the vestal virgins, themselves barren and un­
fruitful, yet guard the sacred gire of the temple. If 
philosophy will do this alor.e, it will do perhaps all that 
is needful. Nature, in grateful recognition will yield 
up her secrets and complete our. knowledge. There is a
real danger, however, and it is here that M. Bergson's
aggressive
criticism applieSj that the intellect in its aggxxmve self- 
consciousness should force its own anticipations on Nature. 
If we are convinced that Nature is spiritual, this must 
not mean that we are prepared to find a nature like our own 
in everything, and that where we fail there is nothing to 
find. We must abase our thought to Nature's intimations
29. *
"in a wise passiveness". Our consciousness of Nature must 
be reciprocating.
In conclusion, Kant was fundamentally sound in making 
Ethical Teleology rather than Aesthetic the middle term in 
the Critical Philosophy. Only, we should not understand 
Teleology as an abstract interpretation of Nature, which 
exploits the organic as a passing show, without individual 
existence of its own, in order to satisfy our intelligence 
and so to promote the higher culture of humanity. Moral 
culture may be the highest end in Nature, but that is no 
reason why there should not be other subordinate ends which 
are equally real. As was hinted at the close of Chapter 
ii, the anomalous position of Teleology as half in and half 
out of immediate experience, constitutes the bridge be­
tween Nature and Freedom. The common interpretation of 
the Critique of Judgment, that Nature and Freedom are re­
conciled in the aesthetic consciousness, is misleading. In 
Teleology alone am do we unite the consciousness of a har­
mony in our immediate experience with the cumulative percep­
tion of a haimony in Nature herself, and so render in­
telligible the realisation of Freedom in the world. It is 
not enough for philosophy to point to Aesthetic as the re­
conciliation of Nature and Freedom. The only real proof 
philosophy can offer is to be found in the process of in­
terpreting Nature, and that is Teleology. The aesthetic 
consciousness has no other actuality than that of a symbol, 
the kihd of Freedom it embodies is the deliberate refuta­
tion of moral Freedom as it is realised in the world. While, 
therefore, the aesthetic consciousness as symbolic expression 
is a real interpretation of Life, it is essentially abstract 
when it is substituted for the life-consciousness as the 
actual realisation of Freedom in Nature, and is even found 
to be inconsistent with moral Freedom. It is a significant 
fact recorded by Schiller, that in almost all periods of
history when Art flourished, society was in a state of
political and moral decadence. In the golden age of Pericles
a
virtue was a vice on the lips of/Socrates and in the life of 
a F ho cion; the Romans were corrupted by Oriental luxury and 
their strength exhausted in the strife of civil war, before 
their inflexible character could assimilate the spirit of 
Greek Art; in modern Italy, Art did not arise until the
cities of the Lombard League had lost the spirit of independ­
ence. Everywhere Art founded its kingdom on the ruins of 
1
Freedom. It is no reproach to Art that it has nothing to 
do with morality, for it already contains morality in and 
for itself as it is passed tfcsugfe through the crucible of 
natural liberty. But it is all the more certain that Art is 
quite indifferent to the actual struggle of Freedom in the 
world, and realises the unity of Nature and Freedom by ignor­
ing the opposition between them. If it cannot be said that 
Art is immoral, then it is a-moral. So long as the artistic 
consciousness is able to take pleasure in a re­
presentation which is indifferent to morality, it is deliber­
ately abstracting from the life-consciousness and has very
little to do with morality indeed. And although the aesthete 
his indifference to the moral issue may be free from all taint o 
by reason of/impurity, it is clearly a very different case
from the experience in which the moral consciousness is not 
ignored but elevated to unthinking goodness. Such an 
aesthetic consciousness recognises no distinction between what 
is immoral and am oral^and is equally intolerant of either.
The complete reconciliation of Nature and Freedom has no 
actual existence until it is achieved through moral culture in 
the final destination of humanity, and for philosophy this 
practical determination is expressed in a teleological inter­
pretation of Nature, whose highest end is ethical. But, for 
this very reason, moral culture cannot present the Ideal, for 
the Idea of humanity is not completely realised in the in­
dividual: "we see not yet all things rjut under him".
1
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Aesthetic eflone can do this in its complete immediacy as 
symbol. As the typical expression of* our personality in its 
first entelechy, Aesthetmc prefigures the higher immediacy of 
realised capacity, when that which is in part shall be done 
away and we shall know even as we are known. For as the 
ideal expression of our mental functions in their naive 
simplicity, it integrates the divergent directions of con­
sciousness in theory and practice, and resolves the opposition 
of whole and part, thought and sense, conception and percep­
tion, possibility and actuality, creative intuition and moral 
obligation. To this complete destination we hope we are 
travelling, and meanwhile Aesthetic is its symbol like the 
rainbow in the sky.
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